F 


MORGAN 

AMERICAN 
ISTHMIAN  CANAL 


BAUCSOFT 
LlBXAinr 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

Microsoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/americanisthmianOOmorgrich 


A'f^-^/^*'*'^^'*^   yi^^-^y^i^t^ 


AN  AMERICAN  ISTHMIAN  CANAL 


THE  CHOICE  OF  KOUTES. 


SPEECH 


Wm.  JOHK  T.  MORGAN, 


OF    ALABAMA, 


SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 


April  17,  1902. 


i 


ATE  UNITED  STATES 


PART  OF  CONG.  RECORD- FREE. 


EJMERIGim  ISTHMIAN  CANAL  AND  THE 
L  CHOICE  OF  ROUTES. 


SIE^EEOia:    OIF 


Hon.  John  T.  Morgan, 


OF  ALABAMA, 


THE  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
April  17,  1902. 


•|  Ml    l-A  "f  "01  'I    I  il'RARY 


SPEECH 

OF 

HON.  JOHN  T.  MORGAN 


NICARAGUA  CANAL. 


Mr.  MORGAN.  If  there  is  no  further  business  before  the  Sen- 
ate, I  should  like  to  call  attention  to  the  notice  I  gave  yesterday 
that  I  would  request  the  indulgence  of  the  Senate  this  morning 
to  make  some  observations  on  the  subject  of  the  Nicaragua 
Canal.  I  ask  that  the  bill  be  called  up  simply  for  that  purpose. 
I  do  not  propose  to  ask  for  its  consideration  this  morning  out  of 
order. 

The  PRESIDENT  pro  tempore.     The  bill  will  be  read  by  title. 

The  Secretary.  A  bill  (H.  R.  3110)  to  provide  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  canal  connecting  the  waters  of  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  oceans. 

Mr.  MORGAN.  Mr.  President,  there  is  but  one  class  of  enter- 
prises projected  in  the  United  States  that  is  free  from  the  control 
of  private  interests  and  is  intended  only  to  promote  the  general 
welfare.  It  is  the  class  of  enterprises  that,  in  some  form,  in- 
crease and  facilitate  ocean  navigation.  Such  works  are  Goyera- 
ment  property  and  are  guarded  by  every  form  of  legal,  judicial, 
and  executive  power  against  the  intrusion  of  private  interests. 

All  rivers,  harbors,  bays,  and  canals  that  aid  the  commerce  of 
the  country  are  free  from  private  ownership  and  are  open  to  the 
use  of  the  people,  upon  equal  terms. 

This  policy  can  not  be  reversed  as  to  a  ship  canal  to  be  con- 
structed and  owned  by  the  United  States  to  connect  the  great 
oceans  without  a  breach  of  public  faith. 

Assuming  that  Congress  is  ready  to  undertake  such  a  work  in 
this  spirit  of  sincere  devotion  to  the  welfare  of  the  people  and  to 
realize  the  anxious  hopes  of  all,  except  those  who  would  profit  by 
further  delays,  I  will  address  myself  on  this  occasion  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  choice  of  routes  for  an  isthmian  canal.  It  is  a  ques- 
tion of  the  greatest  moment,  and  should  be  considered  carefully, 
dispassionately,  and  with  impartial  sincerity. 

A  mistake  made  in  the  selection  of  a  canal  route  which  will  or 
may  involve  the  failure  of  the  effort  to  construct  a  safe  canal 
will  be  fatal. 

A  route  that  is  safe  for  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  a 
ship  canal  is  the  supreme  consideration  that  should  control,  the 
selection  now  to  be  made  by  Congress.  The  interest  at  stake  and 
the  expenditures  involved  are  too  great  to  justify  the  abandonment 
of  a  safe  route  for  the  sake  of  the  possible  saving  of  money  in  a 
less  costly  route  that  is  of  doubtful  safety. 

I  wish  to  present  the  facts  that  bear  directly  upon  this  subject, 
not  in  full  detail,  but  in  just  outline,  for  the  consideration  of  the 
Senate,  and  will  make  quotations  from  the  proofs,  rather  than 
statements  of  their  substance,  in  what  I  now  have  to  say  on  this 
subject. 

6163  3 


In  bringing  the  subject  of  an  istlimian  canal  to  the  attention  of 
the  Senate  in  advance  of  the  consideration  of  the  subject  by  the 
vote  of  this  body  it  is  not  my  intention  to  discuss  the  merits  of 
the  measure  passed  by  the  House  of  Representatives  and  reported, 
without  amendment,  by  the  Committee  on  Interoceanic  Canals,  as 
a  national  or  commercial  question. 

I  will  assume  that  the  Senate,  without  material  division  of 
opinion,  is  convinced  that  a  canal  is  an  indispensable,  national 
necessity,  and  that  the  people,  with  almost  complete  accord,  are 
demanding  it  for  that  reason  and  for  the  additional  reason  that 
it  will  remove  the  obstructions  to  industry  and  commerce  that 
have  so  long  chained  the  right  arm  of  their  strength  in  almost 
helpless  paralysis. 

I  also  assume  that  the  honest  enthusiasm  that  moved  the  House 
of  Representatives  as  one  man  to  vote  a  second  time  for  the  Hep- 
burn bill  was  not  merely  the  result  of  thoughtless  rejoicing  that 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  had  been  put  aside  and  that  the  way  was 
at  last  open  to  success,  but  that  it  was  the  result  of  long  and  mature 
study  of  the  whole  situation,  and  of  a  noble  and  patriotic  impulse 
to  accomplish  a  work  that  no  other  people  could  perform,  for  the 
benefit  of  the  world.  Blind  zeal  has  never  led  in  such  toilsome 
work,  where  the  dredge,  the  pick,  and  the  shovel  are  the  instru- 
ments of  winning  national  honors,  instead  of  the  battle  ship,  the 
sword,  and  the  rifle. 

It  is  only  a  choice  of  methods  and  a  comparison  of  national  ad- 
vantages that  we  are  left  to  decide;  all  questions  of  financial 
ability,  of  private  interests  and  preferences,  of  political  bias,  and 
other  influences  and  antagonism  having  been  relegated  to  the 
rear  by  the  command  of  a  free,  honest,  and  powerful  people. 

The  honor  and  the  high  duty  of  making  this  choice  now  be- 
longs to  Congress.  In  its  performance,  on  my  part,  I  will  not 
permit  any  doubtful  fact  to  sway  my  judgment,  nor  will  I  shrink 
from  presenting  the  whole  truth,  as  I  believe  it,  under  the  pres- 
sure of  any  influence  or  the  bias  of  preconceived  opinions.  It  is 
to  reach  the  logical  results  that  should  follow  the  actual  merits 
of  the  claim  of  either  canal  route,  in  deciding  the  preference,  that 
I  will  try  to  present  an  outline  of  the  questions  that  now  require 
discussion. 

In  this  endeavor  I  will  not  attempt  to  discuss  exhaustively  any 
point  I  may  state,  but  I  will  present  some  of  the  leading  points 
which  control  my  judgment,  leaving  their  more  complete  presen- 
tation to  others  who  have  studied  them  with  gi-eater  care  and 
will  discuss  them  with  greater  ability  than  I  could  bring  to  their 
consideration. 

CERTAINTY  OV  SUCCESS  IS  THE  TRUE  FOUNDATION. 

The  subject  presents  itself  to  my  mind  with  conclusive  force  in 
the  form  stated  in  the  six  propositions  I  will  now  state: 

1.  We  have  reached  the  point  where  investigation  is  complete 
by  observation,  experience,  scientific  research  and  forecast,  and 
these  means  of  knowledge  are  as  conclusive  of  the  facts  as  we 
could  hope  to  make  them  in  another  half  century  of  delay. 

This  knowledge  of  the  controlling  facts,  as  to  the  practicability 
of  a  canal  through  the  American  Isthmus,  satisfies  the  people  of 
the  United  States  that  the  time  for  final  action  has  come. 

2.  The  question  now  to  be  decided  is  the  choice  of  either  of  two 
routes  for  a  canal;  whether  it  shall  be  located  at  Panama,  or 


fhrough  the  valley  of  the  San  Juan  River,  in  Nicaragua  and  Costa 
Rica. 

3.  The  controlling  factor  in  making  this  selection  is  the  assur- 
ance of  success  in  constructing  a  canal  that  will  be  permanently 
useful  for  commerce,  and  for  the  needs  of  the  Government  and 
its  policies,  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

4.  A  sum  of  money  necessary  for  expenditure  in  the  work  of 
constructing  such  a  canal,  to  accomplish  such  ends,  can  not  be 
reasonably  compared  with  the  real  value  of  the  results  to  the  peo- 
ple and  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  the  choice  of 
either  route,  with  safe,  intelligent,  and  sincere  regard  to  its 
pennanent  usefulness  and  advantage,  should  not  be  controlled  or 
affected  by  a  difference  in  the  present  cost  of  construction. 

An  assumed  or  supposititious  difference  in  the  cost  of  construc- 
tion of  either  canal  that  does  not  exceed  $6,000,000  is  not  a  real 
factor  in  the  choice  of  either  route,  if  the  route  that  it  is  cheap- 
est to  build  is  not  the  route  that  will  give  to  the  people  and  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  the  most  certain  assurance  of  suc- 
cess in  constructing  a  canal  that  will  be  permanent  and  the  most 
useful  for  the  industrial  and  commercial  needs  of  the  people  and 
the  most  necessary  for  the  Government  in  its  domestic  and  foreign 
relations  and  its  military  and  civil  policies. 

Yet,  I  will  discuss  the  question  of  the  estimated  cost  of  the  two 
canals,  to  remove,  if  I  can,  the  impression  that  there  is  a  real 
margin  of  expenditure  in  favor  of  the  Panama  route,  the  cost 
of  which  is  estimated  at  $184,233,358,  if  we  should  purchase  that 
canal  and  the  railroad  alongside  it,  for  $40,000,000. 

I  will  recur  to  this  matter  later  on. 

5.  The  assured  certainty  of  success  in  the  construction  of  a 
permanent  canal  is,  of  necessity,  the  basic  or  foundation  fact 
upon  which  Congress  must  act  in  the  selection  of  the  canal  route. 

Considered  as  a  simple  proposition  of  civil  engineering,  there 
is  no  doubt — not  even  a  shadow  of  doubt — as  to  any  fact  touching 
the  practicability  of  a  ship  canal  from  Grey  town  to  Brito,  in  and 
along  the  San  Juan  River  and  across  Lake  Nicaragua. 

It  Is  certain,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  its  cost  is  as 
nearly  within  the  limits  of  exact  estimates  as  any  great  public 
work  that  was  ever  undertaken. 

As  to  this  fact,  there  is  no  difference  of  opinion  among  the 
great  number  of  engineers  who  have  surveyed  the  Nicaragua 
route,  or  the  boards  and  commissions  that  have  studied  and  re- 
ported upon  it,  or  the  contractors  who  have  examined  and  counted 
its  cost  in  every  element  of  calculation  with  a  view  to  making 
contracts  for  its  construction,  or  among  the  great  engineers  sent 
out  by  European  countries  to  ascertain  the  feasibility  of  a  pro- 
posed great  highway  of  the  world. 

It  is  upon  this  ascertained  and  settled  basis  of  certainty  that  I 
rest  my  judgment.  I  have  been  compelled  to  accept  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  Nicaragua  route  is  the  true  and  safe  route  to  be 
adopted  by  Congress,  and  when  I  contrast  it  with  the  many  and 
dangerous  uncertainties  of  the  Panama  route,  my  judgment  will 
not  permit  me  to  cast  aside  this  assured  success  and  this  conclu- 
sive state  of  facts  and,  for  the  possible  saving  of  $5,630,704  in  the 
estimated  cost  of  constructing  the  canal,  to  imitate  the  dog  in  the 
fable,  in  dropping  the  bone  from  his  mouth  to  seize  its  reflected 
image  in  the  water  he  was  crossing,  ^sop's  homely  fable  illus- 
trates a  danger  that  now  threatens  this  august  Senate. 


6 

6.  If  the  dam  al  Bohio,  on  the  Panama  route,  should  fail  for 
any  cause,  the  only  hope  of  a  canal  across  that  isthmus  would 
perish,  never  to  be  restored.    All  engineers  admit  this  fact. 

The  failure  of  a  dam  at  Conchuda,  or  Boca  San  Carlos  or  at 
Ochoa,  or  at  Tambogrande,  or  at  any  other  site  on  the  San  Juan 
River,  would  only  mean  the  loss  of  that  structure,  to  be  replaced 
on  a  better  location  if  a  lake-level  canal  is  preferred. 

A  dam  at  Bohio  is  the  only  possible  location  for  such  a  structure 
across  the  Chagres  River;  while  there  are  many  sites  for  dams 
across  the  San  Juan  River  that  will  raise  the  water  to  the  level  of 
Lake  Nicaragua  and  give  126.24  miles  of  lake-level  navigation  for 
all  classes  of  vessels.  Or  if  lake-level  navigation  in  the  San  Juan 
River  should  be  found  impracticable,  the  resort  to  slack-water 
navigation,  with  low-level  dams  at  its  rapids,  would  substitute  the 
present  plan  with  one  scarcely  less  desirable. 

A  SINGLE  CHANCE  OF  SUCCESS  IS  TOO  GREAT  A  RISK. 

At  Bohio  there  is  but  a  solitary  chance  to  employ  the  Chagres 
River  for  canal  pui-poses,  and  that  is  shaken  with  many  serious 
doubts  in  the  minds  of  the  same  engineers  who  assert  that  no 
doubts  impend  over  the  San  Juan  route;  and  on  this  route  there 
is  an  assured  certainty  of  using  the  waters  of  Lake  Nicaragua  at 
many  places  for  the  construction  of  a  dam  for  a  permanent  canal 
at  the  level  of  the  lake. 

These  chances  are  at  least  ten  to  one,  and  if  the  risk  is  esti- 
mated only  at  tenfold  the  cost  of  the  dam  at  Bohio  it  would  deter 
the  boldest  gambler  in  futures  from  risking  the  possible  loss  of 
more  than  $80,000,000  when,  if  he  was  successful,  his  profits 
could  not  exceed  $6,000,000. 

But  the  loss  of  a  dam  at  Bohio  could  not  be  less  than  $144,233,- 
358  clear  loss  to  the  United  States  in  cash,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
lives  wasted  in  the  work,  the  incalculable  loss  to  our  commerce, 
and  the  national  shame  and  despair  that  our  people  would  suffer. 

We  are  asked  to  stake  too  much  upon  the  dam  at  Bohio,  while 
we  will,  in  all  likelihood,  if  we  choose  that  route,  yield  to  others, 
either  speculative  Americans  or  jealous  competitors  for  trade,  the 
opportunity  to  seize  upon  the  advantages  which  we  have  demon- 
strated to  be  certain  on  the  Nicaragua  route.  That  there  maybe 
no  rational  doubt  that  the  United  States  has  made  this  demon- 
stration, at  the  cost  of  near  $2,000,000, 1  will  present  the  following 
facts,  which  are  undisputed: 

THE  CERTAINTY  OF   SUCCESS  DEMONSTRATED   AT   NICARAGUA,  ACCORDING 
TO   THE   UNDISPUTED  FACTS. 

The  Nicaragua  Canal  Commission,  consisting  of  Rear- Admiral 
John  Q-.  Walker,  president;  Col.  Peter  C.  Hains,  Corps  of  En- 
gineers, and  Prof.  Lewis  M.  Haupt,  civil  engineer,  a  graduate  of 
West  Point,  was  appointed  in  1897.  The  Secretary  of  State  issued 
final  instructions  to  this  Commission  on  November  3, 1897,  closing 
as  follows: 

In  other  words,  3i;oiir  report  should  be  as  full  and  conclusive  upon  the 
subject  as  it  is  practicable  to  make  it,  to  the  end  that  "the  proper  route,  the 
feasibility  and  cost  of  construction  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal,"  may,  if  possible, 
be  absolutely  fixed  and  determined. 

The  Commission  and  its  assistants,  about  100  men.  entered  the 
field  of  work  at  Grey  town  December  5,  1897,  and  completed 
their  examinations  March  20  following,  a  period  of  nearly  four 
months,  leaving  parties  in  the  field  at  work  acquiring  addi- 
tional data.    Their  report  was  completed  May  9,  1899,  and  sent 


to  the  President.  They  were  commissioned  August  2,  1897,  and 
were  closely  engaged  in  this  work  until  May  9, 1899 — a  period  of 
one  year  and  nine  months.  Their  report  has  not  been  equaled  by 
any  subsequent  report  as  to  carefulness  of  statement,  the  breadth 
of  inquiry,  the  precision  of  its  measurements  and  estimates,  and 
the  clear  and  frank  conclusions  at  which  it  arrived. 

They  say  in  their  report  that  they  spent  five  days  in  Panama 
"  in  examining  the  Panama  Canal  line,  the  work  being  done,  and 
the  plans,  drawings,  and  data  in  the  office  of  the  company  at 
Panama." 

The  dimensions  of  the  canal  in  Nicaragua,  surveyed  and 
located  by  this  Commission,  are  as  follows:  In  earth,  150  feet  at 
bottom.  In  the  river,  300  feet  at  bottom.  The  canal  nowhere  to 
be  less  than  30  feet  deep.  The  entire  cost,  with  20  per  cent  added 
for  contingencies,  was  estimated  by  Commissioners  Walker  and 
Haupt  at  $118,133,790,  and  by  Commissioner  Hains  at  $134,818,308. 

In  order  to  get  this  important  report  fairly  before  the  Senate 
and  the  country,  I  present  the  following  extracts  from  the  text 
on  pages  42, 43,  under  the  head  of  "Feasibility,"  and  from  pages 
45, 46,  under  the  head  of  "  Conclusions:" 

FEASIBILITY. 

Under  this  division  of  the  subject  the  Commission  would  respectfully  sub- 
mit that  it  has  failed  to  find  any  competent  authority  that  denies  the  feasi- 
bility of  constructing  a  canal  across  Nicaragua. 

Tte  feasibility  of  the  canal  is  conceded  for  the  following  reasons: 

1.  There  are  at  this  date  sufficient  precedents  for  ship  canals  capable  of 
passing  the  largest  vessels,  so  that  any  question  of  the  navigation  of  such  a 
channel  is  eliminated. 

2.  The  ability  to  construct  and  operate  locks  of  the  requisite  dimensions  is 
sufficiently  established  by  existing  structures  on  the  Manchester  and  Keil 
canals,  at  Davis  Island  on  the  Ohio,  and  at  the  St.  Marys  Canal,  Michigan. 

3.  The  possibility  of  constructing  the  necessary  dams,  weirs,  sluices,  and 
embankments  which  shall  be  sufficiently  stable  and  impermeable  to  control 
the  water  required  for  navigation,  as  well  as  to  regulate  the  floods,  is  within 
the  resources  of  the  engineering  profession  and  is  fully  demonstrated  by 
many  hundreds  of  miles  of  embankments,  levees,  and  dams  both  at  home 
and  abroad.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  ability  to  build  them  out  of 
native  rocks  and  earth  and  to  give  them  the  required  strength  and  tightness 
to  retain  or  to  discharge  the  water  with  safety. 

4.  There  is  no  question  as  to  the  adequacy  of  the  supply  of  water  for  all 
purposes  at  all  seasons,  nor  as  to  its  control  m  times  of  floods. 

5.  Neither  is  there  any  doubt  with  reference  to  the  ability  to  secure  good 
supporting  ground  for  the  trunk  of  the  canal  nor  suitable  sites  for  locks  and 
dams. 

6.  The  harbor  question  is  only  a  matter  of  money,  and  it  is  believed  that 
good,  capacious,  and  safe  artificial  harbors  can  be  created  at  a  reasonable 
cost.  In  brief,  the  Commission  sees  uo  reason  to  doubt  the  entire  feasibility 
of  the  project,  but  it  realizes  the  necessity  of  exercising  due  care  in  the  prep- 
aration for  the  specifications  and  in  the  conduct  of  the  work,  and  that  the 
details  of  construction  be  thoroughly  inspected  and  properly  executed  under 
competent  supervision. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

The  Commission  after  mature  deliberation  has  adoi)ted  and  estimated  for 
the  route  from  Brito  to  Lake  Nicaragua,  called  the  Childs  route,  varient  No. 
1,  and  from  the  lake  to  Greytown,-that  is  called  the  Lull  route,  varient  No,  1. 
This  line  leaving  Brito  follows  the  left  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande  to  near  Buen 
Retiro,  crosses  the  western  divide  to  the  valley  of  the  Lajas,  which  it  follows 
to  Lake  Nicaragua.  Crossing  the  lake  to  the  head  of  the  San  Juan  River,  it; 
follows  the  upper  river  to  near  Boca  San  Carlos,  thence,  in  excavation,  by  the 
left  bank  of  the  river  to  the  San  Juanillo,  and  across  the  low  country  to  Grey- 
town,  passing  to  the  northward  of  Lake  Silico.  It  requires  but  a  single  dam, 
with  regulating  works  at  both  ends  of  the  summit  level. 

The  new  location  selected  for  the  dam  at  Boca  San  Carlos  eliminates  one 
of  the  most  serious  engineering  difficulties  by  avoiding  entirely  the  San 
Carlos  River,  with  its  torrential  floods  and  large  volume  of  sediment,  and  by 
locking  down  immediately  from  this  dam  the  difficulties  and  risks  of  the  high 
embankments  of  the  Menocal  lino  are  also  avoided. 

Instead  of  the  dam  at  La  Flor  a  lock  and  regulating  works  have  been 
5162 


8 

substituted  at  Bueu  Retiro,  where  the  topography  is  well  adapted  for  the 
purpose.  It  is  also  proposed  to  divide  the  surplus  waters  of  the  lake  basin 
between  the  east  and  west  sides,  thus  reducing  the  velocities  in  the  San  Juan 
and  securing  ample  waste-way  capacity  for  the  maximum  discharge  that  can 
ever  occur,  if  stored  and  distributed  over  a  short  period  of  time.  Ample 
provision  has  also  been  made  for  a  possible  fluctuation  of  the  lake  of  6  feet  or 
more  without  injury  to  property  by  fixing  the  elevation  of  the  bottom  of 
the  canal  sufficiently  low  to  cover  seasons  of  rainimum  rainfall.  The  sur- 
veys have  in  general  revealed  better  physical  conditions  than  were  hereto- 
fore supposed  to  exist,  especially  as  to  the  amount  of  rock  in  the  upper  river, 
whereby  it  is  possible  greatly  to  reduce  the  estimated  cost  of  construction. 
This  fact  will  account  largely  for  the  comparatively  moderate  amount  of 
the  estimate  when  the  enlarged  dimensions  of  the  project  are  taken  into 
consideration.  Other  reductions  are  due  to  the  improved  methods  and  ma- 
chinery available,  as  developed  on  the  Chicago  Drainage  Canal,  and  which 
can  not  be  ignored  in  discussing  a  work  of  this  magnitude. 

The  creation  of  sufficiently  capacious  interior  harbors  presents  no  unusual 
difficulties,  and  they  can  be  secured  at  a  reasonable  cost. 

The  field  work,  under  the  authority  of  this  Commission,  has  been  carefully 
and  well  done,  and  is  believed  to  be  aU  that  is  necessary  for  the  preliminary 
location  of  a  canal,  and  to  determine,  within  narrow  limits,  the  final  location 
of  dams,  locks,  and  other  constructions.  Should  a  canal  across  Nicaragua 
be  authorized  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  further  minute  and  careful  inves- 
tigations by  borings  to  determine  the  exact  location  of  locks  and  dams,  for 
wnich  the  Commission  has  neither  the  time  nor  money,  nor  would  it  have 
been  justified  in  doing  work  of  this  character  until  the  construction  of  a  canal 
was  assured.  The  computations  of  amounts  to  be  excavated  have  been  care- 
fully made  and  checked  to  guard  against  errors  and  are  believed  to  be  ac- 
curate within  narrow  limits.  All  possible  information  has  been  sought  with 
regard  to  cost  of  similar  work  in  the  United  States  and  in  Central  America, 
and  a  careful  comparison  made  of  the  probable  differences  between  Nica- 
ragua and  the  United  States. 

To  determine  the  proper  unit  prices  for  excavation  the  average  of  prices 
actually  paid  to  contractors  on  the  Chicago  drainage  canal,  which  represent 
cost  of  plant,  prices  paid  for  work  done,  and  contractors'  profits,  were  taken. 
Up  to  this  point  the  Commission  dealt  only  with  facts.  To  the  prices  paid  at 
Chicago  certain  percentages  have  been  added  for  the  difference  in  location, 
climate,  etc.  These  percentages  are,  of  course,  a  matter  of  judgment,  upon 
which  men  may  honestly  differ.  But  from  all  the  information  obtainable  by 
this  Commission  and  after  careful  consideration,  w-ith  a  desire  to  arrive  at  a 
proper  conclusion,  those  used  in  the  estimate  are  deemed  fair  and  reasonable. 

In  obtaining  the  estimate  for  cost  of  locks  the  prices  actually  paid  for 
building  the  Government  locks  at  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie  were  taken,  and  33 

Eer  cent  was  added  for  the  difference  of  location.  This  percentage  is  be- 
eved  to  be  ample,  as  a  large  part  of  the  expense  of  constructing  the  locks 
will  be  for  material,  much  of  which  can  be  furnished  in  Nicaragua  at  the 
same  or  only  a  small  advance  upon  the  prices  in  the  United  States. 

After  giving  due  weight  to  all  the  elements  of  this  important  question,  and 
with  an  earnest  desire  to  reach  logical  conclusions,  based  upon  substantial 
lap ts,  the  Commission  believes  that  a  canal  can  be  built  across  the  Isthmus 
on  this  route  for  a  sum  not  exceeding  that  stated  in  the  estimate. 

The  dimensions  of  the  canal  proposed  are  much  larger  than  any  heretofore 
considered,  and  will  be  ample  not  only  to  meet  the  present  requirements  of 
commerce,  but  also  for  many  years  to  come.  A  navigable  channel  of  smaller 
dimensions  than  those  proposed,  only  sufficient  for  present  needs,  can  be  con- 
structed for  a  lesser  sum,  if  deemed  expedient. 

The  more  reliable  character  of  the  work  done  in  Nicaragua  by 
this  Commission  than  that  done  at  Bohio,  in  Panama,  by  the  Isth- 
mian Canal  Commission,  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  diamond 
drill  was  not  used  at  Bohio,  while  it  was  used  in  all  the  borings 
made  by  the  Nicaraguan  Canal  Commission. 

ADDITIONAL  STATEMENTS  MADE  BY  THESE  COMMISSIONS  IN  1001. 

These  three  commissioners  were  also  members  of  the  subsequent 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  which  was  appointed  on  the  10th  of 
June,  1899. 

They  made  statements  before  the  Committee  on  Interoceanic 
Canals  on  the  11th  of  May,  1900,  touching  their  former  report,  in 
which  Admiral  Walker  stated,  in  response  to  questions,  as  fol- 
lows: 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  find  any  reason  to  depart  from  the  report  of  the 
foi-mer  Commission  on  the  following  subjects?    I  will  state  them  seriatim: 


9 

Under  the  head  of  "Feasibility,"  jou  say  in  the  former  report: 

"Under  this  diTision  of  the  subject  the  Commission  would  respectfully 
submit  that  it  has  failed  to  find  any  competent  authority  that  denies  the 
feasibility  of  constructing  a  canal  across  Nicaragua." 

Have  you,  since  that  time,  or  did  your  Commission  find  any  authority 
that  denied  the  feasibility  of  the  canal? 

Admiral  Walker.  As  far  as  I  know  the  opinions  of  the  members  of  this 
Commission,  they  have  no  doubt  that  it  is  feasible  to  build  a  canal  across 
Nicaragua. 

The  Chairman.  You  say: 

"1.  There  are  at  this  date  sufficient  precedents  for  ship  canals  capable  of 
passing  the  largest  vessels,  so  that  any  question  of  the  navigation  or  such  a 
channel  is  eliminated." 

Are  you  still  of  that  opinion? 

Admiral  Walker.  I  am  still  of  that  opinion. 

The  Chairman.  You  say: 

"2.  The  ability  to  construct  and  operate  locks  of  the  requisite  dimensions 
is  sufficiently  established  by  existing  structures  on  the  Manchester  and  Kiel 
canals,  at  Davis  Island,  on  the  Ohio,  and  at  the  St.  Mary  Canal,  Michigan." 

I  suppose  you  might  add  to  that  the  drainage  canal  of  Chicago? 

Admiral  Walker.  There  are  no  locks  on  the  drainage  canal. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  still  adhere  to  that  opinion? 

Admiral  Walker.  Yes,  sir;  I  amstUl  of  the  same  opinion. 

The  Chairman.  You  say: 

3.  "The  possibility  of  constructing  the  necessary  dams,  weirs,  sluices,  and 
embankments  which  shall  be  sufficiently  stable  and  impermeable  to  control 
the  water  required  for  navigation,  as  well  as  to  regulate  the  floods,  is  within 
the  resources  of  the  engineering  profession  and  is  fully  demonstrated  by 
many  hundreds  of  miles  of  embankments,  levees,  and  dams,  both  at  home 
and  abroad.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  ability  to  build  them  out  of  the 
native  rocks  and  earth  and  to  give  them  the  required  strength  and  tightness 
to  retain  or  to  discharge  the  water  with  safety." 

Do  you  stUl  adhere  to  that  opinion? 
Admiral  Walker.  Yes,  sir. 
The  Chairman.  You  say  again: 

4.  "There  is  no  question  as  to  the  adequacy  of  the  supply  of  water  for  all 
purposes  at  all  seasons,  nor  as  to  its  control  in  time  of  flood." 

Do  you  still  adhere  to  that  opinion? 

Admiral  Walker.  I  am  still  of  that  opinion. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  principal  factor  in  the  canal  business,  is  it  not? 

Admiral  Walker.  Those  are  pretty  large  factors;  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  further: 

5.  "Neither  is  there  any  doubt  with  reference  to  the  ability  to  secure  good 
supporting  ground  for  the  trunk  of  the  canal  nor  suitable  sites  for  locks  and 
dams." 

Do  you  still  adhere  to  that  view? 

Admiral  Walker.  I  think  that  they  can  be  found;  yes. 

The  Chairman.  You  say: 

6.  "  The  harbor  question  is  only  a  matter  of  money  and  it  is  believed  that 
good,  capacious,  and  safe  artificial  harbors  can  be  created  at  a  reasonable 
cost.  In  brief,  this  Commission  sees  no  reason  to  doubt  the  entire  feasibility 
of  the  project,  but  it  realizes  the  necessity  of  due  care  in  the  preparation  of 
the  specifications  and  in  the  conduct  of  the  work,  and  that  the  details  of  con- 
struction be  properly  executed  under  competent  supervision.  Do  you  adhere 
to  that?" 

Admiral  Walker.  Yes,  sir. 

On  that  examination  General  Hains  stated  as  follows: 

The  Chairman.  General  Hains,  you  were  a  member  of  the  former  Lud- 
low commission,  were  you  not? 

Colonel  Hains.  No,  sir;  of  the  Walker  Commission. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  joined  in  the  report,  making  a  qualification  of 
your  estimate  of  the  cost? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  placed  it  above  that  of  the  other  two  associate  com- 
missioners? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  went  out  and  made  an  examination  of  the  Nicai-agua 
Canal  again,  did  you,  with  the  board? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  any  change  to  make  showing  a  change  of  opin- 
ion on  your  part  as  to  the  feasibiUty  and  practicability  of  the  Nicaragua  route? 

Colonel  Hains.  No,  sir. 

Professor  Hanpt  made  the  following  statements: 

Professor  Haupt.  I  did  not  accompany  the  Commission  to  Nicaragua  ox* 
Panama. 
5162 


10 

The  Chairman.  So  that  your  personal  knowledge  on  the  subject  is  such 
as  you  derived  Then  you  went  there  with  the  former  Walker  Commission? 

Professor  Haupt.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  made  a  study  of  this  subject  since  you  were 
out  on  that  Commission— a  close  study  of  it? 

Professor  Haupt.  I  have,  sir,  as  far  as  the  data  were  available. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  looked  over  the  reports  of  the  Walker  Com- 
mission recently? 

Professor  Haupt.  No,  sir;  I  have  not  revised  them  smce  publication. 

The  Chairman.  From  what  you  have  heard  the  other  engineer  say  here 
to-day,  and  from  what  you  know  of  your  personal  examinations  of  the  Nica- 
ragua route,  have  you  changed  your  opinions  as  expressed  in  that  report? 

Professor  Haupt.  I  have  not,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  see  no  reason  for  changing  your  opinion? 

Professor  Haupt.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman,  Have  you  ever  examined  the  Panama  route? 

Professor  Haupt.  Yes,  sir.  The  Walker  Commission  went  over  the  route 
carefully  and  made  a  reconnoissance  during  the  first  Commission. 

The  Chairman.  What  length  of  time  did  you  spend  there? 

Professor  Haupt.  We  spent  there  about  a  week,  and  had  every  facility 
that  could  be  offered  us  by  the  railroad  company,  as  well  as  the  canal  com- 
panv,  for  the  purpose. 

The  Chairman,  In  what  year  was  that? 

Professor  Haupt.  That  was  in  the  year  1898,  in  the  winter. 

The  Chairman.  While  the  new  company  were  at  work? 

Professor  Haupt.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  see  forces  at  work  while  you  were  there? 

Professor  Haupt.  They  had  about  3,000  men  at  work,  it  was  claimed. 

The  Chairman,  What  part  of  the  Panama  Canal  did  you  examine  while 
you  were  out  there? 

Professor  Haupt.  The  entire  route  of  the  line  of  the  canal,  extending  from 
Panama  to  Colon. 

these  statements  again  confirmed  in  1900  AND  1901. 

On  the  30th  of  November,  1900,  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission, 
in  their  preliminary  report  to  the  President,  recommended  the 
Nicaragua  route  as  "  the  most  practicable  and  feasible  route  for  a 
canal  to  be  under  the  control,  management,  and  ownership  of  the 
United  States." 

A  year  later,  in  their  final  report  to  the  President,  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission  again  recommended  the  Nicaragua  route  as  the 
most  practicable  and  feasible. 

This  should  establish  the  leading  and  foundation  fact  on  which 
the  action  of  Congress  may  safely  rest,  that  in  Nicaragua  there  is 
a  route  that  is  assuredly  feasible  and  practicable,  and  that  if  one 
plan  of  construction  or  one  line  of  location  of  the  canal  should 
fail  another  location  will  be  readily  found  to  substitute  it,  or  other 
dams  can  be  built  to  supply  the  loss. 

In  the  loss  of  a  dam  at  Bohio  the  canal  is  lost;  but  if  the  dam 
at  Conchuda  is  lost,  the  canal  is  only  delayed. 

On  page  161  of  their  report  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission 
say  that— 

A  dam  across  the  San  Juan  River  at  Machuca  Rapids  could  be  built  more 
quickly  and  would  cost  much  less  than  at  Conchuda  or  any  Other  point  be- 
low Machuca;  but  a  canal  in  the  San  Juan  Valley,  between  Conchuda  and 
Machuca,  would  be  very  expensive  on  account  of  the  hilly  chai'acter  of  the 
country. 

These  places  are  about  10  miles  apart. 

As  to  the  one  vital  point  in  the  Panama  Canal,  the  dam  at 
Bohio,  and  as  to  the  dam  at  Conchuda,  on  the  Nicaragua  route — 
that  being  one  of  several  dam  sites  on  the  San  Juan  River  that 
are  entirely  practicable — Admiral  "Walker,  in  his  examination 
under  oath  by  the  committee,  made  the  following  statements: 

Senator  Harris,  The  fact  is  with  regard  to  the  Bohio  Dam  that  the  future 
of  that  is  just  as  much  an  unknown  quantity  as  the  future  of  the  dam  at 
Conchuda? 

Admiral  Walker.  I  should  say  it  was  more  of  an  uncertain  feature.    It  is 


11 

a  great  work  and  a  more  diflS^cult  work  to  build.  The  Conchnda  Dam  I  look 
upon  as  practically  settled. 

Senator  Harris.  So  that  we  know  no  more  about  the  possibilities  and  con- 
tingencies at  Bohio  than  we  do  at  Conchuda— in  fact,  less? 

Admiral  Walkkr.  We  know  less  about  the  contingencies  at  Bohio,  but 
that  is  the  only  point  in  the  whole  line  about  which  we  are  at  all  uncertain. 

Senator  Harris.  But  that  is  the  vital  point? 

Admiral  Walker.  That  is  the  vital  point.  Yes;  it  is  vital  to  the  canal, 
because  the  safety  of  the  canal  depends  on  the  integrity  of  the  dam  in  both 


Senator  Harris.  And  the  control  of  the  river? 
Admiral  Walker.  Yes. 

And  on  page  463  lie  stated  as  follows: 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  remember  any  point  or  fact  upon  which  you  have 
changed  your  opinion  with  regard  to  this  work  from  the  beginning— from 
the  time  you  first  went  to  look  at  it— any  point  of  fact  upon  which  you  have 
changed  your  opinion? 

Admiral  Walker.  Well,  that  would  be  pretty  hard  to  answer.  I  went 
into  the  thing  with  my  sympathies  and  prejudices,  as  far  as  I  had  any,  in 
favor  of  the  Nicaragua  line,  but  I  endeavored  to  take  hold  of  this  question 
with  a  mind  open  to  proof. 

The  Chairman.  I  have  no  doubt  that  is  so,  but  I  want  to  know  whether 
you  have  changed  your  mind  upon  any  fact. 

Admiral  Walker.  I  have  changed  it  to  this  extent,  that  I  now  think  that 
the  best  line  is  the  Panama  line,  if  that  is  a  fact.  That  is  an  opinion;  I  do 
not  think  it  a  fact. 

The  Chairman.  In  an  engineering  sense? 

Admiral  Walker.  Yes;  in  an  engineering  sense. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  you  come  to  that  conclusion  without  changing  any 
facts  in  your  former  statements? 

Admiral  Walker.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Your  judgment  is  convinced  that  you  were  in  error  in 
the  first  statement? 

Admiral  Walker.  No,  sir;  not  at  all.  I  have  not  changed  my  mind  a 
particle. 

The  statement  of  Professor  Haupt,  who  was  a  member  of  the 
Nicaragua  Canal  Commission,  and  also  of  the  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission,  on  the  point  of  the  assurance  of  success  on  the  two 
routes  is  as  follows: 

Senator  Harris.  The  entire  safety  and  elSciency  of  the  canal  in  each  case 
depends  on  the  dam  ? 

Mr.  Haupt.  Unquestionably.  There  is  no  dam  on  the  western  slope  in 
either  project,  for  the  reason  that  the  inclosing  locks  and  their  retaining 
walls  constitute  the  retaining  wall  for  the  water  on  the  west  side  of  the  sum- 
mit levels,  so  that  the  question  of  dams  there  is  not  involved. 

Senator  Hanna.  That  is  slack  water. 

Mr.  Haupt.  Yes;  for  the  summit  level. 

The  Chairman.  Now,  the  miestion  that  you  just  answered  of  Senator 
Harris's  relates  to  a  plan  in  which  one  dam  is  held  to  be  sufficient  on  the 
Nicaragua  route  and  one  dam  on  the  Panama  route,  does  it  not? 

Mr.  Haupt.  It  does;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Hanna.  Is  there  any  way  of  which  you  are  aware  by  which  more 
than  one  dam  could  be  used  or  relied  upon  in  the  Panama  route? 

Mr.  Haupt.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  With  dams  at  intervals? 

Mr.  Haupt.  No,  sir;  there  is  not. 

The  Chairman.  In  the  Childs  survey  and  in  the  Lull  survey  there  were  a 
number  of  dams  across  a  single  river,  f  believe. 

Mr.  Haupt.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  a  practical  method  of  constructing  a  canal? 

Mr.  Haupt.  Entirely  so.  That  would  reduce  the  height  of  the  dam  and 
the  pressm-e  or  head  of  water  and  increase  somewhat  the  expense  and  time 
of  operation. 

Senator  Harris.  It  would  requii'e  a  greater  number  of  locks? 
•  Mr.  Haupt.  Yes;  if  the  lift  is  reduced. 

The  Chairman.  If  I  remember  it  con*ectly,  there  was  a  dam  at  each  of  the 
rapids? 

Mr.  Haupt.  A  dam  at  Machuca  and  one  at  Castillo,  as  well  as  others. 

The  Chairman.  So  that  it  is  in  an  engineering  sense  practicable  to  build 
a  canal  on  the  San  Juan  River  with  several  dams? 

Mr.  Haupt.  It  is;  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman,  whereas  that  is  not  practicable  on  the  Panama  route? 
5162 


12 

Mr.  Haupt.  There  was  a  dam  proposed  at  Gamboa  in  an  earlier  plan,  btit 
It  was  found  to  be  impracticable  and  it  was  abandoned,  and  Bobio  is  balieved 
to  be  the  only  safe  dam  site  of  that  route. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  only  asking  your  opinion  as  an  engineer. 

Gen.  Peter  C.  Hains,  who  was  a  member  of  both  commissions, 
testifies  as  follows: 

The  Chairman.  Has  Mr.  Childs  always  been  regarded  by  engineers  as  a 
good  authoi-ity? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Have  the  accuracy  and  faithfulness  of  his  surveys  ever 
been  questioned? 

Colonel  Hains.  Wherever  we  have  had  occasion  to  go  over  the  same  ground 
that  he  went  over  we  have  found  that  his  work  was  generally  reliable. 

The  Chairman.  "Where  he  established  bench  marks,  youi*  surveys  corre- 
sponded? 

Colonel  Hains.  I  do  not  know  whether  we  found  any  of  his  bench  marks. 
I  doubt  whether  any  of  his  bench  marks  were  found  at  all.  It  is  so  long  ago 
that  I  guess  they  have  all  disappeared. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  a  practicable  canal,  that  depth  and  that  prism, 
running  in  the  manner  in  which  he  surveyed  it,  for  ships  that  would  draw 
less  than  17  feet  of  water? 

Colonel  Hains.  I  do  not  think  there  is  any  thing  impracticable  about  it. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Childs's  plan,  if  I  remember  it  correctly,  was  for  a 
dam  at  every  one  of  the  rapids  of  the  San  Juan  River. 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  He  took  them  one  after  the  other  and  built  low  dams. 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes;  put  low  dams  in. 

He  further  states: 

-The  Chairman.  The  length  of  the  canal  in  the  Lull  survey  is  181.26  miles, 
according  to  the  report.  The  prism  of  the  canal  in  the  earth,  bottom  width, 
was  from  50  to  72  feet,  according  to  conditions  and  circumstances. 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  In  the  rock  it  was  60  feet,  and  the  depth  of  the  canal  was 
26  feet.  The  locks  were  70  by  400  feet,  and  there  were  21  of  them.  I  forgot 
to  mention  that  in  the  Childs  survey  there  were  38  locks. 

Colonel  Hains.  Different  lifts. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.    Now,  Lull's  estimate  was  $65,722,147,  and  his  unit  of 

§  rices  for  work  in  rock  was  §1.25  to  $1.50;  for  earth  work  35  cents,  and  for 
redging  30  to  40  cents  per  cubic  yard;  for  embankments  10  cents,  and  for 
concrete  $8  per  cubic  yard;  for  rock  under  water  $5  per  cubic  yard.  "Would 
that  be  a  practicable  canal  at  that  depth,  and  with  that  prism,  in  those 
waters,  across  from  ocean  to  ocean? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes;  if  I  have  this  project  in  my  mind  correctly. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  now,  the  Commission  of  which  you  were  a  member, 
the  Nicaraguan  Canal  Commission— you  were  a  member  of  that? 

Colonel  MAINS.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  They  estimated  the  length  of  route  at  187.31  miles.  You 
said  that  you  had  spent  some  months  in  making  that  survey. 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  How  long? 

Colonel  Hains.  You  mean  this  last  one? 

The  Chairman.  No,  sir;  I  mean  the  one  that  you  and  Mr.  Haupt  and  Ad- 
miral Walker  were  on. 

Colonel  Hains.  I  spent  about  three  months  down  there. 

The  Chairman.  About  how  many  engineers  did  you  have  under  your 
employment? 

Colonel  Hains.  I  should  say  from  30  to  50;  I  don't  remember. 

The  Chairman.  Skilled  engineers? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  About  how  many  employees  were  there  of  all  kinds,  in- 
cluding the  engineers. 

Colonel  Hains.  I  do  not  remember.  I  suppose  a  couple  of  hundred— two 
or  three  hundred. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  you  made  a  very  careful  survey,  did  you  not? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  One  that  you  are  willing  to  stand  on  and  make  recom- 
mendations on  for  spending  money  by  the  Government? 

Colonel  Hains.  "Yes. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  made  a  survey  on  a  line  of  187.31  miles,  and  then 
you  had  a  bottom  in  earth  of  150  feet  and  you  had  a  bottom  in  rock  of  150  feet 
and  you  had  a  depth  of  30  feet.  Your  locks  were  80  feet  by  620  feet.  Those 
locks  would  accommodate  90  per  cent  of  the  ships  in  the  world  now? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes. 


13 

The  Chairman.  Maybe  more.    Then  you  had  10  locks,  5  on  a  side? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  The  time  of  passage  you  did  not  give,  but  you  had  an  esti- 
mated cost  of  $118,113,790? 

Colonel  Hains.  No;  I  did  not. 

The  Chairman.  I  mean  the  Commission  did— the  majority? 

Colonel  Hains.  The  majority  of  the  Commission  did;  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  dissented? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  put  your  price  at  what? 

Colonel^HAiNS.  About  $ia5,000,(XX). 

The  Chairman.  So  that  the  difference  between  you  was  between  $118,- 
000,000  and  $135,000,000  for  that  construction? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Now,  the  unit  prices  that  you  adopted  were  as  follows: 
In  rock,  $1.03  to  $1.30  per  cubic  yard;  in  earth,  44  cents  per  cubic  yard;  in 
dredging,  30  to  30  cents  per  cubic  yard,  and  the  embankment  you  did  not 
make  any  provision  for.  You  did  not  make  any  estimate.  For  concrete, 
$7.23,  and  for  rock  under  water,  $5  a  cubic  yard.  Now,  was  that  a  good  canal? 
Where  did  you  have  your  dam? 

Colonel  Hains.  Was  it  a  good  canal? 

The  Chairman.  Yes;  was  that  a  safe,  reliable  canal? 

Colonel  Hains.  I  think  that  it  was  a  practicable  canal. 

The  Chairman.  And  one  that  the  Government  could  afford  safely  and 
reliably  to  build,  and  depend  upon  it  to  spend  its  money? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  And  one  that  would  stay  there  after  you  put  it  there? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Where  did  you  have  your  dam? 

Colonel  Hains.  At  Boca  San  Carlos. 

The  Chai  km  an.  How  high  was  it? 

Colonel  Hains.  I  think  it  was  about  113  to  120  feet  in  the  deepest  par^ 
something  like  that. 

Senator  Harris.  I  have  one  more  general  question  that  I  wish  to  ask  you. 
Is  there  any  engineering  work  on  the  Nicaragua  line  that  is  not  easily  within 
the  limits  of  present  engineering  experience  and  knowledge? 

Colonel  Hains.  On  the  Nicaragua? 

Senator  Harris.  Yes. 

Colonel  Hains.  I  think  not. 

Senator  Harris.  There  is  no  work  there,  either  in  the  way  of  dams  or 
locks  or  cuts,  that  involves  any  new  and  untried  problems? 

Colonel  Hains.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Kittredge.  Is  there  on  the  Panama? 

Colonel  Hains.  I  do  not  think  there  is  in  Panama,  unless  it  is  this  dam. 

Senator  Harris.  Well,  I  thought  we  had  discussed  that,  and  I  will  put  the 
additional  question  and  refer  to  what  Mr.  Morison  says.  Mr.  Morison  thought 
it  involved^ 'new  and  untried  problems,"  the  construction  at  this  dam. 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes. 

Senator  Harris.  And  you  agree  with  that? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes;  I  agree  with  that. 

Senator  Hanna.  Would  you  consider  these  untried  problems  as  problems 
that  could  not  be  overcome  in  engineering? 

Colonel  Hains.  No,  sir. 

Senator  Harris.  Is  there  anything  now  among  engineers  that  is  not  re- 
garded as  possible,  given  money  enough  and  time  enough? 

Colonel  Hains.  Very  little. 

Senator  Hanna.  Do  you  believe  generally  that  the  Bohio  Dam,  as  recom- 
mended by  the  Commission,  can  be  constructed  for  the  amount  of  expendi- 
ture estimated? 

Colonel  Hains.  Yes;  I  think  it  can. 

Senator  Hanna.  Your  part  of  the  work  on  this  Commission  was  confined 
to  Nicaragua— that  is,  you  were  on  the  committee  tiiat  examined  Nicaragua 
more  specially? 

Col.  Oswald  H.  Ernst  states  as  follows: 

The  Chairman.  Now,  there  have  been  many  lines  run  through  Nicaragua 
along  that  lino,  commencing  with  the  line  van  by  Childs.  That  was  a  piece 
of  engineering  I  have  heard  very  highly  applauded  by  engineers  as  being 

Colonel  Ern.st.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  And  Childs's  survey  has  been  taken  as  the  basis  of  all  the 
subsequent  surveys,  so  far  as  his  route  corresponded  with  others? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Childs  put  in  a  canal  there  with  17  feet  depth  of  water,a 
harbor  at  Brito  at  the  mouth  of  the  little  river  there. 

Colonel  Ernst.  The  Rio  Grande. 
510  J 


14 

The  Chairman.  No,  this  way,  at  the  lake— Las  Lajas— and  then  at  Grey- 
town,  but  the  bay  was  there  at  Greytown  when  he  made  his  survey  at  deep 
water,  and  his  survey  included  a  slackwater  navigation  of  the  San  Juan  River, 
with  dams  at  all  the  rapids— three  or  four  dams— and  he  took  his  canal 
out  in  the  vicinity  of  the  mouth  of  the  San  Carlos,  somewhere,  and  carried  it 
through  that  level  country  down  to  Greytown.  That  was  a  safe  canal,  was 
it  not  V 

Colonel  Ernst.  "Well,  I  do  not  know  about  below  the  San  Carlos.  I  think 
he  would  have  had  trouble  below  the  San  Carlos. 

The  Chairman.  He  did  not  have  slack-water  navigation  below  San  Car- 
los, as  I  remember  it. 

Colonel  Ernst.  My  recollection  of  it  is  that  he  had,  but  I  may  be  mistaken. 

The  Chairman.  But  it  was  considered  that  that  Would  have  been  a  safe 
canal,  if  constructed,  for  ships  drawing,  say,  1.5  or  16  feat  of  water? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Oh,  I  think  so.  I  think  that  Childs  would  probably  have 
changed  his  lines  a  little  below  the  San  Carlos,  but,  while  I  think  so,  I  repeat 
that  I  think  it  was  an  admirable  plan. 

*  *  *  *  #  *  * 

The  Chairman.  And  then  after  Childs  came  Lull,  and  Mr.  Menocal  was 
his  chief  engineer,  and  they  followed  Childs's  line,  and  adopted  the  slack- 
water  system  in  that  survey  down  to  a  point  near  the  mouth  of  the  San  Carlos 
River,  if  I  remember  correctly,  and  then  took  the  line  through  that  low 

ground  around  to  Greytown,  where  there  was  still  a  good  harbor,  or  a  fair 
arbor.  That  canal  was  24  or  27  feet  deep.  I  have  the  data  somewhere  here, 
but  I  have  not  got  it  so  that  I  can  refer  to  it  just  now.  That  would  have  been 
a  safe  canal,  would  it  not? 

Colonel  Ernst.  I  think  so. 

The  Chairman.  Slack-water  navigation.  And  it  would  have  been  a  very 
useful  canal  to  the  commerce  of  the  world,  would  it  not? 

Colonel  Ernst.  I  should  think  it  might. 

The  Chairman.  With  ships  of  the  size  then  in  vogue. 

Colonel  Ernst.  If  they  had  got  it  done  before  the  ships  increased  too  far. 
The  trouble  with  all  of  our  great  enterprises  is  that  before  they  are  finished 
they  are  outgrown. 

THE  certainty  OP    SUCCESS  CONriRMED    BY  ALL,  THE    COMMISSIONERS  AS 
TO  EIVE  SEPARATE  PLANS  SURVEYED  AND  LOCATED. 

We  have  surveyed,  plotted,  located  down  to  the  working  point 
five  or  six  canals  through  Nicaragua,  at  a  cost  to  us  of  more  than 
$3,000,000,  and  we  have  demonstrated  to  the  world  that  a  canal  can 
be  built  there  for  $68,000,000,  and  I  shall  be  greatly  disappointed, 
if  we  should  take  the  Panama  Canal,  if  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica 
are  not  able  to  find  friends  enough  to  build  that  canal  and  plank 
us  out  of  600  miles  of  length  of  line  and  take  away  from  us  our 
coastwise  trade.  I  should  dislike  very  much  to  risk  as  against  my 
Government  the  energy  and  enterprise  and  sagacity  of  men  who 
built  railroads  across  this  continent,  when  they  undertook,  if  they 
should  undertake  to  do  it,  to  have  a  canal  also  to  work  in  combi- 
nation with  them,  and  I  should  doubt  very  much  the  enterprise 
of  these  Frenchmen,  if  we  should  pay  them  $40,000,000,  and  they 
should  undertake  to  build  one  of  these  canals,  even  that  located 
by  Childs,  by  Lull,  or  by  Menocal. 

No  member  of  either  of  the  three  commissions  expressed  a 
doubt  or  apprehension  as  to  the  certainty  of  the  successful  com- 
pletion of  a  canal  on  the  Nicaraguan  route  on  either  of  five  plans 
that  have  been  adopted,  surveyed,  and  located  by  the  greatest 
engineers  in  America;  from  the  slack- water  plan  of  Childs,  for  a 
canal  17  feet  deep',  to  the  mammoth  plan  of  the  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission,  with  a  single  dam  at  Conchuda  to  raise  the  San 
Juan  River  to  the  lake  level,  and  to  give  unbroken  summit-level 
navigation  from  Lock  No.  4,  which  is  46  miles  from  the  6-fathom 
curve  in  the  Caribbean  Sea,  to  Lock  No.  5,  a  length  of  129.24 
miles,  in  which  there  is  only  one  curve  with  a  radius  of  4.045 
feet,  the  other  26  curves  being  greater  in  radius,  ranging  from 
4.297  to  17.189. 
6102 


15 

And  no  other  engineer  has  seriously  questioned  the  fact  that 
within  the  limits  of  a  reasonable  cost  a  perfectly  feasible  and  per- 
manent canal  can  be  constructed  on  the  Nicaragua  route. 

MR.  COOLEY'S  OPINION  AND  ITS  VALUE. 

On  the  contrary,  such  an  engineer  as  Lyman  E.  Cooley,  who 
located  and  built  the  great  Chicago  drainage  canal  and  many 
other  public  works,  who  examined  both  these  routes  in  1897-98, 
in  company  with  other  engineers  and  contractors,  with  the  pur- 
pose of  contracting  to  build  the  Nicaragua  Canal,  states  as  follows 
in  respect  of  the  certainty  of  success  in  constructing  a  canal  on 
the  Nicaragua  route.  After  discussing  questions  of  doubt  as  to 
the  Panama  route,  as  to  which  he  had  fewer  engineering  objec- 
tions than  some  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  commissioners,  he  says: 

The  Chairman.  Now,  how  many  of  these  doubts  and  difficulties,  if  any, 
exist  on  the  Nicai*agua  route? 

Mr.  CooiiEY.  Why,  there  is  nothing  about  the  matter  as  I  have  outlined  it 
about  which  I  have  any  doubts.  A  man  in  the  face  of  a  new  problem  feels,  I 
imagine,  as  a  general  feels  in  the  face  of  a  battle;  he  does  not  like  it,  but  he 
is  up  against  it  and  he  has  got  to  fight  it  out.  So,  in  regard  to  my  mental  at- 
titude on  the  Nicai'agua  route,  I  have  not  nearly  as  many  doubts  about  the 
building  of  a  canal  at  Nicaragua  as  I  had  about  the  Chicago  canal  before  we 
had  actually  let  the  contracts. 

No  statements  of  reports  made  in  respect  to  this  subject  are  of 
greater  value  than  those  made  by  this  great  engineer  and  canal 
constructor  in  his  deposition. 

He  took  what  some  designate  as  '•  a  business  view  "  of  the  sub- 
ject, having  great  practical  experience  and  great  ability  as  an 
engineer  and  canal  constructor,  and  no  sentimental  or  official 
prepossessions  to  warp  his  judgment  or  to  color  his  opinions. 

MR.  MENOCAL'S  OPINION  AND  ITS  VALUE. 

Mr.  Menocal,  as  the  chief  engineer  of  the  Lull  survey,  made  the 
first  survey  of  a  canal  line  at  Panama  in  1875,  and  pointed  out, 
measured,  and  located  the  line  for  a  lock  canal  that  was  adopted 
by  the  Panama  company  and  is  now  adopted  by  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission,  including  the  dams  at  Alhajuela  and  Bohio. 
The  canal  he  projected  was  24  feet  deep  and  from  60  to  73  feet 
wide  at  bottom,  with  23  locks.  The  summit  level  was  134  feet 
above  sea  level  and  it  was  30  miles  long.  He  had  previously,  in 
1873,  surveyed  the  Lull  canal  line  through  Nicaragua,  as  chief 
engineer  of  that  expedition.  The  dimensions  of  the  canals  in  the 
two  surveys  were  only  slightly  different,  so  that  he  had  the  earli- 
est opportunity  to  compare  them. 

In  1879  he  was  appointed  a  delegate  to  an  international  canal 
congress  at  Paris,  by  the  President,  in  company  with  Admiral 
Daniel  Ammen.  At  that  meeting  they  pointed  out  the  impossi- 
bility of  maintaining  a  sea-level  canal  at  Panama,  and  the  ad- 
vantages of  the  route  through  Nicaragua  for  a  canal  with  locks. 

In  1873,  after  the  Lull  survey  of  a  canal  at  Panama,  DeLesseps 
endeavored  to  obtain  a  concession  for  a  canal  from  Nicaragua, 
which  was  refused.  He  then  turned  his  attention  to  a  sea-level 
canal  at  Panama.  The  warnings  of  Ammen  and  Menocal  as  to 
a  sea-level  canal  at  Panama  were  disregarded  by  the  congress  at 
Paris  in  May,  1879,  and  their  verification  has  proven  to  be  one  of 
the  severest  financial  blows  a  country  ever  received.  In  March, 
1880,  while  De  Lesseps  was  visiting  the  United  States  and  was 
preparing  his  campaign  of  promotion  for  the  sea-level  canal,  and 
organizing  the  "American  committee,"  into  whose  hands  were 

5162 


16 

paid  12,000,000  francs,  he  stated,  before  a  committee  of  the  House 
of  Representatiyes,  as  follows: 

There  were  fourteen  projects  of  canals  presented  at  the  Paris  congress, 
but  the  interest  has  centered  entirely  in  the  Nicaragua  and  Panama  routes. 
As  to  the  Nicaragua  Canal,  Mr.  Menocal  gave  explanations  of  it  to  the  com- 
mittee as  he  had  given  to  the  Paris  congress.  One  of  the  objections  to  that 
route  was  that  it  would  be  necessary  first  to  construct  a  harbor  at  Brito,  and 
another  objection  to  it  was  that  it  was  impossible  by  that  route  to  make  a  sea- 
level  canal.  If  it  were  determined  to  build  a  lock  canal,  and  if  there  could 
not  be  a  canal  between  the  two  oceans  except  a  lock  canal,  then  there  was  no 
doubt  that  the  Nicaragua  route  was  the  best  route. 

Menocal  personally  suryeyed  both  routes  more  than  twenty 
years  ago,  and  has  since  made  two  additional  surveys  of  the  Nica- 
ragua route,  one  for  the  United  States  and  the  other  for  the  Mari- 
time Canal  Company,  besides  his  survey  of  the  San  Juan  River 
and  Grey  town  Harbor  for  the  Government  of  Nicaragua. 

No  living  man  more  thoroughly  understands  every  engineering 
fact  as  to  the  Nicaragua  route  than  he  does.  And  few  better  un- 
derstand the  Panama  route,  on  which  he  spent  more  than  three 
months  at  work  in  the  field,  against  two  weeks  of  observation  by 
the  engineers  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission.  Professor 
Haupt,  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission;  Mr.  Harvey,  who 
planned  and  constructed  the  first  locks  at  the  Soo  St.  Mary's  Ca- 
nal, and  made  a  close  study  of  these  routes;  Lyman  E.  Cooley, 
who  has  studied  both  routes,  on  the  ground,  by  careful  inspection 
and  careful  examination,  both  as  an  engineering  and  as  a  ''  busi- 
ness proposition;"  Mr.  E.  D.  North,  of  New  York,  an  eminent 
engineer;  Mr.  Trundle,  who  located  the  canal  lines  for  the  Nica- 
ragua Canal  Commission  and  for  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission, 
and  Gen.  E.  P.  Alexander,  the  engineer  who  located  the  eastern 
boundary  between  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica,  all  these  and  many 
more  great  engineers  sustain  Mr.  Menocal's  statement  that  there 
is  no  uncertainty  as  to  the  construction  of  a  canal  on  the  Nicara- 
guan  route. 

Mr.  Menocal  made  the  following  statements  in  his  deposition: 

The  Chairman.  Now,  you  seem  to  be  personally  familiar  with  the  ground 
of  Panama,  and  also  personally  familiar  with  the  ground  of  Nicaragua.  You 
have  stated  how  many  surveys  you  have  made  there? 

Mr.  Menocal.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  And  how  much  attention  you  have  given  to  the  subject. 
Because  of  the  surveys  you  have  made  at  Nicaragua,  have  you  discovered 
any  point  in  your  surveys  which  makes  it  doubtful  as  to  the  practicability 
of  a  canal  there? 

Mr.  Menocal.  I  have  not. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  feel  certain,  as  an  engineer,  that  a  canal  is  prac- 
ticable? 

Mr.  Menocal.  I  do. 

The  Chairman.  On  the  Nicaragua  River? 

Mr.  Menocal.  I  do. 

The  Chairman.  Leaving  the  question  of  the  selection  of  the  lines  aside 
entirely? 

Mr.  Menocal.  Yes;  I  do  \inder  those  conditions. 

The  Chairman.  I  ask  you,  from  the  survey  that  you  first  made  down  to 
the  last  survey  that  has  been  made  there  and  reported,  including  the  one  you 
made  across  the  divide,  a  short  line,  have  you  any  reason  as  an  engineer  to 
believe  that  either  of  those  surveys  is  impracticable? 

Mr.  Menocal.  I  have  not. 

Senator  Harris.  In  addition  to  the  fact  of  your  personal  knowledge,  you 
are  also  familiar  with  the  surveys  and  opinions  that  nave  been  made  by  otner 
engineers  in  regard  to  it? 

Mr,  Menocal.  Yes. 

Senator  Harris.  Have  you  ever  heard  of  any  engineer  condemning  the 
Nicaragua  route  as  impracticable? 

Mr.  Menocal.  I  have  not. 

Senator  Harris.  My  impression  has  been  that  it  never  has  been  pronounced 
anything  but  feasible. 


17 

Mr.  Menocal.  I  never  heard  an  engineer  condemn  it  as  impracticable. 
'  There  have  been  several  routes 

Senator  Harris.  Oh,  there  are  variations,  of  course. 

Mr.  Menocal.  Yes,  variation;  but  every  one  of  them  is  practicable. 

Senator  Harris.  While  we  are  on  the  Nicai-agua  line  I  would  like  to  ask 
another  question  concerning  that  line.  All  of  these  various  plans  that  have 
been  proposed  by  yourself  and  all  engineers  contemplate  the  use  of  the  up- 
per part  of  the  San  Juan  River,  practicable  for  slack- water  navigation? 

Ml*.  Menocal.  Yes. 

Senator  Harris.  Do  yoii  not  regard  the  curvature  of  that  upper  water  of 
the  San  Juan  under  any  of  the  plans  that  you  have  examined— that  of  the 
Commission  most  particularly— as  impracticable  or  unsafe  in  any  way? 

Mr.  Menocai..  Oh,  not  at  all.  There  is  nothing  impracticable  in  them. 
They  are  perfectly  feasible. 

Senator  Harris.  And  that  it  is  available  for  navigation  at  night  with  the 
ordinary  electric  light? 

Mr.  Menocal.  Just  as  well  as  in  the  daytime;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Harris.  So  that  in  the  thirty-three  hours  described  by  the  Com- 
mission as  the  time  of  passage  will  mean  thirty-three  continuous  hours,  and 
not  portions  of  three  days  as  suggested? 

Mr.  Menocal.  There  is  no  reason  why  it  should  not  be  so.  It  has  always 
been  contemplated  by  me  that  the  canal  would  be  navigated  day  and  night. 

Senator  Harris.  The  same  as  the  Suez  Canal  is? 

Mr.  Menocal.  Precisely,  just  the  same;  better  than  the  Suez  Canal.    The 

Suez  Canal  goes  through  shallow  lakes  also.    They  have  had  to  excavate 

canals  through  these  lakes,  and  they  navigate  the  Suez  Canal  day  and  night. 

Senator  Harris.  The  channel  can  be  so  marked  that  there  is  no  difficulty 

in  navigating  it  at  night? 

Mr.  Menocal.  No,  sir;  especially  in  a  country  where  you  have  no  fogs. 

Senator  Harris.  They  have  no  fogs? 

Mr.  Menocal.  No,  sir;  always  a  clear  atmosphere,  day  and  night. 

Senator  Harris.  Reverting  to  the  question  Vv-e  touched  this  morning  a  lit- 
tle, do  you  think  that  the  minimum  or  the  greatest  curvature  which  is  indi- 
cated by  the  Commission  is  such  as  to  permit  vessels  to  move  around  fi'eely 
without  the  use  of  tugs  to  assist  them? 

Mr.  Menocal.  I  do. 

Senator  Harris.  And  under  their  own  steam? 

Mr.  Menocal.  Yes. 

Senator  Harris.  And  how  is  it  with  sailing  vessels  through  the  upper 
part? 

Mr.  Menocal.  They  will  have  to  be  towed,  except  across  the  lake,  where 
they  can  use  sails  as  there  is  always  a  breeze  on  the  lake. 

Senator  Harris.  Of  course,  in  the  canal  in  every  case? 

Mr.  Menocal.  That  will  be  the  same  in  every  canal. 

The  Chairman.  Now,  I  want  to  ask,  with  your  knowledge  of  hydraulic 
engineering,  which  is  great,  with  regard  to  the  double  flight  of  locks,  which 
is  recommended  at  Bohio,  with  a  maximum  lift  of  45  feet  each;  how  does  that 
compare  with  any  other  lock  that  you  have  knowledge  of? 

Mr.  Menocal.  That  is  a  larger  lift  than  that  of  any  lock  that  has  yet  been 
built. 

The  Chairman.  There  has  been  no  lock  built  with  a  lift  of  45  feet? 

Mr.  Menocal.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Is  not  the  situation  complicated  by  having  a  double  flight; 
that  is,  two  locks  immediately  after  one  another? 

Mr.  Menocal.  Yes;  I  think  the  mechanical  difficulties  of  building  a  lock  of 
a  45-foot  lift  will  be.  overcome,  but  when  you  come  to  put  the  two  locks  to- 
gether the  difficulties  are  increased. 

The  Chairman.  That  of  course  aggravates  the  situation? 

Mr.  Menocal.  Yes;  very  much. 

preference  for  the  PANAMA  ROUTE  IS  NOT  BASED  ON  ANY  DOUBT  AS 
TO  THE  NICARAGUA  ROUTE. 

If  the  preference  given  to  the  Panama  route  in  the  supplement- 
ary report  of  the  Istlimian  Canal  Commission  was  based  upon  any 
physical  or  engineering  fact,  or  conjecture,  or  belief,  or  opinion 
that  the  Nicaragua  route  is  not  feasible  or  practicable,  or  that  it 
is  not  safe,  useful,  or  profitable  to  the  people  or  Government, 
of  the  United  States,  the  weight  of  evidence  against  such  a  con- 
clusion is  overwhelming.  But  such  is  not  the  case  as  to  any 
feature  of  the  subject.  The  only  ground  stated  for  such  a  prefer- 
ence is  the  alleged  excess  of  cost  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal,  and  the 
cost  of  maintenance  over  the  cost  of  completing  and  maintain- 

5162 2 


18 

ing  the  Panama  Canal  and  its  purchase  at  $40,000,000,  which  sup- 
posed gain  in  such  a  transaction  is  estimated  at  $5,630,704. 

This  sum  of  money,  not  so  great  by  one-half  as  we  have  ex- 
pended on  expositions  in  the  last  twenty-five  years  and  less  than 
one-fifth  of  the  sum  we  have  expended  for  Cuban  independence 
and  one-thirtieth  part  of  what  we  have  contributed  for  trans- 
continental railroads,  is  the  bonus  we  are  to  receive  for  yielding 
forever  the  right  already  secured,  if  we  choose  to  accept  it,  to 
construct  a  canal  through  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica,  which  we 
have  surveyed  at  a  cost  of  at  least  $2,000,000. 

WB  CAN  NOT  AFFOBD  TO  SUBRENDEB  THE  NICABAGUA  BOUTE. 

This  is  a  canal  that  we  have  demonstrated  to  be  practicable, 
feasible,  permanent,  safe,  useful,  and  necessary  to  the  people  and 
Government  of  the  United  States. 

It  is  a  canal  route  that  will  pass  into  other  hands  and  will  be 
constructed,  beyond  our  power  to  prevent  it,  unless  by  the  em- 
plojrment  of  force  and  the  disgrace  of  our  country.  It  will  be  a 
canal  which,  in  the  control  of  any  other  power,  can  be  used 
against  us  as  a  heavy  handicap  on  our  coastwise  trade,  or  as  a 
sword  thrust  between  our  coast  line  and  the  right  arm  of  our 
naval  power  engaged  in  protecting  the  Panama  Canal,  500  miles 
distant.  It  need  not  be  deeper  than  30  feet  or  wider  than  70  feet 
to  accommodate  steamers  and  sailing  ships  that  will  take  from 
us  the  short  line  between  the  oceans. 

There  ought  to  be  reasons  that  are  imperative  to  cause  us  to 
surrender  such  a  canal  for  a  possible  saving  of  $5,630,704,  but 
there  are  none  that  are  either  imperative  or  valuable,  or  that  are 
inviting  or  well  founded.  On  the  contrary,  there  are  facts,  stub- 
bom  and  inevitable,  that  block  the  way  to  the  acquisition  and 
use  of  the  Panama  Canal  and  railroad  by  the  United  States,  not 
one  of  which  can  be  removed  by  the  expenditure  of  $5,630,704. 

The  feasibility,  practicability,  usefulness,  permanence,  and 
commercial  value  of  the  Panama  Canal  to  the  United  States,  are 
all  clouded  with  many  doubts,  either  one  of  which  detracts  more 
than  that  sum  from  its  value,  if  there  was  no  other  possible  route 
with  which  it  could  be  compared. 

THE   DOUBTS  AS   TO   THE   PANAMA  BOUTE   MUST  BE   AS   COSTLY  AS   20   PEB 
CENT  OP  THE  ESTIMATES  BEQUIRED  TO  CONSTRUCT  IT. 

Engineers,  when  they  have  measured  and  completed  the  work 
on  the  canal,  including  every  item  of  cost  within  the  20  per  cent 
allowance  on  unit  prices,  and  for  all  other  contingencies,  and  have 
examined  their  work  and  called  it  good,  as  to  the  Nicaragua  route, 
can  not  reasonably  ask  Congress  to  estimate  the  doubts  they  can  not 
clear  up,  in  advance  of  actual  construction  of  the  canal  at  Panama, 
at  a  rate  of  less  than  20  per  cent  of  the  whole  cost  of  that  canal. 
The  uncertainty  of  success,  in  that  case,  is  quite  as  great  a  percent- 
age of  risk  as  the  contingencies  of  the  cost  of  constniction  at 
Nicaragua. 

On  an  expenditure  of  $184,233,358,  all  of  which  may  be  lost,  the 
contingency  for  doubts,  an  unknown  quantity,  at  20  per  cent,  is 
$36,846,671,  or,  if  only  $40,000,000  is  at  risk,  the  20  per  cent  con- 
tingency for  doubts  is  $8,000,000,  which  sweeps  off  the  proposed 
gain  of  $5,630,704. 

The  existence  of  these  doubts  as  to  the  Panama  Canal  is  a  sub- 
stantial fact,  a  fact  that  can  not  be  escaped,  and  the  character  of 
the  doubts  is  such  that  they  can  only  be  resolved  by  actual  ex- 

5162 


19 

perience  in  building,  controlling,  and  maintaining  the  canal,  and 
not  by  opinion  in  advance  of  construction,  no  matter  what  the 
weight  of  that  opinion  may  be. 

WHAT  ARK  THESE  DOUBTS? 

Some  of  the  gravest  of  these  doubts,  as  to  engineering  results, 
are  admitted  to  be  beyond  the  limit  of  all  engineering  experience. 
They  are  the  conjectured  opinions  of  enthusiastic  engineers,  and 
are  not  facts  ascertained  and  demonstrated  by  actual  engineering 
experience.  The  engineers  on  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission 
all  admit  that  these  doubts  exist,  and  that  they  relate  to  unknown 
facts  and  untried  experiments  that  are  of  vital  importance.  As, 
for  instance,  is  pneumatic  work  indispensable  at  Bohio  Dam? 

This  is  scarcely  a  doubt,  yet  some  of  the  engineers  assert  the 
opinion  that  it  is  not  indispensable.  If  it  is  indispensable,  can  it 
be  successfully  done  at  Bohio  dam? 

All  the  engineers  of  the  Commission  are  of  the  opinion  that  it 
can  be  done,  while  all  admit  that  it  can  not  be  done  without 
serious  peril  to  human  life,  and  all  admit  that  it  has  never  been 
accomplished  under  water  at  a  depth  of  127  feet.  It  is  a  forlorn 
hope  of  engineering  audacity,  and  is  most  likely  to  find  its  Water- 
loo at  Bohio. 

Can  these  conditions  be  relieved  by  pumping?  Pumping  is,  of 
old,  the  dernier  resort  of  the  Panamists.  The  comite  d'estudes 
of  the  old  company  solemnly  recommended  pumping  to  supply 
the  canal  with  water,  and  now  an  engineer  commissioner  recom- 
mends it  to  keep  the  water  down  to  a  level  that  will  permit  men 
at  work  to  live  under  its  pressure.  Even  freezing  the  Chagres 
waters  around  the  caissons  is  coolly  hinted  at  by  some  as  the 
means  of  dredging  under  water  at  a  depth  of  127  feet. 

Some  of  them  say  it  can  be  relieved  by  pumping,  and  others  are 
in  doubt. 

All  the  engineers,  outside  the  Commission,  refuse  to  accept  the 
rock-bottom  plan  for  a  dam  at  Bohio,  except  General  Abbott,  and, 
while  he  is  kindly  disposed  toward  a  rock  dam  if  it  can  be  built 
without  too  great  cost,  he  prefers  the  clay  dam  of  the  comite 
technique,  which  they  adopted  because  they  doubted  the  practica- 
bility of  reaching  a  rock  foundation  for  the  dam  at  Bohio. 

The  Culebra  cut  is  a  question  of  doubt,  with  its  landslides,  and 
creeping  clays,  and  its  indurated  clay,  that  melts  in  water. 

It  is  left  expressly  in  doubt  whether  a  dam  at  Alhajuela  is 
necessary  to  control  the  floods  in  the  Chagres  River,  and  to  sup- 
ply the  canal  with  water  impounded  there  in  reserve  for  the  dry 
season;  but  all  the  engineers  think  it  would  be,  at  least,  a  good 
reliance  in  very  dry  weather. 

Whether  the  Chagres  River  will  repeat  the  floods  of  1879  and 
remove,  as  it  did  then,  the  girders  of  the  great  steel  bridge  on  the 
piers  at  Baracoa  and  flood  the  railroad  track  and  the  great 
swamps  to  the  depth  of  10  or  15  feet,  and  whether  in  such  an 
event  it  can  be  shut  out  from  the  canal  are  matters  of  doubt. 
Whether  any  dam  can  stand  such  torrential  floods  and  escape  the 
fate  of  Johnstown  and  Austin  are  questions  that  only  the  Chagres 
River  will  settle  in  the  course  of  time. 

A  safe  harbor  at  Colon  and  the  safe  passage  of  ships  through  a 
submerged  channel  3i  miles  long  at  Panama  when  the  wind  rises 
and  the  tide  is  at  the  ebb  are  matters  of  doubt.  They  are  matters 
in  which  doubts  are  apt  to  be  resolved  by  destruction,  as  they  have 
often  been  resolved  at  Colon.    The  abandoned  anchors  in  the 


bay  of  Colon,  left  there  by  vessels  that  could  not  wait  long  enough 
to  get  them  aboai'd  when  northers  drove  heavy  seas  into  the  shal- 
low bay,  are  mute  witnesses  to  the  reasons  for  such  doubts. 

All  these  doubts  and  many  others  that  relate  to  the  cost  of 
maintenance  and  the  time  of  transit  of  ships  from  our  Atlantic 
to  our  Pacific  ports  are  resolved  by  the  opinion  of  a  greater  num- 
hev  of  engineers,  of  at  least  equally  high  authority,  against  the 
Panama  route. 

These  doubts  can  neither  be  removed  nor  compensated  for  by 
any  sum  of  money  saved  in  the  estimates  for  a  canal.  Especially 
is  the  sum  of  $5,680,704  insignificant  when  compared  with  these 
uncertainties. 

The  United  States  can  not  afford  to  take  such  risks  in  such  se- 
rious matters  for  a  supposititious  gain  of  so  small  a  sum. 

Our  people  do  not  price  their  lives,  or  the  prosperity  of  the 
85,000,000  now  concerned,  or  the  hundreds  of  millions  who  will 
succeed  them,  at  $5,630,704,  saved  in  a  bargain  that  creates  doubts 
as  to  the  national  integrity  in  the  minds  of  the  people  of  all  na- 
tions, especially  the  people  of  France. 

A  DOUBT  AS  TO  HEALTH  THAT  RBSOLVES  ALL  OTHER  DOUBTS  AGAINST  THE 
PANAMA  ROUTE. 

The  health  of  the  Panama  route  can  not  be  safely  classed  with 
the  matters  of  doubt.  It  is  a  fixed  condition  that  is  in  constant 
warfare  with  human  life.  It  depends  upon  natural  conditions  that 
are  beyond  remedy,  and  as  a  fatal  impediment  to  a  successful 
gateway  for  the  world  it  is  beyond  doubt. 

THE  DOUBT  IS  NOT  AS  TO  ITS   PRESENCE  AT   PANAMA,  BUT  AS  TO  THE 
CHANCES  OF  ESCAPING  IT. 

The  constant  presence  of  yellow  fever  and  Chagres  fever  is  not 
alone  due  to  the  filthy  condition  of  the  cities  of  Panama  and 
Colon  or  to  the  unclean  habits  of  the  people,  nor  is  it  due  to 
mosquitoes.  These  are  aggravations  of  fatal  fevers,  that  make 
them  epidemic,  but  the  seat,  the  habitat,  the  permanent  home  of 
yellow  fever  and  dengue,  or  "Chagres  fever,"  is  in  the  city  ot 
Panama  and  the  adjacent  coasts. 

From  that  center  they  spread  through  a  fostering  atmosphere 
and  are  transmitted  by  the  constant  and  close  association  of  a 
large  number  of  people  at  work  in  a  narrow  space  of  country 
along  the  railroad'and  the  canal  diggings  or  traveling  through 
it.  Spreading  from  the  principal  breeding  ground  at  Panama, 
these  fevers  permeate  the  atmosphere  of  the  canal  belt  and  spread 
through  the  hot  depression  leading  to  Colon,  poisoning  the  people 
along  the  entire  route,  and  from  these  seaports  they  move  out  on 
the  ships  and  attack  all  other  ports.  The  yellow  fever  at  Panama 
is  hostie  humani  generis,  and  all  the  world  can  not  conquer  it. 

The  reasons  are  obvious.  They  are,  certainly,  three  in  number: 
First.  The  tide  of  20  feet  that  rushes  into  the  bay  twice  in  twenty- 
four  hours,  bearing  the  refuse  of  the  sea  and  decaying  animal 
matter  and  leaving  it  to  rot  on  the  hot  beach  when  it  recedes. 
Second.  The  exposure  of  thousands  of  acres  of  mud  flats  to  the 
sun  when  the  tide  goes  out,  to  give  off  their  pernicious  exhalations. 
Third.  The  absence  of  winds  to  scatter  or  take  the  poisonous  ex- 
halations away  from  the  beach  and  the  Bay  of  Panama.    . 

THE  CAUSES  ARE  NATURAL  AND  PERMANENT. 

When  these  natural  causes  are  removed,  Panama  can  be  made 
comparatively  as  immune  from  yellow  fever  as  Habana  and  San- 
tiago de  Cuba  appear  to  be.    But  they  are  immovable. 

61fJ2 


^1 

The  tides  at  the  coasts  of  Cuba  rise  to  the  height  of  about  20  to 
86  inches,  and  leave  very  small  margins  of  sea  bottom  when  they 
ebb;  while  those  at  Panama  rise  18  to  21  feet,  and  when  they  go 
out  they  leave  a  naked  and  vast  inclined  plane  of  many  square 
miles,  covered  with  mud  and  ooze  and  sea  slime,  in  which  shtjll- 
fish  and  sea  animals  abound,  to  die  and  decay  under  a  hot  sun. 
The  average  width  of  this  expo'sed  area,  around  the  Bay  and  Gulf 
of  Panama,  is  not  less  than  two  miles,  and  when  the  tide  recedes 
it  is  uncovered  and  so  remains  for  twelve  hours  at  least.  At  night 
the  cooler  temperature  condenses  the  poisoned  air,  and  it  infects 
all  the  coasts  of  that  bay. 

These  facts  have  always  been  regarded  as  being  so  important 
to  the  world  that  they  have  become  a  part  of  the  history  of  the 
bay  and  city  of  Panama. 

A  LUGUBRIOUS  HISTORY  FROM  AN  OFFICIAL  SOURCE. 

The  final  report  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  of  Novem- 
ber 30,  1901,  treats  of  the  health  of  the  Panama  route  in  the  fol- 
lowing strong,  graphic,  and  just  terms.  They  say,  in  their  final 
report,  page  70: 

The  climate  of  tho  isthmian  canal  regions  is  generally  damp  and  ener- 
vating. The  temperature  is  not  extreme,  rarely  i-aising  as  high  as  95°  or 
falling  below  70°,  but  the  excessive  humidity  greatly  restricts  the  capacity  for 
physical  exertion.  The  lowlands  along  the  coast  have  long  been  known  as 
insalubrious,  and  the  seaports  are  subject  to  fevers.  Perhaps  the  great  diffi- 
culty to  b3  encountered  in  the  construction  of  the  canal  will  ba  the  procure- 
ment of  an  adequate  force  of  laborers,  and  the  preservation  of  their  health 
and  efficiency. 

In  this  rofcpect  the  Panama  route  has  a  lugubrious  history,  from  which  the 
Nicaragua  route  is  free.  The  notorious  mortality  which  attended  the  con- 
struction of  the  Panama  Railroad  and  later  the  operations  of  the  Panama 
Canal  Company  has  taught  a  lesson  which  will  not  soon  be  forgotten  for  that 
route.  Among  the  white  employees  of  this  Commission  sent  to  Nicaragua 
there  were  fewer  cases  of  sickness  than  there  would  probably  have  been 
among  the  same  number  of  men  employed  in  some  parts  of  the  United  States. 
Among  those  sent  to  Panama  the  proportion  of  sick  was  greater.  On  the 
Nicaragua  line  during  tho  operations  of  the  Maritime  Canal  Company  the 
health  of  the  force  was  reported  to  be  good. 

This  matter  is  so  vital  to  the  commercial  world,  to  our  coast- 
wise line  of  traffic,  to  all  travelers  by  way  of  the  canal,  and  to  the 
health  of  our  seaports,  that  even  this  strong  statement  of  the 
Commission  is  not  a  full  and  sufficient  warning  of  the  danger. 

A  MORE  ANCIENT   HISTORY,  NOT  LESS  TRUE. 

Capt.  Bedford  Pirn,  of  the  British  navy,  was  sent  along  the 
Caribbean  coast  in  1861  to  1865  to  ascertain  its  fitness  for  canal 
transit.  Speaking  of  the  country  traversed  by  the  line  of  rail- 
road then  in  operation,  he  says: 

The  nature  of  the  country  through  which  the  line  of  the  road  had  to  be 
carried  was  calculatod  to  strike  the  hardiest  speculator  with  dismay. 

The  first  13  miles  from  the  Atlantic  led  through  deep  swamps  covered  with 
jungle,  full  of  reptiles  and  venomous  insects.  In  all  muddy  places  down  to 
the  verge  of  the  ocean  are  impenetrable  thickets  formed  of  mangroves, 
which  exhale  putrid  miasma.  Farther  on  the  line  runs  through  a  rugged 
country,  over  rapid  rivers  and  all  sorts  of  impediments,  and  after  passing 
the  summit,  descends  rapidly  to  the  Pacific. 

The  cUmate  was  also  sultry  beyond  almost  any  other  part  of  the  world,  while, 
during  the  wet  season  the  rains  descended  in  a  perfect  deluge.  Moreover,  to 
crown  all,  the  resources  of  the  country  were  found  to  bo  nil,  or  nearly  so, 
and  consequently  everything,  especially  labor,  had  to  be  imported. 

In  1825  Robert  B.  Pitman  published  in  London  "A  succinct 
view  and  analysis  of  authentic  information  extant  in  original 
works  on  the  practicability  of  joining  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
oceans  by  a  ship  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  America." 
SIGH 


In  his  book  lie  makes  extensive  quotations  from  the  books  of 
travel  written  by  men  of  high  reputation  as  geographers  and 
scientists. 

On  page  175,  Pitman,  a  British  historian  and  geographer,  gives 
the  following  quotation  from  Dampier: 

I  have  said  before  that  the  bays  have  a  greater  quantity  of  rain  than  the 
headlands.  The  Bay  of  Panama  will  furnish  us  with  a  proof  of  this  by  its 
immoderate  rains,  especially  the  south  side  of  it,  even  from  the  Gulf  of  St. 
Michael  to  Cape  St.  Francis;  the  rains  there  are  from  April  to  November, 
but  in  June,  July,  and  August  they  are  most  violent. 

The  same  author,  after  giving  a  description  of  a  distemper 
which  proved  fatal  to  above  thirty  of  his  crew,  and  which  he  at- 
tributes to  bad  water,  adds: 

I  have  observed  that  in  hot  countries  land  floods,  which  pour  into  the  chan- 
nels of  rivers  about  the  season  of  the  rains,  are  very  unwholesome,  for 
when  I  lived  in  the  Bay  of  Campeachy  the  fish  were  found  dead  in  heaps  on 
the  shores  of  the  rivers  and  creeks  at  such  a  season  and  many  we  took  up 
half  dead,  of  which  sudden  mortality  there  appeared  no  cause,  but  only  the 
malignity  of  the  waters  draining  ofE  the  land  through  thick  woods  and  savan- 
nas of  low  grass  and  swampy  grounds,  with  which  some  hot  countries 
abound. 

On  page  179,  Pitman  quotes  from  Wafer  as  follows: 
Wafer  nearly  agrees  in  this  general  description  of  the  site  of  Panama. 
He  says:  "  Between  the  River  of  Cheapo  and  Panama  the  land  is  low,  even 
land;  most  of  it  is  dry  and  covered  here  and  there  with  short  bushes.  The 
town  is  surrounded  with  savannas,  gentle  flat  hills,  and  courses  of  wood; " 
but,  he  adds,  "  the  place  is  very  sickly,  though  it  lies  in  a  country  good 
enough;  yet  it  is  healthy  in  comparison  with  Portobello."  Of  the  last-men- 
tioned place,  De  Ulloa  observes:  "The heat  is  excessive,  originated  by  the 
situation  of  the  town,  which  is  surrounded  with  high  mountains,  without 
any  interval  for  the  winds." 

Pitman  adds: 

Walton  has  urged  the  unhealthiness  of  the  damp  and  heated  climate  of 
this  IsthniTis  as  one  of  the  greatest  obstacles  to  the  opening  of  a  canal  across 
it,  and  has  stated  that  the  climate  of  Cruces  is  infinitely  more  healthy  than 
that  of  Panama.  He  says:  "Disease  is  a  barrier  against  settling  on  the  Isth- 
mus to  improve  it,  and  that  persons  who  have  withstood  every  other  climate, 
there  become  languid;  and  although  the  negroes  appear  fat  and  hearty,  and 
are  possessed  of  personal  strength  to  bear  the  heaviest  burdens,  yet  want 
alone  impels  them  to  work. 

BARON  HUMBOLDT. 

Pitman  adds,  on  page  180,  the  following  extracts  from  Baron 
Humboldt's  writings  in  1803.    He  says: 

M.  de  Humboldt  has  the  following  passage  on  this  division  of  the  subject: 
"  For  fifty  years  back,  the  vomito  (black  vomit  of  the  yellow  fever)  has  never 
appeared  on  any  point  of  the  coast  of  the  South  Sea,  with  the  excej^tion  of 
the  town  of  Panama.  It  is  situated  on  an  arid  tongue  of  land  destitute  of 
vegetation;  but  the  tide,  when  it  falls,  leaves  exposed  for  a  great  way  into 
the  bay,  a  large  extent  of  ground,  covered  with  fucus  ulvoe  et  meducoe;  the 
air  is  infected  by  the  decomposition  of  so  many  organic  substances;  and  mi- 
asmata, of  very  little  influence  on  the  organs  of  the  natives,  have  a  powerful 
effect  on  the  individuals  born  in  the  cold  regions  of  Europe  or  in  those  of 
the  two  Americas. 

"The  causes  of  the  insalubrity  of  the  air  are  very  different  on  the  two 
coasts  of  the  Isthmus.  At  Panama,  where  the  vomito  is  endemical  and  where 
the  tides  are  very  strong,  the  shore  is  considered  as  the  origin  of  the  infec- 
tion. At  Portobello,  where  remittent  biliouB  fevers  prevail  and  where  the 
tides  are  scarcely  sensible,  the  putrid  emanations  spring  from  the  very 
strength  of  the  vegetation.  A  few  years  ago  the  forests  which  cover  the  in- 
terior of  the  Isthmus  extended  to  the  very  gates  of  the  town;  the  salubrity  of 
the  air  has  considerably  increased  since  the  governor  gave  orders  for  clear- 
ing away  the  wood  in  the  neighborhood.  Of  all  places  where  the  manchineel 
and  the  mangle  vegetate  with  vigor,  the  most  unhealthy  are  where  the  roots 
of  those  trees  are  not  constantly  covered  with  water." 

THE  MODERN  HISTORY  OF  YELLOW  FEVER  AT  PANAMA. 

This  is  enough  as  to  the  history  of  Panama  one  hundred  years 
ftgo,  but  it  is  far  worse  half  a  century  later. 


23 

The  yellow  fever  still  dominates  its  ancient  realm  and  will  do 
so  until  the  three  miles  of  sloping  bottom  out  from  the  beach  in 
the  bay  of  Panama  is  dug  out,  and  until  the  tides  cease  to  wash 
the  dead  matter  of  that  great  gulf  ashore,  and  until  the  winds, 
with  a  steady  offshore  current,  shall  visit  a  coast  along  which  for 
periods  of  many  months  at  a  time  in  every  year  they  have  pes*- 
sistently  refused  to  blow. 

In  the  forty  years  from  1850  to  1890,  when  the  Isthmus  drew 
into  its  narrow  confines  many  thousands  of  people  to  work  on  the 
railroad  and  canal;  the  toilers,  under  the  infatuation  of  high 
prices  for  labor;  the  contractors,  seeking  great  profits  at  the  ex- 
pense of  human  life;  the  speculators  and  robbers,  seeking  prey, 
and  the  officers  grasping  for  high  salaries,  crowded  into  the  canal 
belt,  and  the  yellow  plague  and  beri  beri  and  Chagres  fever  rioted 
in  human  destruction. 

Such  a  history  was  never  made  elsewhere  by  the  ravages  of  dis- 
ease. It  can  be  repeated  and  will  be  while  the  natural  and  irre- 
mediable conditions  continue  to  exist  in  the  bay  of  Panama,  when 
the  fevers  are  fed  with  people  who  are  from  temperate  zones  and 
are  unacclimated. 

ACTUAL  AND  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE. 

Dr.  John  F.  Bransford,  a  retired  surgeon  of  the  Navy,  was  sur- 
geon to  the  Lull  survey  in  Panama  in  December,  1875,  and  in 
Nicaragua  in  1872-73,  and  was  detailed  on  duty  with  the  Smith- 
sonian Institution  in  1876-77,  and  at  other  times  has  made  careful 
and  extensive  examinations  of  a  scientific  character  in  Nicaragua, 
Costa  Rica,  and  Panama,  including  climatic  and  sanitary  condi- 
tions, for  which  he  is  highly  qualified. 

In  his  deposition  he  states  one  cause  for  the  permanent  continu- 
ance of  the  yellow  fever  at  Panama,  and  also  for  the  fact  that  it 
has  never  appeared  in  Nicaragua  along  the  proposed  route  of  the 
canal,  as  follows: 

Dr.  Bransford.  I  am  quite  sure  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  is  not  a  healthy 
country.  That  is  the  story  of  it,  I  think,  always,  everywhere.  Up  in  the 
mountains  of  the  interior  it  is  all  right:  but  along  the  Chagres  River,  and 
particularly  along  that  Rio  Grande  which  comes  down  near  the  line  of  the 
canal  from  the  divide  down  to  Panama,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  mangrove 
swamp,  and  there  is  where  we  had  our  bad  fever,  where  Mr.  Tausig  had  his 
bad  fever.  That  I  consider  a  very  unhealthy  section.  The  trade  wind  does 
not  blow  home  in  the  same  way  that  it  does  in  Nicaragua.  The  line  of  the 
Isthmus  there  is  nearly  east  and  west.  Aspinwall  is  really  west  of  Panama, 
and  the  trade  winds  are  interfered  with  and  deflected  by  the  mountains  east 
of  Panama  and  the  northern  part  of  the  State  of  Colombia,  making  a  stag- 
nation in  the  bay  of  Panama. 

Senator  H anna.  You  spoke  about  yellow  fever  being  prevalent  at  Panama. 
It  has  also  been  prevalent  in  Habana  and  Santiago  de  Cuba,  has  it  not? 

Dr.  Bransford.  Yes. 

Senator  Hanna.  Very  severely? 

Dr.  Bransford.  Yes.  If  you  will  allow  me,  Senator,  I  may  have  used  the 
word  "prevalent,"  but  what  I  meant  was  that  cases  were  liable  to  occur  at 
any  time. 

Senator  Hanna,  At  any  time  of  the  year.  I  understood  that.  Well,  after 
exercising  proper  sanitary  methods  in  Habana  and  in  other  ulaces  in  Cuba 
that  trouble  has  been  obviated  very  largely,  has  it  not?  Yellow  fever  has 
been  reduced? 

Dr.  Bransford.  Yes. 

Senator  Hanna.  The  same  thing  applied  in  Panama  would  produce  like 
results,  would  it  not? 

Dr.  Bransford.  Well,  it  ought,  as  far  as  the  yellow  fever  goes.  I  do  not 
think  anything  will  free  the  country  of  Panama  fever. 

The  Chairman.  Who  was  the  chief  engineer  of  Lull's  expedition? 

Dr.  Bransford.  Mr.  Menocal,  and  there  was  an  engineer  by  the  name  of 
Crowell  from  Philadelphia,  who  was  there  also  as  an  assistant. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  go  ashore  and  remain  ashore  with  the  engineer- 
ing party? 
5162 


24' 

Dr.  Bransford.  Yes;  I  was  tlie  medical  officer  of  the  surveying  party. 

The  Chairman.  That  was  the  occasion  when  Lull  made  the  survey  of 
Tboth  routes,  was  it  not,  through  Panama  and  also  through  Nicaragua? 

Di*.  Bransford.  I  also  went  on  another  survey  in  1875,  with  Captain  Lull, 
when  he  surveyed  the  Panama  route. 

The  Chairman.  That  was  a  separate  survey? 

Dr.  Bransford.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  He  made  the  Nicaragua  survey  first? 

Dr.  Bransford.  The  Nicaragua  survey  first. 

The  Chairman.  And  then  went  to  Panama? 

Dr.  Bransford.  Two  years  afterwards  he  went  down  and  made  the  Pan- 
ama survey. 

The  Chairman.  Was  he  under  the  orders  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  in  making  those  surveys? 

Dr.  Bransford.  Yes;  I  was  an  assistant  surgeon,  and  went  as  medical 
officer  of  both  those  surveys. 

The  Chairman.  I  will  ask  you  to  take  up  the  Nicaragua  line  first;  and  I 
want  to  ask  you  in  regard  to  tne  health  of  the  country,  the  health  of  your 
party,  and  such  facts  as  will  give  the  committee  a  fair  and  just  idea  of  what 
was  the  condition  of  the  health  of  Nicaragioa  as  affected  by  the  climate  or  by 
any  other  consideration  that  you  studied. 

Dr.  Bransford.  I  had  only  two  serious  cases  of  illness  among  those  men 
during  that  survey. 

Senator  Kittredge.  How  large  a  party  was  it? 

Dr.  Bransford.  Forty-five,  first  and  last,  but  it  averaged  36.  There  were 
only  two  serious  cases  of  illness  on  that  expedition.  One  was  a  lieutenant- 
commander,  who  had  a  sunstroke,  and  another  was  an  old  case  of  dysentery, 
which  had  existed  before  the  man  went  there.  We  had  a  good  many  cases 
of  malarial  fever,  none  of  a  very  serious  character,  except  that  they  would 
recur.  That  is,  a  man  would  have  a  slight  attack  of  chill  and  fever,  and  after 
he  got  well  it  would  come  back  on  him. 

Senator  Hawley.  Did  the  complaints  there  take  the  form  of  diarrhea 
at  all? 

Dr.  Bransford.  We  were  very  free  from  any  bowel  trouble  at  all,  sir, 
very.  The  bulk  of  my  practice  was  with  light  cases  of  malarial  fever.  We 
were  there  from  the  ^th  of  December  until  the  6th  of  July,  and,  as  I  said  be- 
fore, there  were  only  two  serious  cases.  Of  course,  there  was  malarial  fever 
in  the  swamps,  particularly  there  in  the  neighborhood  of  Greytown;  but  I 
think  that  the  country  generally  is  about  as  healthy  as  any  tropical  country 
that  I  have  known. 

The  Chairman.  In  your  practice  there  as  surgeon  of  that  party  did  you 
keep  up  with  the  body  of  the  engineers  who  were  surveying— the  workmen? 

Dr.  Bransford.  I  lived  in  one  camp  or  another.  They  were  divided  into 
several  parties,  and  I  would  go  from  one  party  to  another,  according  to  the 
necessities  of  my  profession .  Sometimes  I  would  be  with  one  party  and  some- 
times with  the  otner,  but  I  was  in  the  field  all  the  time  with  one  or  the  other 
of  the  parties. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  make  any  observations  of  climatic  conditions, 
as  to  winds  and  other  things? 

Dr.  Bransford.  The  prevailing  wind  there  is  the  trade  wind.  It  is  right 
m  the  trade- wind  belt,  and  that  is  the  prevailing  wind  pretty  much  the  year 
round.  It  was  much  stronger  in  the  dry  season  than  in  the  wet  season,  but 
it  blows  home.  I  think  the  Ranger,  a  few  years  afterwards,  on  the  west  coast, 
found  that  the  wind  was  to  the  east,  northeast,  or  southeast  for  two  hundred 
and  eighty-three  days  during  the  year  that  she  was  there.  That  is  the  usual 
and  prevailing  wind.  Occasionally  in  the  wet  season  the  wind  hauled  around 
to  the  southwest,  and  then  heavy  rains  came. 

The  Chairman.  Does  that  wind  continue  through  the  entire  opening 
there  up  the  San  Juan  River  and  the  lakes  and  across  to  Brito? 

Dr.  Bransford,  All  the  way  across  the  Pacific.  It  blows  down  in  very 
heavy  gusts  on  the  Pacific  side,  which  they  call  papagoyos,  down  the  gulches 
at  San  Juan  del  Sur  and  Brito.  The  winds  are  often  very  strong,  and  the 
wind  reaches  all  the  way  across. 

The  divide  in  Nicaragua  runs  about  northwest  and  southeast,  right  across 
the  ti*ack  of  the  trade  winds.  The  trade  wind  usually  is  east-northeast,  and 
the  line  of  that  canal  from  Greytown  to  Brito  is  very  nearly  east  and  west, 
a  little  bit  northwest  from  Greytown,  but  so  nearly  east  and  west  that  the 
wind  draws  right  through  that  gap,  and,  in  my  opinion,  is  the  most  impor- 
tant factor  in  the  health  conditions  along  that  route. 

Senator  Hanna.  At  about  what  rate  does  the  trade  wind  blow  there;  how 
many  miles  per  hour? 

Dr.  Bransford.  I  do  not  know,  sir;  I  could  not  say;  but  it  usually  com- 
mences up  to  the  northeast  and  blows  very  strong  for  two  or  three  days, 
Bometimes  four  or  five  days,  and  then  moves  down  toward  the  east  and  dies 
out  a  little  and  then  shifts  back  again.  I  know  that  when  I  was  there  in 
1876  and  1877—1  was  also  in  Nicaragua  on  duty  connected  with  the  Smith- 


25 

sonian  Institution— very  often  the  winds  blew  so  strong,  when  I  was  on  the 
west  side  of  the  lake,  that  I  would  not  be  able  to  go  to  Ometepec  Island,  where 
I  was  at  work,  for  two  or  three  days  at  a  time  sometimes. 

The  Chairman.  What  did  you  say  you  were  doing  on  these  last  two  occa- 
sions? 

Dr.  Bransfohd.  I  went  down  at  the  request  of  the  Smithsonian  Institu- 
tion on  special  duty,  alone,  on  exploring  duty  for  the  Smithsonian  Institution. 

If  Congress  chooses  to  reinstate  the  horrors  of  Panama,  the 
motive  or  the  consideration  should  be  something  greater  than 
the  possible  saving  of  $5,630,704  in  the  construction  of  a  canal. 

PRACTICALi  EXPERIENCE. 

The  true  history  of  the  death  rate  at  Panama  was  never  writ- 
ten. It  has  been  suppressed,  At  this  date  we  can  find  but  few 
men  who  knew  and  participated  in  that  holocaust  among  the  la- 
borers who  were  stricken,  to  tell  even  what  one  man  could  see  and 
know  of  these  great  battles  with  *'  the  destruction  that  wasteth  at 
night,  and  the  pestilence  that  walketh  at  noonday." 

The  lives  of  the  survivors  were  shortened  and  they  have  nearly 
all  passed  away.  They  were  probably  30  years  old,  on  an  aver- 
age, at  that  time,  and  if  they  were  now  living  they  would  be  from 
60  to  80  years  old. 

One  of  the  participants  informed  the  committee  of  his  personal 
knowledge  of  this  matter,  and,  though  he  is  old  and  sick  from 
disease  he  there  contracted,  he  came  to  Washington  to  testify, 
declaring  that  he  had  no  personal  interest  to  subserve,  but  that 
he  is  deeply  concerned  that  his  Government  should  not  create  the 
opportunity  for  repeating  the  terrible  history  of  Panama.  For 
nearly  six  years  he  was  the  track  master  of  the  Panama  Railroad, 
and  was  constantly  in  contact  with  the  laborers  who,  in  great 
numbers,  were  at  work  on  the  railroad  and  the  canal  at  Panama. 

Mr.  Plume  states  the  following  facts.  His  service  with  the 
Panama  Railroad  Company  was  from  1883  to  1888. 

The  Chairman.  How  many  hands  did  you  have  under  you  as  a  rule— about 
an  average? 

Mr.  Plume.  I  had  10  men  to  every  section,  and  a  section  run  4  to  5  miles. 

The  Chairman.  About  how  many  people  did  the  canal  company  have 
there  while  you  stayed  there? 

Mr.  Plume.  Well,  it  was  estimated  that  they  had  10,000,  but  I  doubt  very 
much  if  5,000  were  working.  The  labor  is  of  such  a  class  that  it  is  utterly  im- 
possible to  get  them  to  work;  it  is  this  lazy,  good-for-nothing  Jamaica  labor, 
and  the  climate  there  is  so  bad  that  a  man  can  not  work. 

The  Chairman,  Well,  now,  I  want  to  get  at  that,  and  I  want  you  now  to 
be  careful  in  your  statements  about  that.  Did  you  have  any  trouble  in  pre- 
serving the  health  of  the  party  under  your  control— these  10m.en  to  a  section? 

Mr.  Plume.  Oh,  a  great  deal,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  What  was  the  average  amount  of  loss  per  annum,  say 
during  the  five  or  six  years  you  were  there,  out  of  your  own  party,  now? 

Mr.  Plume.  Well,  every  month  or  two  1  would  lose  a  man,  perhaps  two 
men.  I  will  explain  it  to  you.  If  a  man  gets  wet  there  with  the  rain  he  is 
sure  to  be  sick  the  next  morning.  The  dew  commences  to  fall  at  3.30  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon,  and  if  a  man  gets  his  clothes  wet  with  this  dew  and  he  goes 
to  bed  with  his  clothes  on,  as  sure  as  he  is  born  he  will  wake  up  sick  the  next 
morning.  I  never  saw  such  a  climate  in  all  my  life,  and  I  have  worked  in 
the  rice  fields  of  South  Carolina,  and  gracious  only  knows  that  is  bad  enough. 

The  Chairman.  Can  you  give  the  committee  some  idea  of  the  condition 
of  health  of  these  canal  laborers  during  the  time  you  wore  in  this  Isthmus? 

Mr.  Plume.  When  I  went  there  we'  used  to  run  one  train- perhaps  it 
would  be  a  car  or  two  box  cars— in  the  morning  out  of  Colon  up  to  Monkey 
Hill.  Our  graveyard  is  about  5  miles  from  Colon,  on  a  hill  called  Monkey 
Hill,  but  I  had  not  been  there  a  year  when  we  were  up  there.  Over  to 
Panama  it  was  the  same  way— bury,  bury,  bury,  running  two,  three,  and 
four  trains  a  day  with  dead  Jamaica  niggers  all  the  time.  I  never  saw  any- 
thing like  it.  It  did  not  make  any  difference  whether  they  were  black  or 
white,  to  see  the  way  they  died  there!    They  die  like  animals. 

The  Chairman.  Of  what  diseases  would  they  die,  if  you  know  anything 
about  it? 
5162 


26 

Mr.  Plume.  There  are  four  most  deadly  fevers.  There  is  the  yellow  fever, 
the  pernicious  fever,  the  putrid  fever,  and  the  typhoid  fever,  and  the  inter- 
mittent fever.  If  the  intermittent  runs  long  enough  it  will  turn  into  typhoid 
or  those  other  bad  fevers.  A  man  will  only  last  three  or  four  days,  unless 
thev  have  pretty  quick  and  pretty  severe  treatment. 

The  Chairman.  Did  the  Panama  Canal  Company  have  good  shelter  for  its 
hands  and  good  hospitals? 

Mr.  Plume.  Yes,  there  is  no  finer  hospital  on  the  globe  than  the  one  they 
have  at  Panama.  It  is  on  the  side  of  the  Ancon  Mountain,  which  used  to  be  a 
volcano  several  centuries  ago,  and  the  lava  from  the  volcano  went  across 
Panama  and  out  into  the  bay  about  a  mile.  The  hospital  is  a  splendid  thing. 
It  is  said  to  have  cost  §5,000,000,  and  I  guess  it  did.  Down  in  this  valley  you 
dig  a  hole  about  two  feet  deep  and  you  come  to  a  boiling  spring,  right  under 
the  mountains,  and  they  have  engines  there  pumping  water  up  to  this  hos- 
pital. There  is  a  man  in  Panama  who  has  a  concession  to  bury  people.  He 
opened  a  graveyard,  I  suppose  300  feet  one  way  and  400  the  other.  Every 
grave  is  numbered  that  they  may  know  who  is  buried  there.  In  exactly  one 
year  after  he  opened  it  I  drove  by  there,  and  there  were  1,875  crosses  in  that 
burying  ground,  and  that  does  not  count  the  men  that  were  in  the  ovens. 
They  have  ovens  along  the  wall,  a  brick  wall,  and  they  bury  people  in  there 
who  can  afford  to  pay  for  it;  but  there  were  1,875  crosses  in  that  burying 
ground,  to  give  you  a  little  idea  of  the  health  of  the  country. 

The  Chairman.  About  what  year  was  that? 

Mr.  Plume.  That  was  in  the  early  part  of  1887.  De  Lesseps  brought  out  57 
men  there  for  engineers,  chiefs  of  sections,  a,nd  for  different  purposes,  clerks. 
In  three  months,  sir,  there  were  only  3  of  them  left.  I  never  saw  any- 
thing like  it  in  my  life.  If  a  man  drinks  tlaere,  he  is  just  as  sure  to  die  as  he 
is  alive;  it  is  fatal;  and  here  is  something  very  wonderful:  I  have  always  no- 
ticed if  a  Frenchman  gets  one  of  those  fevers,  he  is  just  as  sure  to  die  as  he 
has  a  hair  on  his  head.  The  doctors  have  told  me  that  it  is  on  account  of  their 
having  drunk  so  much  of  this  French  claret  in  France,  which  is  full  of  log- 
wood, and  it  has  burned  the  linings  of  their  stomachs,  and  as  soon  as  they  get 
a  fever  they  die.  My  allowance  of  quinine  was  an  ounce,  and  it  would  last 
me  three  weeks.    That  is  what  affected  my  hearing. 

The  Chairman.  You  suffer  from  it  yet? 

Mr.  Plume.  What  is  that? 

The  Chairman.  You  suffer  from  it  yet? 

Mr.  Plume.  Oh,  yes,  and  never  will  get  over  it.  I  always  took  medicine, 
kept  my  liver  clean,  and  that  is  the  way  I  kept  on  my  feet:  and  when  I  left 
that  climate  and  came  here  a  doctor  worked  six  days  and  six  nights  on  me  to 
save  my  life.  My  brother-in-law  told  me  that  I  must  have  a  constitution  of 
iron,  and  I  believe  I  have. 

officers  of  the  PANAMA  COMPANY  TESTIFY. 

Mr.  Colne,  who  was  the  agent  for  the  old  company  in  America, 
states  that  the  hospital  expenses,  not  including  the  buildings,  was 
$4,548,127  from  1881  to  1890,  of  which  sum  $680,000  was  for  medi- 
cine. 

General  Abbott  testified  that  during  the  same  period  the  an- 
nual average  percentage  of  diseases  at  Panama  was,  for  diseases 
of  Europe,  18.83,  and  of  diseases  due  to  climate  the  percentage 
was  47.24.  This  related  to  cases  treated  in  the  hospitals,  and 
proves  that  the  local  diseases  were  epidemic. 

General  Abbott  tells  of  another  "  lugubrious  "  situation,  as  to 
the  railroad  laborers,  as  follows: 

Now,  I  will  offer  all  that  I  have  been  able  to  collect  with  reference  to  health 
on  the  Panama  Railroad.  There  was  a  fearful  loss  of  life  during  the  construc- 
tion of  the  railroad.  I  passed  over  the  route  in  1855,  just  after  it  had  been 
finished.  The  surgeon  of  the  steamer  had  been  employed  on  the  line,  and  he 
told  me  much  about  it.  He  said  the  conditions  were  something  frightful— 
that  they  had  to  contend  not  only  with  disease,  but  with  suicide.  A  great 
many  coolies  had  been  imported,  and  they  were  very  unhappy  and  wanted  to 
get  back  to  China.  They  had  an  idea  if  they  committed  suicide  they  would 
go  back. 

The  surgeon  said  it  was  necessary  to  watch  them  with  the  greatest  care: 
that  if  a  Chinaman  found  a  little  puddle  of  water  he  would  hold  his  face  down 
into  it  until  he  drowned,  without  exciting  the  attention  or  notice  of  anyone. 
The  excessive  death  rate  was  due,  doubtless,  not  only  to  the  climate,  but  also 
to  the  conditions  and  to  the  varioas  races  that  were  tried.  It  was  not  then 
known  that  the  heavy  work  should  be  done  by  negroes.  I  have  no  idea  that 
anything  like  the  mortality  then  encountered  will  be  repeated  on  any  isth- 
mian line. 
5162 


27 

The  Chairman.  You  never  heard  of  a  Chmaman  committing  suicide  la 
Washington,  did  you? 

If  it  had  occurred  to  General  Abbott  to  state  that  the  name  of 
the  railroad  station  at  Matachin  means  "dead  Chinese,"  he  would 
have  been  able  to  account  for  the  fact  that  Chinese,  when  taken 
with  the  fever,  would  slip  away  from  observation  and  drowa 
themselves  in  puddles  of  water. 

A  NAVAIi  OFFICER  TESTIFIES, 

Commander  Lucien  Young  states  in  his  deposition  as  follows: 

The  most  unhealthy  place  on  earth  is  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  I  had  yel- 
low fever  myself  in  Panama,  and  I  have  seen  them  dying  I5y  the  wholesale; 
and  so  far  as  yellow  fever  is  concerned,  I  would  rather  be  in  Habana  than  in 
Panama. 

This  evidence,  with  much  more  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  quote, 
establishes  the  fact  that  yellow  fever  is  indigenous  at  Panama 
and  other  localities  of  the  canal  route;  that  it  is  of  malignant  type 
and  can  not  be  extirpated,  because  it  is  the  result  of  natural 
causes  that  human  agencies  can  not  change. 

If  the  choice  of  routes  for  a  canal  depended  upon  this  one  fact, 
we  would  certainly  be  wise  to  turn  to  the  Nicaragua  route,  even 
at  an  excess  of  cost  amounting  to  $5,630,704. 

One  duty  that  the  Government  owes  to  humanity — which  rises 
above  all  other  personal  considerations — in  the  choice  of  these 
routes  is  the  care  of  the  health  and  lives  of  men  whose  labor  is 
the  real  power  that  must  open  this  great  waterway.  No  Senator 
can  be  indifferent  to  this  demand  of  duty,  nor  can  the  Senate 
afford  to  take  the  risk  of  repeating  the  history  of  Panama  during 
the  thirty  years  of  human  sacrifice  that  have  made  it  so  lugubri- 
ous. 

THE  HEALTH  COlirTRAST  BETWEEN  THE  TWO  ROUTES. 

If  every  other  consideration  of  advantage  was  in  favor  of  the 
Panama  route,  the  salubrity  of  climate  and  the  natural  conditions 
that  assure  the  health  of  Nicaragua  would  determine  the  choice 
in  favor  of  that  route.  The  contrast  between  these  localities  as 
places  of  abode  gives  great  weight  to  the  argument  in  favor  of 
Nicaragua. 

All  maritime  and  civilized  nations  will  use  an  isthmian  canal, 
not  alone  for  ships  of  war  and  commerce,  but  for  migration  and 
travel  around  the  world  and  to  and  from  every  coast  and  seaport 
of  every  country^  all  of  which  will  be  brought  by  it  into  direct 
and  unobstructed  communication  by  the  canal.  The  myriads  of 
people  of  coming  generations  that  will  pass  through  a  canal  cut 
through  the  American  Isthmus  will  have  the  right  to  reproach 
this  Congress  and  will  not  fail  to  do  so  if  we  select  for  them  a 
route  on  which  pestilence  lurks  by  the  wayside,  instead  of  a  route 
that  nature  has  made  free  from  such  dangers. 

The  saving  of  $5,630,704  will  appear  to  them  as  a  paltry  con- 
sideration for  the  choice  of  a  fever-breeding  ground,  when  a 
healthy  and  attractive  route  for  a  canal  is  offered. 

THE  WALKER  NICARAGUA  CANAL  COMMISSION'S  REPORT  OF  1899. 

Tliis  question  is  not  new.  It  arose  at  the  first  moment  of  a 
choice  between  these  routes,  as  long  ago  as  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury. It  was  carefully  studied  by  our  Nicaragua  Canal  Commis- 
sion, of  which  Admiral  Walker  was  president,  in  1897-1899,  in 
view  of  objections  then  urged  by  the  Panama  Canal  Company 

5163 


28 

and  others  to  the  Nicaragua  route,  and  the  following  answer  was 
made  by  that  Commission: 

The  impression  that  this  portion  of  the  Isthmus  is  unusually  unhealthy  is 
erroneous.  On  the  contrary,  the  local  conditions  are  such  that  with  ordinary 
hygienic  precautions  the  risks  from  disease  are  slight. 

The  frequent  i-ainf all  on  the  east  coast  furnishes  an  ample  supply  of  fresh, 
soft  water,  condensed  directly  from  the  clouds.  The  porous,  sandy  soil  ab- 
sorbs it  so  rapidly  as  to  prevent  stagnation,  while  the  animal  refuse  is  quickly 
removed  by  the  scavenger  birds  and  fish  continually  on  the  alert  for  food. 

With  their  light,  loose  clothing,  vegetable  diet,  and  cleanly  habits,  the  na- 
tives seldom  suffer  from  fevers.  Even  our  unacclimated  Americans,  passing 
from  a  rigorous  winter  temperature  to  the  mild  region  of  the  trade  winds, 
were,  with  few  exceptions,  exempt  from  febrile  complaints,  and  amongst 
the  largo  number  of  engineers  sent  out  there  was  no  mortality  in  the  coun- 
try. The  constant  motion  of  the  wind,  sweeping  through  this  low  divide, 
appears  to  remove  the  noxious  exhalations  which  characterize  other  portions 
or  the  Isthmus. 

Yellow  fever  finds  no  habitat  at  Greytown,  and  even  when  imported  does 
not  become  epidemic.  Abstemious  habits  and  careful  police  of  camps  will 
insure  as  good  health  among  laborers  as  will  be  found  in  many  locations  in 
this  country.  The  climate  would  affect  the  labor  question,  therefore,  chiefly 
by  the  lassitude  resulting  from  its  enervating  influence. 

Assistant  Engineer  Stewart  says  that — 

"The  atmospheric  conditions  are  excellent,  and  for  the  seven  months  we 
were  in  the  field  we  worked  in  all  conditions  of  weather,  losing  but  one  entire 
diiv  on  account  of  a  heavy  downpour  of  twelve  hours." 

The  narrow  limits  within  which  the  temperature  I'anges  are  shown  from 
a  few  selected  observations  at  various  stations  during  the  year  as  below.  The 
Rio  Viejo  station  is  located  on  the  western  slope  of  the  Cordilleras,  east  of  the 
lake,  and  at  a  higher  altitude  than  the  others.  Hence  its  greater  range  of  30 
degrees.  This  uniformity  of  temperature  is  one  of  the  important  factors  in 
the  considei-ation  in  the  permanency  of  important  works  as  well  as  in  the  health 
of  the  inhabitants. 

It  would  be  quite  sufficient  to  stop  at  this  conclusive  statement, 
against  which  no  fact  is  stated,  but  the  subject  vras  again  opened 
on  the  hearings  before  the  Committee  on  Inter  oceanic  Canals, 
and  some  opinions  were  stated  that  the-  cutting  of  a  canal  in 
Nicaragua  might  produce  health  conditions  there  like  those  that 
exist  at  Panama. 

WILL  NICARAGUA  FALL  A  PREY    TO  DISEASE  LIKE  PANAMA? 

The  importance  of  the  subject  justifies  a  brief  statement  of  the 
facts  deposed  to  by  the  witnesses  before  the  committee.  Dr. 
Bransf  ord,  whose  statements  as  to  the  health  of  Panama  and  Nica- 
ragua I  have  read  to  the  Senate,  has  actual,  personal,  and  scien- 
tific knowledge  of  this  subject,  makes  the  following  statements  as 
to  Nicaragua: 

The  Chairman.  How  long  did  you  remain  on  these  two  latter  visits? 

Dr.  Bransford.  I  think  I  went  down  each  time  in^anuary  and  stayed 
until  June.  I  am  not  absolutely  sure  of  it,  but  that  was  about  the  time,  from 
January  to  June,  in  1876  and  also  in  1877.  Then  in  1881 1  was  down  there  again 
for  the  Smithsonian  Institution,  in  Guatemala,  Nicai-agua,  and  Costa  Rica. 

The  Chairman.  "What  particular  duty  were  you  on  then? 

Dr.  Bransford.  The  same  duty,  examining  the  remains  of  the  Indian 
inhabitants. 

The  Chairman,  Were  you  much  over  the  country  while  you  were  down 
there? 

Dr.  Bransford.  All  the  time.    I  was  in  the  interior. 

The  Chairman.  What  kind  of  country— agriculturally,  topographically, 
and  with  reference  to  climatic  considerations— is  Nicaragua? 

Dr.  Bransford,  Well,  conditions  are  entirely  different  on  the  two  slopes. 
On  the  Atlantic  slope  it  is  heavily  wooded,  and  there  is  a  much  heavier  rain- 
fall than  on  the  Pacific.  Most  of  the  population  is  on  the  Pacific  side  of  the 
main  range  of  mountians.  The  country  along  the  route  of  the  canal  from 
Lake  Nicaragua  to  Brito  is  one  of  the  finest  agricultural  countries  I  have  ever 
seen.  Rivas  is  the  principal  town.  There  are  half  a  dozen  smaller  towns 
around  it,  and  the  whole  of  that  country  from  the  lake  to  the  coast  moun- 
tains, a  distance  of  some  8  or  10  miles,  is  a  garden  spot  for  tropical  fruits, 
chocolate,  sugar  cane,  and  fruits  of  all  kinds. 

The  Chairman.  What  kind  of  a  population  has  it,  with  reference  to  in- 
dustry, quietude,  and  general  disposition? 
6162 


29 

Dr.  BRANsrORD.  The  ruling  portion  of  the  i)opu]ation  is  the  nsnal  mixture 
of  Spanish  and  Indian.  They  are  about  like  all  the  other  South  Americans. 
Some  of  them  claim  to  be  pure  Spaniards,  and  from  that  they  are  everything 
down  to  pure  Indian.  They  have  the  characteristics  of  the  ordinary  Spanish- 
Americans,  being  inclined  to  revolutions  and  so  on;  but  the  main  body  of  the 
population  is  a  very  sturdy  Indian  people.  I  think  they  are  very  m.uch 
stronger,  more  reliable,  better  men,  than  the  mixed. 

Senator  Hawley.  Well-behaved? 

Dr.  Bransford.  They  are,  sir;  as  far  as  my  experience  goes.  They  are  very 
steady  and  good  workers.  When  we  wanted  good,  reliable  men  for  work  we 
always  tried  to  get  the  pure  Indians. 

MR.  treat,  a  contractor,  TESTTnBS. 

Mr.  Treat,  a  contractor  who  built  nearly  10  miles  of  railroad 
for  the  Maritime  Canal  Company,  from  Greytown  west,  made 
the  following  statements: 

Mr.  Treat.  It  was  a  peculiar  contract.  I  took  it  for  the  purpose  of  study- 
ing the  questions  of  labor  and  climate  and  health  and  supplios,  having  in 
view  a  large  contract  on  the  canal,  and  I  said  if  they  would  give  me  control 
of  the  whole  thing,  and  not  let  the  engineers  interfere  with  me  too  much,  and 
would  furnish  what  I  wanted  from  New  York,  I  would  build  the  railroad  for 
10  per  cent  of  what  I  paid  out  for  labor  in  the  country,  I  paying  my  own  of- 
fice force  and  superintendent  of  construction.  I  commenced  the  work  about 
the  last  of  May,  1890,  and  finished  my  work  about  the  last  of  December,  1890— 
I  believe  it  was  1890. 

The  Chairman.  What  length  of  road  did  you  build? 

Mr.  Treat.  Nearly  10  miles— perhaps  a  little  less  than  10  miles. 

Senator  Hanna.  Standard  gauge? 

Mr.  Treat.  Standard  gauge. 

The  Chairman.  Describe  the  point  you  started  from  and  where  you 
"went. 

Mr.  Treat.  I  started  from  the  Greytown  Harbor— that  is,  the  lagoon— and 
went  south  of  the  canal  line  as  located— parallel  to  it,  perhaps  a  thousand 
feet  away  from  it— directly  to  the  westward,  parallel  with  the  canal  line  all 
the  way. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  build  out  to  the  Deseado  River,  or  stream? 

Mr.  Treat.  I  think  I  crossed  that;  I  am  not  sure. 

The  Chairman.  What  sort  of  a  country  was  it  that  you  went  through? 

Mr.  Treat.  It  was  almost  perfectly  fiat,  you  might  say,  covered  with 
forests,  the  first  8  or  9  miles  covered  with  water— completely  covered  with 
water. 

Senator  Hanna.  How  deep? 

Mr.  Treat.  From  a  foot  up  to  over  a  man's  head. 

The  Chairman.  How  did  you  construct  a  road  through  that  water? 

Mr.  Treat.  I  cut  down  trees  and  built  a  solid  corduroy  by  laying  the  logs 
parallel  to  each  other,  perhaps  16  or  18  feet  long,  until  I  got  above  the  water, 
and  then  I  laid  rails  on  top  ot  this  causeway  of  logs  and  put  a  steam  shovel  at 
work  where  the  entrance  was  to  be  for  the  canal  and  loaded  flat  cars  there 
with  the  excavation.  I  had  two  trains  of  flat  cars,  15  cars  to  a  train,  and  two 
locomotives,  and  then  I  backed  these  cars  out  on  this  ti-ack  laid  on  the  logs, 
and  used  a  ballast  plow,  and  in  time  completely  buried  this  foundation  taken 
from  the  entrance  to  the  canal.  I  actually  commenced  the  construction  of 
the  canal  by  taking  out  about  100,000  cubic  yards  at  that  point,  and  in  time  of 
course  I  buried  this  substructure  completely  with  sand.  Of  course,  as  these 
logs  were  covered  with  sand,  the  track  was  raised  and  the  sand  tamped  un- 
der it  until  a  substantial  road  was  built. 

The  Chairman.  Was  it  a  substantial  road? 

Mr.  Treat.  Oh,  yes. 

The  .Chairman.  Now,  at  what  cost  per  mile  was  that  road  built? 

Mr.  Treat.  The  whole  cost  was  about  $30,000  a  mile. 

The  Chairman.  Where  did  you  get  your  cross-ties? 

Mr.  Treat.  I  got  some  from  the  timber  alongside  the  track,  and  aome  cy- 
press ties  from  Now  Orleans. 

The  Chairman.  About  how  many  men  did  you  have  under  you  while  you 
were  at  work  there? 

Mr.  Treat.  Perhaps  a  couple  of  hundred  at  the  start,  up  to  the  neighbor- 
hood of  1,000.  I  think  I  had  nearly  1,000  after  two  months  and  from  that  up 
to  the  end. 

The  Chairman.  How  long  did  you  keep  them  there? 

Mr.  Treat.  Seven  months. 

The  Chairman.  State  what  kind  of  work  they  did. 

Mr.  Treat.  Why,  of  course  a  large  part  of  the  work  was  right  In  these 
swamps,  in  water.  I  cut  down  the  trees  and  cut  them  up  into  lengths,  some 
very  large  trees,  3  feet  in  diameter,  mostly  very  heavy  timbsr  that  would 
5168 


30 

not  float,  and  the  worlt  was  to  drag  these  logs  through  the  water;  they  would 
BO  nearly  float  that  20  to  30  men  would  tie  a  rope  to  a  big  log  and  drag  it  along 
on  the  bottom  to  the  place  they  wanted  it  ana  then  turn  it  around  on  tp  the 
line  of  the  railroad,  so  that  the  work  that  these  men  did  was  wholly  cutting 
these  trees  and  putting  them  in  place  to  form  a  part  of  the  embankment,  a 
foundation  for  the  embankment,  and  fully  half  of  the  men  were  working  in 
this  water  ten  hours  a  day. 

The  Chairman.  Every  day? 

Mr.  Treat.  Yes;  every  day.  Out  of  seven  months  we  lost  only  two  half 
days  from  any  reason,  and  that  was  on  account  of  cold  rains. 

The  Chairman.  And  that  is  aU  the  time  that  you  lost? 

Mr.  Treat.  That  is  all  the  time  that  we  lost.    "We  did  not  work  on  Sunday. 

The  Chairman.  "Well,  what  was  the  condition  of  health  of  your  men? 

Mr.  Treat.  Why,  the  first  lot  of  men  that  we  had  there  from  Jamaica 
were  a  poor  lot,  picked  up  off  the  streets  largely  and  in  poor  health,  seemed 
to  be  half  starved.  I  should  say  that  their  general  health  improved  while 
they  were  on  the  work.  At  the  end  of  the  work  they  went  away  looking  bet- 
ter and  feeling  better  than  when  they  commenced.  They  had  good  food,  a 
good  dry  place  to  sleep,  and  when  they  were  sick  a  good  hospital  to  go  to. 

MR.  MENOCAL.. 

Mr.  Menocal,  who  has  been  more  in  Nicaragua  than  any  other 
American  engineer — in  all,  more  than  ten  years  of  time — states  as 
follows  in  speaking  of  Panama: 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  consider  that  a  healthy  country? 

Mr.  Menocal.  I  do  not. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  consider  it  very  unhealthy? 

Mr.  Menocal.  Very  unhealthy. 

The  Chairman.  How  does  it  compare  with  Nicaragua  in  that  respect? 

Mr.  Menocal.  I  regard  Nicaragua  as  very  healthy. 

Senator  Hanna.  How  would  it  be  at  Nicaragua  if  you  were  digging  a  canal 
there? 

Mr.  Menocal.  We  did  do  some  digging  in  the  canal. 

Senator  Hanna.  What  I  mean  to  ask  is,  there  has  been  digging  done  pretty 
much  the  whole  length  of  the  Panama  Canal,  the  earth  has  been  turned  up 
by  excavations  made.  Suppose  you  had  corresponding  excavations  along  the 
Nicaragua  route  from  the  valley  of  the  San  Juan  Eiver  and  you  turned  up 
the  soil  there,  would  you  have  any  sickness  from  it? 

Mr.  Menocal.  It  is  possible  there  may  be  some  more  sickness  than  they 
have  now,  but  I  can  say  this:  We  built  12  miles  of  railroad,  6  of  which  was  in 
these  swamps,  and  the  men  had  to  work  in  water  from  their  feet  to  their 
necks,  and  we  did  not  lose  a  man  on  account  of  sickness  contracted  by  reason 
of  the  climate  or  the  conditions  under  which  the  work  was  done.  We  had 
1,800  men  employed  in  the  building  of  that  railroad  and  we  did  dredging 
there  for  a  distance  of  about  seven-eighths  of  a  mile  into  the  swamps,  and 
the  condition  of  health  of  the  people  on  board  of  the  dredges  was  excellent, 
and  those  living  in  the  vicinity  just  the  same.  I  was  not  ill  there  myself, 
nor  were  the  other  engineers.  We  had  cleared  the  timber  for  about  9  miles 
from  Greytown  and  about  10  miles  on  the  west  side  of  the  lake,  and  we  did 
not  have  any  illness  on  that  account. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  remark  true  through  the  entire  line  to  Brito  in 
regard  to  health? 

Mr.  Menocal.  It  is  claimed,  and  I  believe,  that  the  more  you  go  west  the 
healthier  it  is.  I  would  like  to  caU  the  attention  of  the  committee  to  one 
matter,  if  I  am  permitted  to  do  so. 

The  Chairman.  Oh,  yes. 

Mr.  Menocal.  I  refer  to  one  condition  in  Nicaragua  which  does  not  exist 
in  Panama.  It  is  very  true  that  we  have  swamps  back  of  Greytown  extend- 
ing several  miles,  but  the  rainfall  is  so  great  that  the  water  in  the  swamps  is 
renewed  constantly.  You  can  drink  it  at  any  place.  We  used  to  drink  it 
constantly. 

Senator  Hawley.  It  is  not  stagnant? 

Mr.  Menocal.  It  is  not  stagnant.  It  is  being  renewed  all  the  time  from 
the  heavy  rains,  while  in  Panama  in  the  four  or  five  months  of  dry  season  the 
swamps  get  dry,  and  then  is  when  the  sickness  prevails.  That  is  the  time 
that  the  country  becomes  extremely  unhealthy.  It  is  not  in  the  rainy  season. 
What  I  fear  is  the  dry  season. 

The  Chairman,  what  effect  do  the  trade  winds  have  in  Nicaragua,  ac- 
cording to  your  opinion? 

Mr.  MENOCAL.  The  healthy  condition  of  Nicaragua  is  partly  attributable 
to  the  trade  winds  blowing  up  the  valley  of  the  San  Juan,  and  I  believe  it  is 
correct. 

Senator  Hanna.  Let  me  ask  you,  what  year  did  you  do  this  work  that  you 
are  talking  about  in  Nicaragua? 

Mr.  Menocal.  From  1887  to  1892. 
5162 


MB.  JONBS  TESTIFIBS. 

Mr.  James  O.  Jones  states  as  follows,  speaking  of  the  Nicaragua 
Canal  Commission: 

The  CHAiRMAisr.  You  were  employed  tinder  that  Commission  for  eleven 
months? 

Mr.  JoNKS.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Were  you  in  Nicaragua  all  the  time? 

Mr.  Jones.  I  was  in  Nicaragua  for  eleven  months,  and  I  was  here  under 
the  same  Commission  for  about  nine  months. 

The  Chairman.  Writing  up  their  report? 

Mr.  Jones.  In  the  Washmgton  office,  working  on  the  precise-level  report. 

The  Chairman.  When  you  went  back  a  second  time,  under  what  author- 
ity did  you  go? 

Mr.  Jones.  I  went  back  in  July,  1899,  under  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commia- 
sion,  headed  by  Admiral  Walker. 

The  Chairman.  How  long  did  you  remain  there  on  that  service? 

Mr.  Jones.  I  was  there  from  July,  1899,  until  May,  1901— about  twenty-two 
months. 

The  Chairman.  What  were  you  engaged  in  while  you  were  there  on  that 
service? 

Mr.  Jones.  I  was  engaged  in  the  hydrographic  work  under  Mr.  Arthur  P. 
Davis. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  stop  your  work  on  account  of  the  weather  when 
it  was  raining? 

Mr.  Jones.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Here,  when  you  were  running  the  line,  or  when  you  were 
attending  to  this  hydrographic  work? 

Mr.  Jones.  The  rain  did  not  stop  my  work  at  all.  I  was  out  in  the  rain 
and  all  kinds  of  weather  while  I  was  engaged  in  this  hydrographic  work,  and 
when  on  the  line  of  precise  levels  that  I  speak  of  was  out  in  the  rain  all  day. 
Of  course,  in  the  hardest  showers  or  when  it  was  raining  very  hard  we  could 
not  work. 
-  The  Chairman.  You  were  exposed  to  it? 

Mr.  Jones.  We  were  exposed  to  all  of  it. 

The  Chairman.  About  now  many  men  were  in  that  precise-levels  party? 

Mr.  Jones.  There  were  six  men. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  continued  at  work  for  eleven  months? 

Mr.  Jones.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  In  the  field? 

Mr.  Jones.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  What  was  the  state  of  the  health  of  those  men  during 
that  time? 

Mr.  Jo^TES.  It  was  very,  very  good.  They  aU  had  very  remarkable  health 
for  the  kind  of  country  that  we  went  through. 

The  Chairman.  Did  they  have  any  sickness? 

Mr.  Jones.  There  was  no  sickness  to  amount  to  anything  at  aU,  None  of 
the  men  were  laid  up. 

The  Chairman.  During  that  eleven  months? 

Mr.  Jones.  Not  to  speak  of.  A  man  might  bo  laid  up  a  day  or  two  or 
something  of  that  kind  occasionally,  but  never  ill  to  speak  of. 

The  Chairman.  You  were  working  right  along  through  these  ponds  and 
water  courses,  and  so  on? 

Mr.  Jones.  For  some  distance  on  the  river  we  encountered  heavy  swamps. 
We  worked  right  through  them;  worked  in  water  up  to  our  knees  and  some- 
times up  to  our  shoulders.  We  set  up  the  instrument  in  water  almost  up  to 
the  thumbscrews.  ,     -       ,       , 

The  Chairman.  And  none  of  that  party  were  sick  to  spoak  of,  as  I  undei-- 

Mr.  Jones.  No;  there  was  no  illness  at  all  in  the  camp  to  amount  to  any- 
thing. 

The  Chairman.  Abotit  how  many  men  were  engaged  under  Admiral 
Walker  in  Nicaragua  on  the  isthmian  canal  survey? 

Mr.  Jones.  The  Nicaragua  Canal? 

The  Chairman.  The  Nicaragua  Canal  survey. 

Mr.  Jones.  Why,  there  were  about  seventy.  There  were  sixty-nine  men 
went  down  on  the  Newport  and  a  few  more  came,  and  one  or  two  returned  to 
the  States.    There  wore  about  seventy  men  in  all. 

The  Chairman.  How  long  were  those  men  employed  on  the  Isthmus;  I 
mean  to  say  at  Nicaragua? 

Mr.  Jones.  Why,  I  suppose  they  were  there  for  eight  months  anyway. 

Th&  Chairman.  In  the  wet  season  or  the  dry  season? 

Mr.  Jones.  They  were  there  through  a  period  of  both. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  did  they  work  right  along  through  these  jwndsand 
moi-asses? 

Mr.  Jones.  Yes;  they  worked  just  the  same  as  I  did. 


32 

The  Chairman.  Wliat  was  tlie  state  of  the  health  of  that  party  during  the 
time  they  were  there? 

Mr.  Jones.  It  was  remarkably  good. 

The  Chairman.  Did  any  of  them  die? 

Mr.  Jones.  No,  sir;  none  of  them  died  while  the  parties  were  there. 

The  Chairman.  "Were  any  of  them  sick? 

Mr.  Jones.  There  was  some  sickness,  but  nothing  to  amount  to  anything 
at  all. 

The  Chairman.  What  kind  of  water  did  you  drink  while  you  were  out 
there  during  all  this  long  service? 

Mr.  Jones.  "We  drank  San  Juan  River  water  when  we  got  to  it,  and  when 
we  were  back  away  from  it  we  would  drink  the  waters  from  the  small  rivers 
that  were  tributaries  of  the  San  Juan.  We  would  drink  any  water  that  we 
came  to,  almost;  swamp  water  or  anything  else. 

Gen.  Edward  P.  Alexander  testified  as  follows: 

General  Alexander.  After  the  civil  war  I  was  first  professor  of  engi- 
neering and  mathematics  in  the  University  of  South  Carolina  for  four  years- 
and  then  I  went  to  railroading,  and  I  was  engaged  in  railroading  generally  as 
manager  of  roads  with  engineers  doing  work  under  me  for  some  twenty 
years,  more  or  less  Since  then  I  have  been  on  two  governmental  commis- 
sions, one  on  the  improvement  of  The  Dalles  of  the  Columbia  River,  The  Dalles 
and  Salido  Falls  in  Oregon,  and  one  commission  on  the  connection  between 
the  Chesapeake  Bay  and  the  Delaware  Bay.  These  were  joint  commissions 
of  civilians  and  Army  and  Navy  officers  generally.  Then  for  three  and  a 
half  years  I  was  employed  as  engineer  arbitrator  of  the  boundary  survey  be- 
tween Nicai'agua  and  Costa  Rica,  by  those  two  Governments. 

The  Chairman.  Where  did  you  reside  during  the  time  you  were  thus  em- 
ployed by  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica? 

General  Alexander.  My  headquarters  were  generally  at  Greytown, 
Nicaragua. 

The  Chairman.  How  did  you  find  the  health  conditions  of  Greytown  dur- 
ing your  i-esidence  there. 

General  Alexander.  I  found  them  very  good  indeed;  never  lived  in 
a  place  that  had  less  malaria. 

The  Chairman.  Is  there  much  population  in  Greytown? 

General  Alexander.  No;  very  small;  only  about  1,400. 

The  Chairman.  What  years  were  these? 

General  Alexander.  1897, 1898, 1899.  and  part  of  1900. 

The  Chairman.  I  wish  you  would  d9scrib3  that  country  as  to  its  eligibil- 
ity for  civilized  people— for  white  people— its  productions,  and  other  matters 
connected  with  agriculture.    Just  give  a  description  of  it  as  you  saw  it. 

General  Alexander.  It  impressed  me  as  one  of  the  most  attractive  coun- 
tries that  I  ever  saw  for  a  poor  man  to  make  a  living  in.  As  I  laughingly  told 
the  gentleman  who  was  escorting  me  around,  if  I  had  to  be  born  again  I  would 
ask  the*angel  that  was  bringing  me  down  to  take  me  to  Nicaragua,  if  I  was 
to  be  landed  v/ithout  any  money;  that  I  would  rather  light  in  Nicaragua  than 
in  any  other  place  I  knew. 

The  climate  is  very  pleasant.  The  agricultural  opportunities  are  limitless. 
The  soil  is  good,  and  I  do  not  know  a  more  attractive  country  than  that. 

The  Chairman.  Do  they  raise  a  variety  of  crops  there? 

General  Alexander.  Everything  in  the  world. 

The  Chairman.  What  are  the  characteristics  of  the  population? 

General  Alexander.  Its  population  are  a  good,  plain,  country  people. 
They  seem  to  be  amiable,  courteous,  and  polite,  and  I  do  not  think  tliey  were 
specially  disposed  to  go  into  insurrections  or  rebellions.  They  are  indus- 
trious enough  at  anytlaing— in  fact,  they  are  very  industrious  at  anything 
that  they  are  used  to.  They  would  not  do  much  if  you  put  them  at  a  wheel- 
barrow and  a  ditch,  perhaps,  but  put  them  in  the  woods  with  a  machete  or 
on  the  river  with  aj^addle  and  they  will  do  as  good  a  day's  work  as  any  man 
that  I  ever  saw.  There  are  plenty  of  instances  there  of  men  whom  I  saw 
who  are  in  very  comfortable  circumstances,  who  started  out  in  life  with 
nothing  but  a  machete,  who  have  got  little  coffee  plantations,  fruit  planta- 
tions, etc. 

The  Chairman.  Does  cofifee  grow  abundantly  in  that  country? 

General  Alexander.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Of  good  quality? 

General  Alexander.  While  I  was  there,  in  1889,  it  was  Nicaraguan  coffee, 
raised  in  the  vicinity  of  Matagalpa,  that  brought  the  highest  price  in  London 
of  any  coffee  sold  that  year  from  any  part  of  the  world. 

The  Chairman.  That  Matagalpa  country  is  a  white  settlement,  is  it  not? 

General  Alexander.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  A  prosperous  people? 

General  Alexander.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Ai'e  they  peaceable  and  obedient  to  the  laws? 


33 

General  Alexander.  They  seem  to  be  so,  entirely. 

The  Chairman.  What  do  yon  think  of  that  region  of  country,  including 
Costa  Rica  and  other  parts  of  Central  America  that  would  be  accessible  com- 
mercially to  the  canal,  as  a  feeder  to  the  canal,  the  income  of  it? 

General  Alexander.  I  think  it  ought  to  be  one  of  the  richest  tropical 
countries  in  the  world. 

The  Chairman.  Capable  of  sustaining  large  population? 

General  Alexander.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  What  would  you  expect  from  the  health  of  the  people? 

General  Alexander.  There  is  no  trouble  about  the  health  anywhere  in 
that  country,  I  think. 

The  Chairman.  You  found  it  healthy? 

General  Alexander.  I  found  it  so,  entirely. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  have  as  good  health  there  as  you  had  at  home  in 
South  Carolina? 

General  Alexander.  Entirely  so;  yes,  sir. 

Senator  Mitchell.  That  condition  as  to  health  applies  to  both  sidesof  the 
divide,  does  it? 

General  Alexander.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  H.  H.  Trundle,  the  engineer  who  surveyed  and  located  the 
canal  for  the  Nicaragua  Canal  Commission  and  also  for  the  Isth- 
mian Canal  Commission  east  from  Boca  San  Carlos  to  Grey  town, 
testifies  as  follows: 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  think  it  any  more  difficult  to  construct  a  canal 
through  that  portion  of  Florida  where  you  were  than  at  Greytown? 

Mr.  Trundle.  No:  I  do  not  know  that  it  would  be  any  more  difficult  to 
construct.  I  notice  one  difference,  though,  that  while  I  was  in  Florida  I  em- 
ployed most  of  my  men  to  help  me  there,  and  none  of  them  would  last  more 
than  a  month  or  two.  They  would  get  sick  or  something  and  leave.  One 
that  I  took  down  from  here  was  sick  there  and  had  to  leave,  qtiite  sick,  and 
in  Nicaragua  we  had  very  little  sickness  either  among  the  natives  or  the  men 
that  we  took  from  the  States. 

The  Chairman.  In  the  first  survey  you  made  for  Admiral  Walker's  com- 
mission, or  the  Nicaraguan  CanalCommission,  about  how  many  men,  officers, 
and  employees  of  every  kind  were  under  your  charge? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Well,  my  i)arty  numbered  about  6  or  7,  and  I  had  about  20 
or  30  laborers,  depending  upon  the  country  that  I  was  going  through. 

The  Chairman.  How  long  wore  you  engaged  in  the  field  there? 

Mr.  Trundle.  I  think  I  was  in  the  field  about  ten  and  a  half  months. 

The  Chairman.  Ten  and  a  half  months  consecutively,  straight  along? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  What  was  the  health  of  your  party  on  that  occasion? 

Mr.  Trundle.  I  think  I  had  one  man  at  the  hospital  for  a  week  or  ten 
days,  one  officer,  and  then  all  of  us,  I  think,  had  a  day  or  two  of  sickness  occa- 
sionally. I  was  sick  three  times,  I  think,  but  not  sick  enough  to  leave  camp; 
and  I  would  only  stay  in  camp  while  I  had  fever,  and  then  go  ahead  on  the 
work.  Among  tne  laborers  there  was  practicallv  no  sickness  other  than  a 
few  machete  cuts  that  caused  them  a  good  deal  of  trouble. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  and  your  men  take  the  water  as  it  came? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  And  the  swamps  as  they  presented  themselves? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  And  went  right  through  them? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Cutting  your  way  with  machetes? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  On  the  second  occasion  you  had  a  larger  party? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Yes;  I  had  four  engineer  parties,  each  alx)ut  the  same  size 
as  my  other  party— four  engineer  parties  of  about  six  or  seven  men,  and  theu 
each  of  those  parties  had  from  fifteen  to  twenU'-five  laborers. 

The  Chairman.  How  long  were  you  in  the  field  with  those  men? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Very  nearly  a  year;  more  than  eleven  months,  I  think. 

The  Chairman.  Consecutive  work? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Every  day? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Yes.  ,  _         ,    ,  ^ ,».  ^ 

The  Chairman.  That  was  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  work  that  you 
were  doing  then? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  What  was  the  health  of  your  party  then? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Well,  the  health  was  good.    I  had  one  or  two  men  in  the 

hospital  two  or  three  times  for  a  few  days.    One  man  was  quite  sick.    That 

is,  he  had  some  of  the  fever  that  thev  have  down  there,  and  he  was  pretty 

sick,  but  I  don't  remember  how  long  he  was  in  the  hospital.    I  do  not  think 

5162 3 


he  was  there  over  ten  days,  if  as  long,  and  then  he  went  out  on  the  work 
again. 

The  Chairman.  That  was  the  only  real  sick  man  you  had? 

Mr.  TrundLiB.  That  was  the  sickest  I  had,  and  he  was  at  no  time  danger- 
ously ill. 

The  Chairman.  What  was  the  general  health  of  yonr  party? 

Mr.  TbundLiI;.  Oh,  it  was  good.  It  was  better  than  I  would  expect  any- 
where that  I  have  ever  been  in  the  States  where  I  had  as  much  swamp  to 
contend  with. 

The  Chairman.  Was  it  as  good  as  the  health  of  your  people  when  you 
were  in  Florida? 

Mr.  Trundle.  It  was  better. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  drink  the  water  of  the  country  as  you  came  to 
it,  or  did  you  have  a  particular  supply  of  water? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Well,  I  tried  to  have  the  water  all  boiled  for  drinking  water 
in  the  camps,  and  I  thought  that  I  was  succeeding  pretty  well;  but  since  I 
have  gotten  back  I  have  found  out  that  I  did  not  succeed  quite  so  well  as  I 
thought.  I  attribute  the  health  largely  to  the  fact  that  the  water  was  boiled, 
and  I  was  speaking  of  it  afterwards  to  some  of  the  men,  and  they  have  told 
me  since  that  they  always  kept  the  boiled  water  but  they  seldom  drank  it. 
I  think  all  of  them  drank  the  water  pretty  much  as  they  came  to  it.  A  good 
many  of  them  used  the  water  vine,  and  drank  water  from  that. 

The  Chairman.  There  is  a  vine  there  that  yields  water? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Gives  about  a  pint  as  you  cut  it? 

Mr.  Trundle.  Yes;  you  ctit  off  about  3  feet  of  it. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  health  of  the  natives  in  that  part  of  the 
country  who  were  employed  by  you? 

Mr.  TRUNDLE.  They  seemed  to  be  healthy.  They  never  lost  much  time, 
other  than  wnen  they  would  get  a  chance  to  go  to  Greytown  and  get  drunk, 
or  something  like  that. 

MB.  LYMAN  E.  COOLEY  TESTIFIES. 

Mr.  Lyman  E.  Cooley,  the  engineer  and  constructor  of  the  Chi- 
cago Drainage  Oanal,  spent  four  weeks  in  the  field  in  Nicaragua 
while  the  Nicaragua  Canal  Commission  was  at  work  there  in  1899. 

In  his  deposition  he  makes  the  following  statements: 

The  Chairman.  As  engineer  for  the  contracting  company  in  1897  and  1898, 
of  which  you  make  mention,  did  you  visit  the  localities  of  the  Nicaragua  and 
Panama  Canal  routes? 

Mr.  Cooley.  We  went  entu'cly  over  the  Panama  route  and  examined  it  in 
a  casual  manner.  We  examined  the  Nicaragua  route  with  great  care  on  the 
ground,  as  much  as  we  could. 

The  Chairman.  Was  it  a  private  enterprise? 

Mr.  Cooley.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  What  were  you  doing  down  there?  What  was  your  pur- 
jKJse  in  going  there? 

Mr.  Cooley.  A  number  of  gentlemen  in  New  York  were  interested  in  the 
canal  proposition  financially,  and  had  undertaken  to  finance  the  project  of  an 
interoceanic  canal  in  case  a  group  of  contractors  could  put  a  price  upon  it.  V/e 
went  down  there  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  we  could  put  a 
price  upon  it  or  not. 

You  are  in  a  wilderness  in  much  of  Nicaragua.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  things. 
The  physical  discomfort  in  getting  around  is  simply  enormous  on  the  eastern 
division.  Fortunately  I  had  the  good  sense,  I  congratulate  myself  on  that,  to 
select  men  who  were  pioneer  men,  who  had  been  doing  pioneer  work,  not 
municipal  contractors,  but  men  who  had  been  out  against  the  frontier,  and 
engineers  of  the  same  class,  who  would  not  be  deterred  by  an  unbroken 
wilderness. 

And  one  of  these  men  remarked,  in  a  very  significant  way,  that  if  the  coun- 
try was  cleared  up,  if  there  were  roads  where  men  could  ride  about  with  a 
liuggy  and  get  around  comfortably,  and  if  there  were  good  hotels  at  conven- 
ient intervals,  it  would  make  every  difference  in  the  world  in  a  man's  mental 
attitude.  You  may  look  for  the  average  man  who  undertakes  to  examine 
these  routes  to  be  in  favor  of  Panama  for  that  reason.  I  did  not  discover 
anything  in  Nicaragua  that  was  equal  to  an  Arkansas  canebrake  in  the  St. 
Francis  bottoms.  I  did  not  discover  anything  in  the  way  of  a  forest  that  w^s 
equal  to  a  Wisconsin  forest.  I  did  not  discover  anything  in  the  way  of  in- 
sects that  was  equal  to  experiences  I  have  had  on  the  Missouri  River  bottoms 
in  the  State  of  Nebraska. 

We  looked  particularly  into  the  health  conditions,  and  I  am  just  as  confi- 
dent of  the  health  conditions  in  Nicaragua  as  I  am  along  the  Gulf  coast  of  the 
United  States;  and  I  am  not  as  confident  of  the  health  conditions  at  Panama. 

I  believe  that  those  conditions,  the  mere  difference  on  that  one  thing  of 


35 

comparative  health  alone,  will  make  the  diflference  hetween  a  profit  and  a 
loss  to  a  syndicate  that  undertakes  to  build  these  works.  I  Tjelieve.  further, 
that  if  you  will  take  the  $40,()(M),()00  with  which  it  is  proposed  to  buy  the  situa- 
tion at  Panama,  and  spend  that  sum  judiciously  in  Nicaragua,  and  then  re- 
call this  same  Commi&sion,  there  will  not  be  a  question  of  doubt  as  to  the  su- 
periority of  the  Nicaragua  route  in  the  mind  or  any  man  who  has  signed  this 
last  report.  That  is  my  best  judgment,  and  I  am  very  firm  in  that  conclu- 
sion. 

The  Chairman.  I  wish  now,  Mr.  Cooley,  to  get  your  views  on  the  com- 
mercial and  military  advantages  of  the  Nicaragua  route  as  compared  with 
the  Panama  route,  for  the  benefit  of  the  United  States  Government  and  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  and  I  will  be^in  by  asking  you  first  as  to  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  local  development  of  production  and  concentration  of  population 
on  the  Nicaragua  route;  and  the  basis  of  that  would  be,  first,  the  tempera- 
ture of  the  country  and  its  healthfulness.  I  ask  you  now,  if  you  please,  to 
describe  that  country  with  reference  to  this  matter. 

Mr.  Cooley.  I  looxed  into  that  phase  of  it  for  the  reason  that,  as  a  com- 
mercial enterprise,  which  was  then  proposed,  the  question  of  what  assets 
could  be  created  by  a  corporation  building  the  canal  there  was  a  very  mate- 
rial question  as  to  its  profits,  and  whether  it  was  justified  in  undertaking  the 
scheme  at  all  or  not. 

Nicaragua  Ues  practically  in  the  same  latitude  north  as  Java  or  the  East 
Indies  lie  in  the  south.  It  has  eveiy  variety  of  climate,  from  the  lowlands, 
where  they  produce  indigo  and  cocoa  and  various  fiber  plants  and  fruits, 
clear  up  to  the  frost  line. 

The  Chairman.  Rubber? 

Mr.  Cooley.  Rubber  trees,  yes;  and  at  an  altitude  of  1.200  to  1,500  feet  you 
strike  the  coffee  belt,  extending  to  the  frost  line,  and  up  at  the  frost  line  and 
above  you  can  raise  the  northern  cereals  and  vegetables.  At  a  market  in  San 
Jose  I  saw  a  collectian  of  kitchen  truck  raised  m  Costa  Rica  near  the  frost 
line  in  the  month  of  February  that  would  duplicate  a  northern  market  garden. 

You  can  select  your  climate.  Nicaragua,  Honduras,  and  Costa  Rica,  in  an 
area  of  perhaps  5(),(J00  to  C0,(KX)  square  miles  naturally  tributary  to  the  Nica- 
ragua Valley— more  than  the  State  of  New  York,  more  than  the  island  of 
Java— has  every  variety  of  climate.  I  mention  the  island  of  Java  because  it 
is  one  of  the  most  highly  developed  spots  on  earth,  carrying  a  population  of 
24,0(X),000  on  47,(XX)  square  miles.  I  believe  that  Nicaragua  has  as  large  a 
potential,  from  the  Pacific  at  the  Bay  of  Fonseca  through  to  the  Caribfc^n. 
Wheth'^r  the  country  east  of  Castillo  will  be  susceptible  of  much  develop- 
ment I  do  not  know.  They  have  develoi)ed  a  good  deal  on  the  Rama  River, 
and  at  Bluefields  and  at  Limon  they  have  done  considerable  in  the  way  of 

S reducing  bananas.  The  bananas  of  the  United  States  coming  into  New 
cleans  come  largely  from  Bluefields,  and  the  bananas  going  to  New  York 
come  largely  from  Limon,  Costa  Rica,  and  in  the  interior  you  can  produce 
everything  that  a  tropical  country  produces. 

As  to  the  health  conditions,  I  made  diUgent  inquiry,  on  the  western  divi- 
sion, of  Dr.  Flmt,  a  man  over  80  years  old,  at  Rivas,  who  has  lived  in  tho 
country  since  1848  as  a  practicing  physician,  and  of  Dr.  Cole,  who  has  been 
there  since  1854,  at  Rivas.  I  could  not  learn  that  they  had  any  diseases  which 
we  need  bo  apprehensive  about,  especially  on  the  western  division,  and  that 
it  was  immune,  you  might  say,  from  such  things  as  kidney  troubles  and 
rheumatism. 

The  Chairman.  Pneumonia? 

Mr.  Cooley.  No;  they  have  pneumonia  everywhere  on  earth.  Tuberculosis 
is  not  in  the  country,  I  believe.  I  asked  Dr.  Flint,  after  I  had  gone  over  the  en- 
tire catalogue,  what  the  people  really  did  die  of,  because  it  was  evident  that 
they  died.  He  said  that  the  majority  of  the  death  i-ate  in  this  country  is  due 
to  lack  of  proper  nutrition  and  to  dissipation. 

On  the  Atlantic  side  we  had  Dr.  Soto,  who  accompanied  our  party  as  physi- 
cian to  see  that  none  of  us  got  into  ill  health,  and  we  got  from  nim  the  statis- 
tics of  what  little  experience  they  had  had  at  Greytown  with  the  force  that 
they  worked  there  when  he  was  the  company's  physician.  He  asserted  that 
there  had  never  been  a  case  of  yellow  fever  at  Greytown,  unless  it  was 
sx)oradic,  and  had  been  brought  there.  There  had  been  only  four  cases  that 
ho  knew  of  as  a  matter  of  fact,  and  that  the  so-called  yellow  fever,  jungle 
fever,  spotted  fever,  or  whatever  you  call  them,  which  all  belong  to  the  men- 
ingitis type,  were  not  virulent.  That  was  also  the  testimony  of  Dr.  Flint  and 
Dr.  Cole. 

A  year  later  a  physician  came  to  my  place  in  Chicago  and  wanted  to  go 
somewhere  in  the  Tropics.  There  were  four  of  them  in  the  party  bent  on 
new  experiences  and  scientific  collections,  and  I  ad^^sed  Nicaragua,  and  asked 
that  they  investigate  especially  the  health  condition  there. 

One  of  these  gentlemen  turned  up  in  my  oflico  three  or  four  months  ago 
He  had  spent  four  months  in  Nicaragua,  and  as  a  physician  he  had  inquired 
diligently.  He  had  si)ent  part  of  his  time  in  the  Silico  lagoon  country  down 
around  Greytown  himting  alligators  and  collecting  sjpecimens  for  museums. 


He  said  he  had  ahsolntely  no  tronble,  and  he  finally  summed  up  the  situation 
as  his  personal  opinion  that  no  man  need  die  in  Nicaragua  except  of  old  age, 
if  he  will  take  care  of  himself. 

Now,  the  evidence  of  our  own  party  was  that  we  took  15  men  across  the 
Isthmus.  It  was  a  question  whether  wo  should  make  special  provision  and 
take  special  precaution  about  the  water  and  things  of  that  kind.  Mr.  Mason 
very  sensibly  remarked  that  if  we  ever  did  business  in  that  country  we  would 
have  to  drink  the  water  that  was  in  the  country,  and  he  was  going  to  drink 
it  all.  So  we  all  did  the  same.  We  drank  aU  the  water  we  came  to,  from  one 
side  of  the  Isthmus  to  the  other. 

The  Chairman.  Took  it  as  you  came  to  it? 

Mr.  Coo  LEY.  Oh,  yes.  There  were  some  streams  that  we  avoided,  of 
course,  used  otir  horse  sense  about,  just  as  we  would  in  the  United  States. 
And  there  was  no  man  in  our  party  who  suffered  from  it.  On  the  Pacific 
side  we  rode  horses  and  some  of  us  had  not  been  on  horseback  for  years. 
Some  were  men  of  age.  and  we  went  right  out  there  for  four  days  and  camped 
on  the  ground,  and  slept  out  nights.  On  the  Atlantic  side  we  walked  under 
very  great  fatigue  and  camped  out  every  night,  and  no  man  was  inconven- 
ienced, although  the  fatigue  was  as  great  as  you  coTild  experience  under  any 
conditions  in  tiie  United  States. 

None  of  us  experienced  any  inconvenience  except  Mr.  Stephens,  who 
ought  not  to  have  taken  that  trip,  because  he  was  a  man  nearly  60  years  of 
age,  and  he  got  very  much  exhausted,  tired  out,  and  when  he  got  up  to  San 
Jose,  Costa  Rica,  he  had  a  little  touch  of  intermittent  fever  that  lasted  him  a 
week  and  was  vei'y  light.  That  was  the  only  experience  of  that  kind  we 
had.  And  I  feel  confident  that  if  we  had  stopped  at  Greytown  a  couple  of 
days  longer  and  rested,  he  would  not  have  come  down  with  it. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  a  good  fruit  country? 

Mr.  COOLEY.  I  was  shown  an  orange  tree  at  Greytown  from  which  they 
had  picked  200  boxes  of  fruit  the  previous  year. 

The  Chairman.  Two  hundred  boxes? 

Mr.  COOLBY.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  About  how  many  in  a  box? 

Mr.  CooLEY.  I  don't  know  how  many.  There  are  about  125  in  the  ordi- 
nary shipping  box.  That  was  told  to  me  by  the  consul  at  that  point.  At 
Castillo  I  picked  limes  off  of  trees  that  were  loaded. 

On  the  Pacific  side  the  oranges  were  growing  wild.  There  was  no  market 
for  them.    The  citrus  fruits,  I  think,  grow  well  all  the  way  across. 

The  Chairman.  And  cocoa? 

Mr.  CooLBY.  Yes;  that  is  the  chocolate  bean.  Manier,  the  French  choco- 
late man,  whose  brand  you  buy  all  over  the  country,  has  his  plantations  near 
Rivas. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  an  attractive  country  in  its  topography  and  scenery? 

Mr.  CooLEY.  The  shores  of  Lake  Nicaragua  are  beaiitiful  as  a  dream. 
Lake  Nicaragua  is  about  half  as  bi^  as  Lake  Ontario.  If  I  was  leading  the 
ideal  life  which  some  people  are  striving  for  I  should  spend  six  months  of  the 
year  on  Lake  Nicaragua,  or  in  that  valley  there  after  this  canal  was  opened. 

I  feel  a  kind  of  indignation  when  I  hear  people  talk  fiippantly  about  this 
health  question.  I  remember  that  the  army,  the  crack  service  of  the  United 
States,  with  selected  lives,  were  not  able  to  do  as  well  in  Cuba  or  as  well  at 
Chattanooga,  right  in  our  own  country,  as  we  did  on  the  Chicago  Drainage 
Canal  with  8,000  hoboes  picked  up  from  all  creation.  There  we  had  as  good 
a  condition  of  health  as  m  the  best  wards  of  Chicago.  The  health  question 
was  one  that  I  went  into  deeply,  and  I  think  I  can  say  justly  that  through  my 
initiative  in  that  matter  and  through  the  cooperation  of  the  State  board  of 
health  of  Illinois  that  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  great  public  works 
we  produced  an  ideal  condition  of  health. 

The  Chairman.  Ometepe,  which  is  a  little  island  filled  with  volcanoes  that 
I  think  are  extinct,  in  Lake  Nicaragua,  is  referred  to  by  some  medical  au- 
thorities as  being  a  very  excellent  site  for  hospitals  and  for  sanitariums. 

Mr.  CooLEY.  I  think  it  undoubtly  would  be. 

The  Chairman.  For  navigators  and  sailors? 

Mr.  CooiiEY.  I  think  it  undoubtedly  would  be  ideal;  anywhere  on  that 
western  division  is  a  fine  coxmtry.  Up  there  on  the  Brito  headland,  nearly 
400  feet  above  the  sea,  is  an  outlook  that  is  magnificent. 

The  Chairman.  I  believe  that  used  to  be  a  place  of  resort  for  the  coast 
people? 

Mr.  CooLEY.  Yes;  so  I  understand.  I  think  anywhere  around  there  the 
health  conditions  are  excellent. 

MB.  SOKSBY  AND  MR.  DONALDSON,  OUR  CONSULS  IN  NICARAGUA,  TESTIFY. 

If  we  take  the  picture  of  Panama  as  drawn  by  Capt.  Bedfore 
Pirn,  Baron  Humboldt,  and  the  Panama  Canal  Commission,  and 
set  it  beside  that  drawn  by  General  Alexander  and  Mr.  Cooley, 
and  by  Consuls  Sorsby  and  Donaldson,  and  if  we  could  resolve 


37 

every  question  in  favor  of  Panama,  except  that  of  health,  hn- 
manity  wonld  forbid  us  from  priceing  that  priceless  blessing  at 
$5,630,704  and  choosing  a  country  always  subject  to  the  ravages 
of  sickness  for  the  use  of  millions  of  people  in  preference  to  a 
beautiful  and  healthful  canal  route  through  Nicaragua.  Consul 
Donaldson  has  resided  at  Managua,  in  Nicaragua,  since  189a.  He 
went  there  with  the  Ludlow  Commission  as  an  engineer. 

These  depositions  were  taken  in  June,  1900.  They  are  of  great 
importance  and  can  not  be  abbreviated  so  as  to  present  a  correct 
view  of  the  facts  stated  in  them.  A  few  facts  from  each  will 
show  their  knowledge  of  the  healthfulness  of  Nicaragua.  Mr. 
Donaldson  says: 

Q.  I  suppose  your  travels  \7ith  the  engineering  parties  you  accompanied 
through  tne  San  Juan  region  have  given  you  an  opportunity  to  bo  stricken 
with  any  of  the  diseases  of  that  country? 

A.  Yes;  I  have  had  plenty  of  opportunities.  I  have  slept  in  all  sorts  of 
places. 

Q.  Slept  in  wet  clothes? 

A.  I  will  not  say  I  slept  in  wet  clothes,  because  I  always  carried  a  bundle 
wrapped  in  rubber,  so  that  I  could  have  something  dry  to  wear  for  the 
night.  I  have  gone  all  day  in  wet  clothes,  have  put  on  wet  clothes  in  the 
morning,  and  have  done  so  for  months  at  a  time;  but  at  night  I  have  always 
had  dry  i>ajam,as  to  get  into  and  a  dry  blanket,  which  I  kept  rolled  up  in  a 
rubber  sack. 

Q.  That  was  during  your  engineering  work? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Were  any  of  your  party  troubled  with  malaria  or  chills? 

A.  Nobody  m  our  party  had  any  sickness  at  all.  We  had  10  Americans  in 
the  party,  besides  natives. 

Q.  Taking  Nicaragua  from  ocean  to  ocean,  would  you  be  willing  to  say  that 
it  is  a  healthful  or  an  unhealthful  country? 

A.  I  should  say  that  the  country  is  perfectly  healthful.  The  only  unhealth- 
ful places  are  the  cities,  and  that  is  owing  to  their  filthy  conditions. 

Q,  You  have  a  family  of  children? 

A.  I  have  three  children. 

Q.  And  they  have  been  brought  up  in  that  country? 

A.  They  have  been  in  better  health  in  that  country  than  when  they  were 
in  New  York.  My  youngest  little  girl  in  this  country  had  a  bronchial  trouble 
after  she  had  had  the  whooping  cough  in  New  York  at  the  age  of  3.  and  natu- 
rally I  felt  somewhat  anxious  about  taking  her  to  Nicaragua.  But  she  has 
come  back  to  New  York  and  is  to-day  one  of  the  strongest  little  girls  you  ever 
saw— at  the  age  of  8  now. 

Q.  Taking  Nicaragua  from  ocean  to  ocean,  through  and  through,  you 
would  say,  I  supi)ose,  that  it  would  be  a  very  valuable  country  in  the  hands 
of  people  who  had  any  industry  and  thrift? 

A.  Yes.  By  nature  it  is  a  rich  country  and  perfectly  healthful.  There  is 
nothing  under  the  sun  they  need  there  but  industi*y.  It  would  make  a  fine 
country  to  live  in. 

Q.  For  small  farmers,  particularly? 

A.  Yes.  You  can  get  a  splendid  climate  there  by  going  up  3,000  feet,  where 
you  would  not  suffer  from  heat  at  all.  It  is  only  in  the  low  country  where 
you  suffer.  I  have  siiffered  much  more  in  New  York  from  heat  than  I  ever 
have  in  Managua.  There  is  nothing  the  matter  with  the  country;  there  is 
nothing  the  matter  with  the  climate;  the  whole  difliculty  lies  witn  the  peo- 
ple.   They  are  too  easy-going;  they  take  life  very  easily. 

Mr.  Sorsby,  who  has  resided  at  Grey  town  since  1898,  says: 

Senator  Morgan.  Are  the  lands  in  the  valley  of  the  San  Juan  River  valu- 
able—I  mean  for  agricultural  purposes  and  timber? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  They  are,  beginmng  at  about  6  or  7  miles  up  the  river  from 
Grey  town. 

Senator  Morgan.  And  extending  up  to  the  lake? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  Yes,  sir;  except  immediately  on  the  bank  above  Castillo. 

Senator  Morgan.  If  a  ship  canal  were  constructed  through  that  country 
would  it  add  to  the  value  of  those  lands* 

Mr.  Sorsby.  It  would  add  enormously  to  the  value  of  the  lands  from  about 
that  distance  up. 

Sei\ator  Morgan.  What  are  the  chief  agricultural  and  horticultural  pro- 
ductions of  that  country? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  The  chief  production  at  present  on  the  river  is  cacao,  and 
there  is  a  great  deal  of  rubber  brought  out  from  there.  There  are  several 
5162 


mbber  plantations  planted  there.  There  are  several  cattle  ranches  along 
the  river.  There  are  some  bananas  planted;  not  much,  though  it  is  consid- 
ered excellent  for  bananas.  There  is  none  grown  there  now,  because  of  the 
difficulty  of  handling  them,  of  shipping  over  the  bar.  The  woods,  the  tim- 
bers, higher  up  the  river  are  considered  fine  and  good. 

Senator  Mokgan.  What  kind  of  timber  is  it? 

Mr.  SoRSBY.  I  have  seen  various  kind  of  hard  wood. 

Senator  Morgan.  Mahogany? 

Mr.  SoRSBY.  No,  sir;  I  have  not  seen  any  mahogany  there.  Up  the  river, 
near  the  lake,  there  is  quite  a  lot  of  cedar,  red  cedar,  and  several  varieties  of 
cedar.  There  a*e  various  kinds  of  hard  woods  in  there  that  I  do  not  know 
the  names  of. 

Senator  Morgan.  Is  it  a  coffee  country? 

Mr.  SORSBY.  No,  sir.  Between  the  lake  and  Greytown  and  near  the  line  of 
the  proposed  canal,  or  near  the  line  of  the  river,  it  is  not  considered  a  coffee 
country.    The  elevation  is  too  low. 

Senator  Morgan.  Is  it  a  sugar  country? 

Mr.  SoRSBY.  Yes,  sir;  I  think  the  soil  and  climate  admirable  for  the  culti- 
vation of  sugar  cane. 

Senator  Morgan.  Rice? 

Mr.  SoRSBY.  Yes,  sir;  sugar,  rice,  friuts,  and  vegetables  of  all  kinds. 

Senator  Morgan.  Indian  com? 

Mr.  SoRSBY.  I  doubt  that  Indian  com  "woxild  grow  very  well  in  any  part  of 
the  country. 

Senator  MORGAN.  Is  it  a  good  cattle  country? 

Mr.  SORSBY.  Yes,  sir;  a  good  cattle  country. 

Senator  Morgan.  Does  it  appear  to  be  a  well- watered  country? 

Mr.  SoRSBY.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Morgan.  How  about  the  health  of  that  region  between  the  lake 
and  the  seaboard? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  I  can  only  answer  that  by  referring  to  the  men  employed  by 
the  Nicaragua  Canal  Commission. 

Senator  Morgan.  Have  no  people  settled  in  that  region? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  There  are  some  settlements  immediately  on  the  river  banks 
and  up  the  various  rivers  emptying  into  the  San  Juan  River. 

Senator  Morgan.  Leading  into,  you  mean? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  Leading  into  the  San  Juan  River.  I  have  seen  a  great  many 
of  those  people— some  foreigners  are  in  there— living  on  the  San  Carlos  and 
various  other  rivers  leading  into  the  San  Juan  River,  and  the  universal  ex- 
pression is  that  it  is  healthy. 

Senator  Morgan.  Is  there  any  yellow  fever  or  Chagres  fever  in  that 
country? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  There  is  no  yellow  fever  in  any  part  of  Nicaragua. 

Senator  Morgan.  Is  there  any  Chagres  fever? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  No,  sir;  nothing  that  resembles  either  yellow  or  Chagres  fever 
on  the  Atlantic  side.  There  is  no  yellow  fever  in  any  part  of  Nicaragua, 
though  at  Granada  and  Managua  they  have  malarial  fevers.  They  are  quite 
prevalent  during  what  is  known  as  the  dry  season  up  there. 

Senator  Morgan.  That  is  on  the  lake? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  Yes,sir;  on  the  two  lakes.  It  is  attributed  to  the  bad  sanitary 
conditions  and  the  water  that  is  used. 

Senator  Morgan.  If  I  understand  you  correctly,  tne  valley  of  the  San 
Juan  River  is  very  sparsely  inhabited? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Morgan.  Is  the  forest  heavy? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  The  undergrowth  is  very  heavy. 

Senator  Morgan.  Almost  impenetrable? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Morgan.  What  is  the  effect  of  the  rainfall  in  that  part  of  Nica- 
ragua upon  the  health  and  comfort  of  those  living  in  that  region? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  I  think  it  is  beneficial  to  health.  It  is  inconvenient.  It  has 
the  effect  of  keeping  fresh  water  in  all  the  lagoons  there.  The  engineers  of 
the  canal  commission  tell  me  that  they  drank  their  water  out  of  the  lagoons 
and  streams,  and  it  was  good.  In  Greytown  it  serves  to  freshen  the  atmos- 
phere, and  there  is  very  little  sickness  during  the  rainy  system. 

Senator  Morgan.  I  gather  from  your  statement,  then,  that  the  rainfall 
there  would  neither  be  deleterious  to  the  health  of  the  country  nor  to  the 
construction  or  preservation  of  such  a  work  as  a  canal  with  embankments? 

Mr.  Sorsby.  It  certainly  would  not  affect  the  preservation,  judging  from 
the  indication  shown  by  tne  work  that  has  been  done  there.  It  might  be 
inconvenient.  Constant  rainfall  would  naturally  be  inconvenient  to  a  day 
laborer.  It  is  con.sidered  there  that  that  is  the  healthiest  jjart  of  the  year  in 
Qre3rtown  and  vicinity. 

I  thought  these  features  of  the  case  of  sufficient  importance  to 
require  that  the  facts  should  be  presented  in  some  detail. 

6162 


Under  the  health  conditions  as  they  are  and  will  remain  it 
seems  impossible  that  the  United  States  can  furnish  the  money 
and  take  the  risk  of  the  sacrifice  of  lives  that  are  necessary  to 
purchase  and  complete  the  canal  at  Panama. 

POLICE  POWERS   NECESSARY  IN  SANITATION. 

Connected  with  the  health  conditions  at  Panama,  in  such  a 
way  that  it  is  inseparable,  is  the  question  of  police  jurisdiction 
and  control  of  the  bays  of  Colon  and  Panama,  and  of  these  cities. 
A  joint  control  of  these  places  is  indispensable  to  sanitation  and 
the  preservation  of  the  peace.     , 

A  mixed  or  joint  control  is  incongruous,  irritating,  and  danger- 
ous.   In  fact,  it  is  utterly  inadmissible. 

The  city  of  Panama  is  the  capital  of  a  State  of  Panama,  and 
lies  within  less  than  3  miles  of  the  Panama  Canal;  and  the  Pan- 
ama Railroad  enters  the  city. 

It  can  not  be  reasonably  expected  that  the  powers  of  local  gov- 
ernment vested  in  that  State  and  necessary  for  the  control  of  its 
capital  city,  whatever  they  may  be,  will  be  yielded  to  the  United 
States  in  whole  or  in  part;  or,  if  that  should  occur,  that  we 
could  expect  to  use  them  with  such  vigor  and  so  exclusively  as  is 
necessary  in  sanitation  and  quarantine. 

In  all  our  efforts  to  repress  the  contagion  of  yellow  fever  the 
highest  powers  of  government,  both  State  and  Federal,  have 
been  necessarily  resorted  to,  and  even  these  have  been  frequently 
ineffectual  to  prevent  bands  of  private  persons  from  anned  inter- 
ference with  the  regulations  established  by  law. 

Personal  liberty,  in  its  most  personal  and  individual  sense,  is 
always  involved  in  the  execution  of  health  regulations,  and  such 
occasions  require  the  exertion  of  the  most  direct  and  arbitrary 
authority,  backed  by  force  in  frequent  instances. 

It  will  be  in  vain  that  we  will  hope  to  control  or  suppress  yel- 
low fever  or  the  bubonic  plague,  cholera,  beri-beri,  or  leprosy,  to 
all  of  which  Panama  is  at  all  times  exposed,  when  either  Panama 
or  Colombia  is  to  be  allowed  a  voice  in  the  regulations  we  must 
adopt,  or  in  the  selection  and  control  of  the  men  who  are  to  enforce 
them.  It  is  sheer  folly  to  undertake  such  a  conflict  as  is  required 
to  suppress  yellow  fever  with  forces  divided  and  alien  to  each 
other,  in  the  midst  of  a  mixed  throng  of  low-grade  people. 

The  control  of  the  trade  and  intercourse  between  Colon  and 
Panama,  the  State  capital,  and  Carthagena,  the  commercial  cap- 
ital, and  Bogota,  the  political  capital  of  Colombia,  by  the  con- 
cessionaires of  a  canal,  except  by  force  or  by  some  special  agree- 
ment, is  impossible.  The  people  of  those  places  will  not  tolerate 
sanitary  regulations  that  will  prevent  their  free  intercourse.  The 
importance  of  this  exclusive  control  of  sanitation  is  gi*eatly  mag- 
nified when  we  attempt  to  apply  the  necessary  regulations,  at  all 
times  and  without  relaxation,  as  they  must  be  applied  to  the  oc- 
cupants of  Panama  City  and  to  the  intercourse  of  the  people  of 
all  nations  through  this  highway  of  the  world. 

If  the  regulations  are  not  of  absolute  authority  and  strictly  and 
continually  enforced,  the  canal  ^vill  become  an  artery  for  the  dis- 
semination of  diseases  through  the  world. 

WHY  WE  ARE  AGAIN  IN  PANAMA  WITH  WAR  SHIPS. 

In  1846  we  entered  into  a  treaty  agreement  with  New  Gran- 
ada— now  Colombia — to  guarantee  the  sovereignty  of  that  Repub- 
lic over  the  State  of  Panama.    The  consideration  for  this  agree- 

5102 


irn?iit,  as  it  was  expressed  in  tlie  treaty,  was  of  little  value  aa 
compared  with  the  burden  of  this  engagement,  which  has  proven 
to  be  serious  and  is  now  a  source  of  expense,  anxiety,  and  trouble 
to  us.  The  real  consideration  was  that  our  duty  of  protection 
was  exclusive  and  carried  with  it  the  right  to  admit  or  refuse 
other  nations  to  assume  a  like  close  relation  with  Colombia. 
This  became  manifest  when  Great  Britain  and  France,  on  the 
suggestion  of  Colombia,  sought  to  share  with  the  United  States 
these  burdens  and  obligations,  which  we  refused;  and  so  the  mat- 
ter stands  to-day. 

In  1846  Colombia  had  a  single  purpose  in  making  that  treaty, 
which  was,  with  our  assistance,  to  hold  the  State  of  Panama  sub- 
ject to  her  sovereign  dominion.  The  same  cause  exists  to-day,  and 
the  danger  against  which  Colombia  was  providing  is  greater  than 
it  was  in  1 846 ,  and  for  stronger  reasons.  The  cause  is  that  Panama 
has  always  been  averse  to  the  union  with  Colombia,  preferring 
independence  or  a  union  with  the  other  isthmian  States.  They 
have  no  patriotic  sentiment  and  no  identity  of*  business  relations 
to  support  the  union  with  the  continental  States  of  Colombia. 
Conste-nt  jealousy  has,  on  four  occasions,  broken  out  into  open 
wars  of  insurrection  since  1846. 

There  have  been  and  are  still  internecine  wars,  and  are  all  po- 
litical in  character.  Holding  Panama  in  the  leash  bound  to  Co- 
lombia, as  we  have  been  compelled  to  do  and  are  now  doing,  we 
incur  the  natural  resentment  of  those  people,  nearly  all  of  whose 
possessions  of  any  real  value  are  at  the  canal  terminals  or  near  to 
its  line. 

AN  TJNTRrENDLY  PEOPLE  IN  PANAMA. 

If  we  acquire  control  of  those  people,  along  with  the  bays,  the 
cities,  the  railroad,  and  the  canal,  we  will  encounter  the  serious 
difficulty  of  using  and  operating  them  among  an  unfriendly  people. 

Power  alone  can  not  be  relied  upon  to  protect  a  canal  under 
such  conditions,  and  the  task  is  full  of  dangers,  especially  where 
the  country  is  already  occupied  by  insubordinate  and  revolutionary 
elements.  We  may  get  along  without  it,  but  the  experiment  is  very 
costly  at  the  price  of  $5,630,704,  with  an  additional  stipend  to  be 
paid  to  Colombia.  Panama  must  be  paid  at  least  the  $25,000  per 
annum,  secured  to  her  in  the  railroad  concession,  for  more  than 
sixty  years  to  come,  or  for  all  time,  if  the  lease  is  to  be  made  per- 
petual, because  she  holds  that  right  against  the  railroad  company 
under  and  as  part  of  the  concession  of  Colombia  to  the  Panama 
Railroad,  which  has  been  enacted  as  a  public  statute  by  the 
Colombian  Congress. 

When  Panama  shall  hereafter  seek  to  increase  her  allowance  as 
the  price  of  peace  and  good  conduct  toward  the  canal,  as  she  cer- 
tainly will,  we  will  naturally  expect  trouble. 

THERE  IS  NO  ADVERSE  CONDITION  IN  NICARAGUA  OR  COSTA  RICA. 

These  political,  sanitary,  police,  and  social  conditions  are  quite 
the  reverse  on  the  Nicaragua  route.  There  we  have  no  natural 
causes  of  epidemic  diseases  to  remove,  and  yellow  fever  has  never 
been  a  visitor  to  the  region  in  which  the  canal  is  located.  It  is  a 
salubrious  country,  constantly  fanned  by  the  trade  winds,  with  a 
temperature  that  varies  only  30  degrees,  between  56  and  96  Fah- 
renheit, with  a  lake  system,  45  miles  across  and  140  miles  long,  in 
the  center  of  the  land,  over  which  these  winds  move  without  ob- 
struction. 

The  island  of  Ometepe,  in  Lake  Nicaragua,  has  been  selected  by 

6162 


41 

the  common  judgment  of  travelers  as  a  sanitarium  for  seamen 
who  will  pass  it  on  their  long  and  weary  voyages.  The  beautifnl 
country  is  a  place  of  refreshment  for  all  voyagers,  abounding  in 
excellent  fruits  and  supplies  of  fresh  foods.  The  lake  can  be  con- 
veniently utilized  for  the  repairs  of  vessels,  even  to  the  cleansing 
of  the  bottoms  from  the  accumulation  of  sea  grasses  and  barnacles 
that  lower  their  speed  while  they  are  en  voyage  passing  through 
its  fresh  waters. 

But  a  much  greater  advantage  as  to  sanitation  and  police  is  the 
fact  that  this  fertile  country  is  practically  unoccupied,  and,  un- 
der our  control,  the  future  occupants  will  be  subject  to  our  selec- 
tion. Bad  characters  can  not  congregate  in  the  canal  belt  or  in 
the  ports,  if  we  object.  In  Panama  this  vital  question  is  one  of 
expulsion.  In  Nicaragua  it  is  a  question  of  our  permission.  The 
difference  is  wide  enough  and  sufficiently  important  to  make  it 
fundamental  in  the  choice  of  a  canal  route. 

At  Panama  it -is  a  question  of  purging  out  the  bad  characters 
found  in  a  low-grade  population  of  30,000  in  a  district  of  35 
miles. 

At  Nicaragua  the  question  is  whether  we  will  tolerate  bad  men, 
or  demoralizing  occupations,  in  the  building  up  of  the  cities,  towns, 
and  farms  in  the  canal  belt,  which  has  not  more  than  2,000  in- 
habitants in  a  distance  of  183  miles. 

There  is  no  economic  question  connected  with  the  future  man- 
agement of  the  canal  of  more  importance  than  that  of  peopling 
the  canal  belt  and  the  terminal  cities  with  proper  occupants. 

I  am  only  touching  the  outline  of  all  these  vital  questions, 
leaving  the  further  and  better  discussions  of  their  merits  to 
others. 

THE  POLITICAL  COOPEIIATTON  OF  THREE  REPUBLICS. 

It  is  a  political  situation  of  great  moment,  and  it  is  a  cause  of 
sincere  gratification  to  the  three  Republics  concerned  in  this  canal 
that  their  interests  are  unified  and  not  discordant,  as  the  interests 
of  the  State  of  Panama  are  toward  those  of  Colombia. 

Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  and  the  United  States,  if  they  unite  in 
establishing  this  canal  by  agreement,  are  not  seeking  profits  from 
its  earnings,  but  from  the  general  prosperity  it  will  bring  to  the 
Governments  and  the  people  of  the  three  Republics.  No  local 
dissension  can  arise  in  either  Republic  to  question  its  sovereign 
power  to  enter  into  or  to  keep  the  compact,  such  as  may  arise  in 
Panama. 

The  maintainance,  safety,  and  prosperity  of  the  canal  is  so 
identified  with  the  growth  and  solidarity  of  Costa  Rica  and  Nica- 
ragua, from  which  it  is  inseparable,  that  they  will  gladly  con- 
tribute all  their  governmental  and  moral  power  to  its  support  and 
protection.  They  will  both  be  jealous  for  the  safety  and  prosper- 
ity of  the  canal,  with  no  cause  for  jealousy  toward  each  other  as 
to  ownership  or  control,  and  the  United  States  will  he  bound  to 
both  in  every  bond  of  regard  and  sympathy  and  by  the  great  and 
overruling  necessity  of  shortening  the  distance  between  all  our 
Eastern  ports  on  the  Great  Lakes,  the  Atlantic  and  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  and  our  ports  and  possessions  along  the  coast  and  in  the 
islands  of  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

There  seems  to  be  no  room  for  disagreement  in  future,  when 
our  mutual  interests  are  common  to  each  Republic,  and  are  en- 
tirely separated  from  competition  with  each  other.  Such  accord 
and  concurrence  in  the  establishment  of  this  gi-eat  benefaction  U} 

5162 


42 

mankind  is  a  new  and  splendid  proof  of  the  unity  and  harmony 
of  principle  that  exists  in  the  spirit  and  purpose  of  republican 
government. 

TBANSPORTATION  IN  SAILING  SHIPS. 

A  greater  question  than  any  I  have  tried  to  present,  so  far  as  it 
affects  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  and  the  prosperity  of 
those  who  create  commerce  by  production,  manufactures,  and 
transportation,  is  directly  presented  in  the  proposition  to  purchase 
and  complete  the  Panama  Canal. 

That  question  is,  whether  vessels  propelled  by  sail  will  be  driven 
from  the  ocean  trade  and  ultimately  from  existence,  by  vessels 
propelled  by  steam.  This  prediction  is  urged  by  the  Panamists 
as  an  inevitable  fact.  It  is  a  prophecy  of  evil  to  mankind,  which 
Congress  is  asked  to  assist  in  fulfilling  speedily.  If  it  is  a  proph- 
ecy like  that  which  chained  the  blinded  Sampson  to  the  pillars 
of  the  temple,  the  result  will  be  equally  destructive  to  all. 

It  is  a  disturbing  thought  and  a  distressing  forecast,  that  the 
alleged  rapid  progress  of  civilization,  through  commercial  ex- 
pansion, requires  that  we  should  discard  the  ocean  winds  that 
have  built  up  commerce  from  its  cradle. 

It  is  neither  commercial  wisdom  nor  common  sense  that  would 
cause  the  world  to  dispense  with  this  incalculable  power  of  the 
ocean  winds  in  propelling  vessels,  that  is  the  free  gift  of  the 
Creator,  and  is  always  ready  for  use,  to  take  up  steam  as  the  mo- 
tive power  of  ships  of  commerce  only  for  the  reason  that  time  is 
saved  in  making  voyages. 

The  saying  that  "time  is  money,"  which  alone  accounts  for 
this  attempted  destructive  revolution  in  commercial  economics, 
means  that  money  and  credit  are  to  supplant  the  benevolence  of 
the  All- wise  Creator  in  conferring  this  blessing  upon  all  the  gen- 
erations of  men. 

That  condition  has  not  been  reached  and  we  will  not  witness 
the  day  of  its  arrival.  Our  effort  to  hasten  it  will  fail.  May 
God  protect  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  world 
against  that  day. 

I  have  less  dread  of  its  realization  because  the  prophets  of  this 
evil  are  driven  to  this  course  of  reasoning  by  the  weight  of  the 
fact  that  the  calm  belt  off  the  bay  of  Panama  is  impracticable 
for  the  profitable  employment  of  sailing  vessels.  It  is  an  absurd 
theory,  adopted  as  the  only  escape  from  a  fatal  dilemma.  If 
"the  wish  is  not  fathei*  to  the  thought,"  the  thought  at  least  is 
not  disturbing  to  the  advocates  of  the  Panama  route.  They  ac- 
cept it  as  a  decree  of  fate,  with  philosophic  indifference  to  the 
result.  They  openly  avow  that  the  Panama  Canal  is  to  be  com- 
pleted without  any  reference  whatever  to  the  interests  or  advan- 
tages of  the  owners  and  navigators  of  sailing  vessels  or  any  losses 
they  may  sustain  through  the  assistance  of  Congress  to  increase 
competitive  advantages  of  vessels  propelled  by  steam. 

THE   ISSUE    IS    SQUARELY  MADE  AND    THIS  CONGRESS  WILL  DECIDE  IT  ON 
THIS  BILL. 

No  more  reckless  an  attitude  was  ever  taken  with  reference  to 
an  economic  question,  or  with  less  benevolence,  reason,  or  jus- 
tice to  support  it.  But  by  confession  of  the  advocates  of  the 
Panama  route,  boldly  stated,  and  by  the  pressure  of  facts  that 
can  not  be  controverted  or  avoided  the  issue  is  squarely  made 
and  must  be  met. 

L162 


43 

Since  the  era  in  which  Job  spoke  of  those  "  that  go  down  to 
the  sea  in  ships,"  the  winds  have  been  as  necessary  to  sea  travel 
and  commerce  as  the  rains  have  been  to  the  productions  of  the 
soil,  and  it  is  as  likely  that  men  and  animals  will  abandon,  the 
brooks  and  springs  and  take  to  hot  drinks  as  it  is  that  steam  will 
supplant  the  winds  in  the  movement  of  ships. 

Steam  represents  the  mechanical  force  of  expansion,  caused  by 
heat  operating  upon  water,  while  the  winds  represent  that 
force,  combined  with  the  force  of  gravitation,  oi)erating  upon 
the  air,  a  highly  elastic  agent.  Through  these  qualities  the  winds 
transport  themselves  to  the  places  where  they  are  needed  for  com- 
merce, by  the  action  of  natural  laws,  and  they  are  unfailing  in 
supply  and  in  volume  and  power.  They  are  almost,  if  not  quite 
as  certain  as  "  the  stai*s  in  their  courses,"  and  require  no  prep- 
aration of  human  labor  or  skill  to  prepare  them  for  their  work, 
or  to  marshal  them  in  their  constant  array  to  answer  the  calls  of 
the  Master,  who  directs  the  breezes  and  rules  and  guides  the 
tempests. 

The  winds  are  not  dug  from  the  deep  mines  under  the  moun- 
tains and  transported  on-  railroads  to  the  seaboard  as  coals  are, 
and  they  require  no  human  help  to  cross  the  seas  to  some  coaling 
station,  again  to  be  handled  and  transferred  to  coal  bunkers, 
and  again  handled  in  furnace  rooms  of  ships  under  the  severest 
exactions  upon  human  health  and  strength.  The  winds,  once 
used,  return  to  the  places  where  they  were  found,  awaiting  the 
service  of  man,  with  all  their  vigor  and  elastic  force.  But  coals, 
when  once  they  are  used  to  generate  power,  disappear  and  can  not 
be  recreated.  They  create  a  vacuum  in  eai-th  and  air  that  they 
can  not  restore. 

Comparing  these  forces,  a  child  should  understand  the  imi>er- 
ishable  nature  and  value  of  the  winds,  and  be  able  to  contrast 
them  with  the  perishable  forces  generated  from  coal,  which  con- 
sume themselves  in  the  use.  If  the  winds  did  not  come  to  the  aid 
of  coal,  to  transport  it  to  the  points  where  it  is  to  be  used  in 
steamships,  the  percentage  consumed  in  tliis  transportation,  like 
an  eating  cancer,  would  soon  destroy  the  body  that  supports  it. 

Africa,  South  America,  the  Pacific  coasts  of  Russia  and  North 
America,  and  the  vast  area  of  southern  Asia  are  so  scantily  sux>- 
plied  with  coal  that  the  commerce  of  those  regions  could  not  be 
transported  by  the  power  of  steam  that  they  could  supply  during 
a  period  of  even  a  half  century.  The  rapid-transit  commerce  of 
those  regions,  which  only  includes  such  commodities  as  c^n  bear 
the  burden  of  heavy  freight  rates,  is  transported  in  steamers  that 
burn  coals  from  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  Australia,  and 
the  United  States.  The  coal  supply  of  the  Eastern  Hemisphere 
begins  to  fall  away,  and  all  Europe,  including  Germany  and  Great 
Britain,  are  beginning  to  import  coals  from  America. 

That  fact  strikes  the  vain  notion  dead,  that  steamships  will 
ever  drive  sailing  ships  from  the  oceans.  This  fact  is  exemplified 
in  the  lists  of  steamships  and  sailing  ships  built  in  the  United 
States  in  1901,  which  I  will  append  to  my  remarks. 

On  the  contrary,  the  cost  of  steam  transportation,  as  it  affects 
commerce  in  the  coarser  and  cheai)er  articles  of  traffic,  is  so 
burdensome  to  countries  that  have  scant  supplies  of  coal  tliat 
France  is  granting  heavy  subsidies  to  sailing  vessels,  with  the 
effect  of  a  rapid  growth  of  such  tonnage  under  her  flag  within 


44 

the  past  five  years,  and  Norway-Sweden  is  rapidly  increasing 
her  merchant  sailing  fleet. 

THE  INCREASE  OF  STEAMSHIPS. 

After  the  opening  of  the  Suez  Canal  in  1871  there  was  a  rapid 
increase  in  the  number  and  tonnage  of  steamships  for  ocean  serv- 
ice, in  which  Great  Britain  led  all  other  countries  and  hegan  by 
pouring  subsidies  into  their  coffers. 

This  movement  was  in  pursuance  of  a  great  and  necessary 
national  policy  of  Great  Britain  far  more  than  as  a  result  of  any 
legitimate  commercial  demand  for  rapid  or  cheap  transportation. 
Great  Britain  had  her  Pacific-  possessions  to  guard  and  care  for. 
She  had  Egypt  and  South  Africa  to  look  after,  and  the  trade  of 
India  to  continue  to  hold  in  the  grasp  of  monopoly.  She  had  Rus- 
sia to  exclude  from  the  Mediterranean,  and  France,  Italy,  Ger- 
many, Spain,  and  Portugal  to  compete  with  for  the  traffic  of  the 
Orient. 

There  were  no  winds  in  the  Red  Sea  to  move  sailing  ships,  and 
there  were  dangerous  winds  in  the  Indian  Ocean  and  fitful  winds 
in  the  Mediterranean  that  rendered  sailing  ships  useless  on  the 
Suez  Canal  route.  She  purchased  the  stock  of  the  Khedive  in  the 
canal  en  bloc,  and,  while  it  was  not  the  majority  of  the  stock  of 
the  canal  company,  it  enabled  her  to  put  her  directors  in  that 
company,  which  she  did.  And  by  repressive  influences  of  a  dip- 
lomatic sort  she  strangled  the  possible  competition  of  an  Ameri- 
can isthmian  waterway,  while  she  was  reaping  great  profits  from 
her  Suez  Canal  stock  and  was  forcing  new  channels  of  trade 
through  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

It  was  not  that  she  abandoned  her  long-settled  policy  of  building 
sailing  ships  as  the  burden  bearers  of  commerce,  but  because  she 
needed  more  steamships  for  emergent  service  to  work  the  Suez 
Canal  and  to  maintain  her  supremacy  on  the  sea. 

The  proof  of  this  is  clear  when  the  rapid  and  great  increase  of 
sailing-ship  tonnage  to  Australia  and  around  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  is  considered. 

In  1884  vessels  aggregating  1,565,649  tons  entered  and  cleared 
at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  In  the  year  1898  this  tonnage 
amounted  to  5,602,955,  a  fivefold  increase  in  fourteen  years. 
The  proportion  of  sailing  ships  in  this  increased  tonnage  was 
greater  than  it  was  before  the  Suez  Canal  was  opened.  It  was 
the  Suez  Canal  fleet  of  steamers  that  she  so  rapidly  increased 
with  the  stimulus  of  subsidies,  while  her  sailing  ships  increased 
without  such  aids. 

AMERICAN  VESSELS  AND    THEIR  TONNAGE, 

On  page  1146  of  the  Hearings  Professor  Johnson  gives  the  ton- 
nage of  registered  American  vessels  as  follows: 

Steamers,  1,183,000  tons;  sailing  vessels,  1,360,000  tons,  show- 
ing an  excess  of  177,000  tons  in  favor  of  sailing  ships.  Having 
reached  this  safe  equilibrium,  the  sailing-ship  construction  is  re- 
suming its  activity  and  is  steadily  growing.  It  does  not  grow  so 
rapidly  as  steamships  in  tonnage,  but  more  rapidly  in  the  num- 
ber of  vessels. 

Ships  enrolled  for  the  coastwise  trade  are  not  included  in  the 
above  statement,  and  the  professor  states  that  three-fifths  of  the 
coastwise  trade  is  conducted  in  sailing  ships. 

It  is  needless  to  speculate  how  or  why  these  conditions  have 


45 

occnrred.  They  are  actual  and  existing  conditions,  established 
by  actual  computations  in  iBgures.  They  certainly  do  not  justify 
adverse  prophecies  as  to  their  ultimate  disappearance. 

The  proposition  to  create  a  canal  by  drawing  on  the  treasury  of 
the  people,  and  to  locate  it  where  sailing  ships  can  not  use  it,  be- 
cause of  the  calm  belt  into  which  its  Pacific  terminus  opens,  thereby 
depriving  more  than  half  the  tonnage  of  the  United  States  of  all 
advantage  from  it,  is  simply  monstrous,  when  taken  by  itself. 

It  is  grievously  unjust  when  it  drives  sailing  ships,  built  on 
either  coast,  from  access  to  the  other,  even  around  Cai)e  Horn,  in 
profitable  voyages,  by  giving  to  steamships  the  advantage  of 
more  than  10,000  miles  in  distance  in  passing  to  and  from  the 
North  Atlantic  and  North  Pacific,  and  by  shutting  them  off  from 
such  opportunity  it  is  unjust  to  all  commercial  men  and  to  all 
producers  and  manufacturers  by  destroying  more  than  one-half 
the  competition  beween  water  transportation  and  railroad  trans- 
portation on  commodities  that  find  their  interchangeable  mar- 
kets on  our  sea  coasts,  lake  shores,  and  gulf  coasts  from  Sitka 
around  to  Duluth. 

It  is  ruinous  to  individual  enterprise  in  the  building,  owning, 
and  navigating  sailing  ships,  by  turning  over  the  whole  business 
of  ocean  transportation  to  the  owners  of  costly  steamer  lines,  and 
putting  the  commercial  dominion  of  the  seas  in  the  hands  of  cor- 
porate trusts,  and  of  the  combiner;  of  the  sceptered  masters  of 
finance  and  credit  who  are  called  capitalists. 

There  is  no  American  need  of  such  exclusive  privileges,  and  it 
is  sheer  spoliation  to  tax  the  people  to  the  extent  of  $180,000,000 
in  this  generation  to  construct  the  canal  and  in  all  coming  gener- 
ations to  make  them  pay  tolls  on  their  productions  to  support 
such  privileged  classes,  while  they  will  gather  harvests  of  gold 
from  their  labors. 

I  pass  by  the  contracts  of  the  Panama  Railroad  with  other  lines 
of  transports  now  existing  and  have  in  the  recent  past  extorted 
hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars  from  producers,  chiefly  from  the 
people  of  the  Pacific  slope,  to  which  agreements  the  United  States 
will  become  a  party  when  it  buys  the  Panama  Railroad,  with  the 
consent  of  New  York.  As  compared  with  the  destruction  of  our 
sailing  ships  that  we  would  surely  visit  upon  them  in  purchasing 
and  completing  the  Panama  Canal,  this  is  even  a  smaller  naatter 
than  the  inheritance  of  the  Panama  scandals,  which  will  stink  in 
the  nostrils  of  all  men  who  live  and  all  who  shall  follow  us. 

When  the  era  of  destruction  has  overtaken  the  sailing  ships, 
which  is  so  flippantly  predicted  by  our  economic  soothsayers, 
then,  also,  will  come  the  era  of  lockouts  and  strikes  in  the  coal 
mines  of  the  leading  producers  of  "  sea  power,"  and  commerce 
will  be  brought  to  a  standstill,  a  dead  center,  in  all  the  seaports 
of  the  world.  Labor  may  then  have  its  dire  revenge  upon  capi- 
tal, unless  armies  are  interposed  to  compel  miners  to  work,  to 
produce  coal  to  propel  the  ships  of  war  and  commerce. 

I  can  think  of  no  more  helpless  state  in  which  the  world's  com- 
merce would  be  found  than  the  realization  of  these  dreams  of  our 
learned  pundits,  who  so  confidently  and  with  such  a  smiling  air 
of  hope  look  forward  to  the  abolishment  of  sailing  ships  as  in- 
convenient tools  of  trade. 

I  would  then  be  hopeless  of  relief  through  even  the  magical 
skill  of  the  associated  peace  arbitrators,  who  now  promise  a  great 

5162 


46 

remedy  for  a  very  slight  attack  of  this  annual  visitation  of  lock- 
outs and  strikes.  If  the  world  is  to  be  destroyed  by  fire  in  the 
end  of  all  things,  I  would  dread  the  destruction  of  the  sailing 
ship  by  the  fires  of  the  steamers  as  the  beginning  of  the  end. 

THE  VALUE  OF  A  DAY  IN  THE  VOYAGE  BETWEEN  CUB  ATLANTIC  AND 
PACIFIC  COASTS. 

If  steamers  are  so  essential  to  the  speed  of  commercial  inter- 
course, or  if  the  emergencies  of  war  demand  the  shortest  line 
and  the  quickest  voyage  for  our  armed  fleets  for  their  rapid  con- 
centration, the  advantage  of  a  day  may  be  vital  to  the  country 
in  the  one  case  or  to  the  merchant  in  the  other.  And  the  cost  of 
even  a  day's  voyage,  when  applied  to  1^000  ships  through  an  in- 
definite reach  of  time,  will  be  a  loss  of  incalculable  sums  to  the 
persons  or  the  government  that  owns  the  ships. 

Ascertained  facts,  as  to  which  there  is  no  real  controversy, 
demonstrate  the  assertion  that  on  a  round  trip  between  ports  of 
the  North  Atlantic  and  the  North  Pacific  oceans  there  is  an 
actual  loss  of  not  less  than  three  days,  or  seventy-two  hours,  be- 
tween the  voyages  of  steamers  that  will  pass  through  a  canal 
at  Panama  as  compared  with  the  same  steamers  on  voyages  to 
and  from  the  same  ports  passing  through  the  canal  at  Nicaragua. 

This  is  a  vital  point  in  the  economic  question  involved  in  the 
choice  of  routes,  and  it  is  due  to  its  importance  that  it  should  be 
established  in  a  satisfactory  manner. 

If  we  will  strain  our  thoughts  up  to  the  conception  of  the  ac- 
tual loss  of  time  and  money  that  will  fall  upon  the  owners  of 
steam  vessels  that  will  pass  through  an  isthmian  canal  in  a  hun- 
dred years,  which  is  the  shortest  period  for  any  proposed  lease  of 
canal  privileges,  and  if  we  will  add  to  it  the  loss  that  mil  fall 
upon  the  owners  of  cargoes,  we  -will  find  that  the  route  which  is 
shortest  by  three  days  would  be  the  cheapest  to  the  American 
people  if  it  cost  $500,000,000  more  than  the  longer  route,  and  that 
$5,030,704  saved  in  the  proposed  bargain  would  not  pay  the  inter- 
est on  that  sum  for  a  single  year. 

Sailing  ships,  in  this  connection,  being  entirely  excluded  from 
consideration,  the  sailing  distances  for  steamers  between  the 
same  teiininals  of  a  voyage  through  the  respective  routes  and  the 
speed  of  the  same  vessels,  as  it  is  eifected  by  the  tides  on  each 
coast  and  the  length  and  the  curvature  of  each  canal,  and  the  ad- 
vantages of  speed  derived  from  a  voyage  through  fresh  water, 
are  the  factors  that  decide  this  important  economic  question. 

THE  VOYAGE  OF  THE  OREGON. 

These  points  are  conclusively  established  by  the  testimony  in 
favor  of  the  Nicaraguan  route.  The  dimensions  of  the  ship  se- 
lected by  the  witnesses  for  the  test  is  5,000  tons'  burden,  and  the 
normal  rate  of  speed  is  10  knots  an  hour,  or  250  miles  per  day. 
The  distance,  computed  between  Key  West,  which  is  an  average 
central  point  on  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coast,  and  San  Francisco, 
our  chief  mart  of  trade  on  the  Pacific,  is  shown  in  the  following 
official  statement  of  the  Navy  Department  as  to  the  voyage  of 
the  Oregon  during  the  war  with  Spain.  This  distance  is  3,665 
knots  by  the  Nicaragua  route,  measured  by  the  shortest  practi- 
cable line  of  navigation,  and  3,750  knots  measured  by  "a  route 
thfit  avoids  all  shoal  water  and  is  absolutely  safe  for  navigating 
battle  ships." 

By  the  Panama  route  the  distance  is  4,363  knots,  and  the  dif- 

6162 


47 


ference  in  distance  is  613  knots  in  favor  of  Nicaragua  by  the  ronte 
that  is  absohitely  safe  for  battle  ships,  and  965  knots  by  a  route 
that  is  practicable  for  battle  ships  and  must  be  entirely  safe  for 
5,000-ton  merchant  steamers. 

But  the  supreme  need  for  the  canal  being  governmental,  in  case 
of  national  emergency,  the  distance  of  613  knots  to  the  credit  of  the 
Nicaragua  route  is  adopted  for  the  further  basis  of  computation 
as  to  the  saving  of  distance,  time,  and  money  by  that  route. 

The  voyage  of  the  Oregon,  as  it  is  stated  by  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment, with  reference  to  time,  distance,  and  the  cost  to  the  Gov- 
ernment, is  as  follows: 

MEMORANDUM  REGARDING  THE  PASSAGE  OF  THE  OREGON  ITROM  THB 
ATLANTIC  TO  THE  PACIFIC. 

The  U.  S.  S.  Oregon  left  San  Francisco  on  March  19, 1898,  with  1,567.4  tons 
of  coal  on  board.  Of  this  coal,  l,127i  tons  had  been  taken  on  board  in  San 
Francisco,  at  a  cost  of  $7.95  per  ton,  and  the  remaining  439.9  tons  had  been  on 
board  previously,  at  a  cost  of  $5.50  per  ton,  making  the  total  value  of  coal  on 
board  |ll,l]2.6o  and  the  average  value  per  ton  $7.09. 

Coal  was  received  on  the  trip  at  Callao,  Peru,  Sandy  Point,  Chile,  Rio  de 
Janeiro,  Brazil,  and  Barbados,  West  Indies,  and  the  vessel  arrived  at  Key 
West  with  251.8  tons  of  the  coal  originally  on  board  at  San  Francisco. 

In  regard  to  the  cost  of  the  trip  through  either  the  Nicaraguan  or  Panama 
canal,  the  following  distances  were  furnished  by  the  Hydi'ographic  Office, 
Navy  Department: 

Knots. 

San  Francisco  to  Brito  (west  end  of  Nicaragua  Canal) 2,700 

Jan  Juan  del  Norte  to  Key  West 965 

San  Francisco  to  Panama - 3,277 

Colon  to  Key  West 1,086 

The  following  table  shows  the  cost  of  coal  for  the  trip  in  making  the  pas- 
sage to  Key  West  from  San  Francisco  by  the  Nicaraguan  and  Panama  canals, 
based  on  the  knots  per  ton  of  coal  and  cost  of  coal  taken  on  board  in  San 
Francisco,  which  coal  would  have  been  enough  in  either  case  to  make  the 
entii'e  trip: 


Nicaragua  Canal. 

Panama  Canal. 

Dis- 
tance. 

Coal. 

Coal, 
cost. 

Dis- 
tance. 

Coal. 

Coal, 
cost. 

San  Francisco  to  end  of 
canal                           . 

Miles. 

2,700 

.      170 

965 

Tons. 

651.7 

41 

232.9 

$4,620.00 
290.69 

1,651.26 

Miles. 

3,277 

50 

1,068 

Tons. 
791 
12.1 

257.8 

$5,608.19 

Through  canal 

85.79 

From  eastern  end  of  canal 
to  Key  West 

1,827.80 

Total 

8,835 

925.6 

6,562.16 

4,395 

1,060.9 

7,521.78 

Delays  at  15  tons  per  day . 



45 

319.05 

30 

212.70 

Total 

. 

970.6 

6,881.21 

1,090.9 

7,833.48 

Coal  remaining  on  board 

956.8 

476.5 

Saving  in  cost  of  fuel  by 
going  through  the  canal- 

43.385 

42.483 

The  cost  of  sending  the  Oregon  around  the  Horn  from  San  Francisco  to 
Key  West  was  as  f  oUows: 

Coal $.50,266 

Pay  of  officers  and  crew,  rations,  etc 42,411 

Stores  (except  coal  and  ordnance  stores) 4,870 


Total 97,547 

Actual  time  taken  to  make  the  trip  through  the  straits,  sixty -eight  days. 
Average  speed  with  coal  taken  in  San  Francisco,  per  day,  260  knots. 
5162 


48 

Days. 
Time  by  Nicaraguan  Canal  (including  delay  of  three  days  getting  throtigh 

Time  by  Panama  Canal  (including  two  days  delay  getting  through  canal) .  19 

Total  saving  in  time  by  Nicaragua  Canal 51 

Total  saving  in  time  by  Panama  Canal 49 

Note.— The  distance  herein  given  of  965  knots  from  San  Juan  del  Norte 
(Qreytown)  to  Key  West  is  the  shortest  practicable  distance,  while  that  fur- 
nished by  the  Committee  on  Interoceanic  Canals  of  1,055  knots  for  the  same 
route  is  longer  by  reason  of  a  route  being  chosen  which  avoids  all  shoal  water 
and  is  absolutely  safe  for  navigating  battle  ships. 

The  other  witnesses— Professor  Haupt,  Mr.  Cooley,  Captain 
Miller,  Mr.  Noble — and  the  report  of  Lieutenant  Sullivan,  all  sub- 
stantially agree  as  to  these  sailing  distances  by  the  two  routes; 
but  the  foregoing  statement  from  the  Navy  Department  settles 
the  matter  beyond  reasonable  controversy. 

Taking  the  distances  thus  ascertained,  and  one-half  the  coal 
consumption  as  the  ratio  for  a  merchant  steamer  of  5,000  tons, 
and  the  time  saved  at  the  average  of  four  days  on  a  round-trip 
voyage,  and  the  loss  by  the  Panama  route  in  the  item  of  coal  con- 
sumption is  as  follows: 

The  per  diem  coal  consumption  on  a  ship  of  $5,000  tons $37. 61 

For  tour  days,  on  each  round  trip 150.44 

On  five  ships  of  5,000  tons,  each  day  it  is 752.20 

For  a  year  it  is  for  the  single  item  of  coal 274,553.00 

Interest,  insurance,  depreciation,  wages,  and  supplies,  and  in- 
tsrest  and  insurance  on  cargo,  if  they  are  estimated  only  at  an 
eciual  cost,  increases  the  loss  on  five  ships  per  day  to  $1,508.40, 
and  per  annum  to  $550,566,  and  for  ten  years  to  $5,505,660. 

These  estimates  are  on  a  less  tonnage  than  passes  through  the 
Suez  Canal,  and  on  about  one-third  of  the  tonnage  that  passes 
through  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie  Canal  annually. 

Instances  that  prove  these  facts  are  multiplied  in  the  testimony 
of  the  witnesses,  but  these  figures,  taken  from  the  voyage  of  the 
Oregon,  are  a  demonstration,  and  I  prefer  to  adopt  them  as  the 
basis  of  my  verdict. 

THE  LOSS  OF  MONEY  TO  SAILING  SHIPS. 

As  to  the  loss  of  time  on  sailing  ships,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
make  a  calculation  to  compare  these  two  routes,  since  the  advo- 
cates of  the  Panama  route  dismiss  them  from  all  calculations  "as 
unconsidered  trifles."  If  we  should  still  venture  a  plan,  that 
sailing  ships  shall  not  be  destroyed  by  excathedra  declarations  of 
their  enemies,  but  shall  have  at  least  the  opportunity  to  visit  the 
great  oceans  through  Nicaragua,  where  favoring  winds  from  the 
heavens  invite  them  continually,  we  can  support  that  plan  out  of 
the  mouths  of  the  enemies  of  this  great  industry. 

The  subject  has  been  most  carefully  examined  by  that  greatest 
of  the  geographers  of  the  seas,  Mathew  F.  Maury,  who  ranks  as 
a  great  admiral  amongst  all  sailors,  but  was  only  a  lieutenant 
and  chief  of  the  National  Observatory  in  the  old  Navy,  from 
which  he  resigned. 

Under  the  orders  of  the  Government,  this  subject  has  been  care- 
fully reexamined  by  Lieutenant  Sullivan,  and  for  many  years  it 
has  been  under  the  close  observation  of  the  Hydrographic  Office 
of  the  Navy  Department.  The  sailing  directions  of  the  Bureau 
of  Navigation  are  in  evidence  on  the  hearings;  the  testimony  of 
Captain  Bryan,  Captain  Miller,  Commander  Young,  and  others, 
detailing  their  personal  observations,  and  the  report  of  the  Isth- 
6162 


49 


mian  Canal  Commission  show,  beyond  dispute,  that  the  calm  belt 
off  the  Bay  of  Panama  forbids  commerce  to  seek  the  Northern  Pa- 
cific Ocean  through  the  Panama  Canal,  while  the  strong  and  steady 
trade  winds  blow  across  Nicaragua  at  Grey  town  and  Brito,  and 
continue  constantly  and  without  interruption  across  the  Pacific 
to  the  coast  of  China. 

Between  Panama  and  San  Francisco  the  average  loss  of  time 
for  a  sailing  vessel  is  fifteen  days  one  way,  and  frequently  it  is 
more  than  two  months.  Putting  the  loss  of  time  for  a  sailing 
ship  of  5,000  tons  at  one-half  the  sum  it  will  cost  a  steamer,  the 
loss  in  money  for  thirty  days  on  a  round  trip,  or  $75  per  diem,  will 
be  $2,350  on  each  voyage  out  and  in.  What  the  loss  will  be  to 
the  whole  country  through  the  exclusion  of  sailing  ships  from 
the  advantages  of  an  isthmian  canal  I  will  leave  to  the  computa- 
tion of  those  who  have  the  courage  to  face  that  disastrous  sit- 
uation. 

THE  CURVATURE  OP  THE  TWO  ROUTES. 

The  curves  on  the  canal  line  on  the  Nicaragua  route  are  for  the 
much  greater  part  in  the  section  occupied  by  the  San  Juan  River, 
where  the  washing  of  the  canal  banks  by  the  waves  from  vessels 
will  do  no  possible  harm  and  will  constantly  improve  the  channel. 

The  following  statement  from  the  bureau  of  inquiry,  furnished 
by  the  great  navigator.  Rear- Admiral  George  W.  Melville,  utterly 
dissipates  the  contention  that  the  curvatures  of  the  canal  as  lo- 
cated by  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  is  either  dangerous  to 
ships  or  that  they  will  reduce  the  speed  to  a  minimum  rate. 

It  would  seem  very  sad  if  that  Commission  in  their  plan  had 
so  arranged  it  that  the  greatest  ships  could  not  safely  pass 
through  it  with  their  own  steam.  But  the  following  paper  proves 
that  they  have  made  ample  provision  for  even  high  speed: 

Washington,  D.  C,  March  31, 1902. 

Dear  Senator:  Answering  your  letter  about  permissible  speed  of  ships 
around  curves,  I  have  gotten  out  the  following  for  you,  which  with  pleasure 
I  now  transmit: 

A  twin-screw  ship  can,  on  her  own  steam,  round  a  curve  of  any  radius 
down  to  one  of  less  than  her  own  length  by  the  expedient  of  g:oing  ahead 
with  one  screw  and  backing  with  the  other;  her  speed,  meantime,  will  of 
necessity  be  very  small,  or  even  backward,  depending  on  the  relative  speeds 
of  the  two  screws. 

With  both  engines  going  ahead  under  equal  steam,  the  sharpest  turns  that 
can  be  followed  oy  means  of  the  rudder  alone  will  be: 


Name. 


Draft. 


"'JSnT- Speed. 


Ra- 
dius. 


Brooklyn 

Oregon: 

Port  helm... 

Starboard  helm 

Indiana 


Feet. 


Tons. 
9,215 


11,460 
11,460 
10,235 
10,225 


Knots. 


10 


Feet. 
1,113 
1,012 
918 

480 
435 
592 
637 


The  speeds  given  in  the  table  are  those  of  actual  trials.  At  other  speeds 
the  minimum  radius  would  not  be  veiy  different,  and  the  maximum  speed  at 
which  such  a  short  curve  would  be  attempted  would  be  limited  only  by  the 
tendency  of  the  vessel  to  heel  over,  a  limitation  which,  however,  is  never 
approached  in  a  vessel  having  reasonable  stability. 

All  of  the  above  applies  to  the  conditions  on  the  open  sea. 

In  a  canal  the  greatest  permissible  speed,  whether  on  a  curve  or  a  straight 
516 


60 

stretch,  is  determmed  by  the  w^ear  and  t«ar  on  the  banks  from  the  wash  of 
the  waves.  At  a  given  (wave-making)  speed  the  waves  produced  in  the  canal 
are  much  larger  than  on  the  open  sea,  and  their  destructive  action,  even 
when  the  banks  are  protected  by  riprap,  is  such  that  speeds  greater  than  6  or 
7  knots  are  practically  out  of  the  question. 

With  best  wishes  and  respect,  yours,  faithfully, 

GEO.  W.  MELVILLE. 
Hon.  John  T.  Morgan, 

United  States  Senate. 

THE  CLEANSING  OF  SHIPS'  BOTTOMS  IN  ITRESH  WATER. 

As  the  opporttmity  is  now  directly  presented,  and  the  subject 
is  of  much  importance  to  commerce  and  navigation  and  gives  to 
the  Nicaragua  Canal  route  a  prominent  advantage  over  the  Suez 
and  Panama  routes,  I  will  present,  without  argument,  a  paper 
from  Rear- Admiral  Melville,  chief  engineer  of  the  Navy,  relating 
to  the  effect  of  immersion  of  ships  in  fresh  water,  in  clearing 
their  bottoms  of  sea  grass  and  barnacles  after  long  ocean  voyages. 

It  is  a  subject  of  great  importance,  and  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
Nicaragua  Canal  is  the  only  place  where  this  can  be  done  while 
the  ship  is  pursuing  its  voyage.  The  fresh-water  navigation  in 
the  Nicaragua  Canal  extends  for  180  miles,  while  in  the  Panama 
Canal  it  extends  no  more  than  21  miles.  If  it  is  true  that  the  sub- 
mergence of  ships  in  fresh  water  for  a  day  will  kill  these  parasites, 
they  wiU  soon  afterwards  drop  from  the  vessel  while  on  its  voy- 
age, and  the  impediment  to  speed  will  be  removed.  It  is  asserted 
by  Mr.  McDonell,  who  is  a  close  student  of  such  matters,  that  the 
real  work  is  done  in  the  submergence  of  the  vessel  for  twenty- 
four  hours  by  killing  the  parasites. 

It  wiU  be  seen  from  the  following  letter  that  our  naval  authori- 
ties attach  great  importance  to  this  subject  in  respect  of  war 
vessels. 

Mr.  President,  that  is  quite  a  lengthly  letter,  considering  the 
nature  of  the  subject,  but  it  is  so  very  important  that  Admiral 
Melville  has  gone  into  the  subject  for  the  ascertainment  of  his- 
torical facts  and  calculations.  I  shall  not  undertake  to  delay  the 
Senate  by  reading  the  figures,  as  no  Senator  could  pretend  to  re- 
tain them  in  his  mind;  but  the  advantage  of  the  immersion  of  a 
man  of  war,  or,  in  fact,  of  any  steamer  or  any  sailing  ship,  in  the 
fresh  waters  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal  over  a  sailing  distance  of 
180  miles — it  is  all  fresh  water  in  the  Nicaragua  Canal — in  re- 
spect of  the  cleansing  of  the  bottoms  of  ships  of  barnacles,  sea- 
weeds, and  other  Crustacea,  is  one  of  the  most  important  features 
connected  with  the  whole  subject.  It  looks  like  a  small  matter, 
but  still,  when  we  count  the  loss  of  speed  of  ships,  particularly 
battle  ships  and  cruisers,  when  speed  at  times  is  of  such  absolute 
indispensable  necessity,  we  can  save  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  millions  upon  millions  of  dollars  by  passing  those 
ships  through  these  fresh-water  lakes  that  otherwise  would  be  ex- 
pended in  cleaning  the  bottoms  of  ships  in  dockyards,  etc 

The  letter  referred  to  is  as  follows : 

Department  OF  THE  Navy, 

Bureau  of  Steam  Engineering, 

Washington,  D.  C,  March  SI,  1902. 
Dear  Senator  Morgan:  The  efficiency  of  all  vessels  is  greatly  impaired 
by  the  foulness  of  the  ships'  bottoms.  In  the  days  of  sail  the  resulting  loss 
was  not  so  great,  for  the  hulls  of  the  wooden  ships  were  sheathed  and  there- 
fore barnacles  and  graases  did  not  attach  themselves  so  readily  to  the  hull 
Ktructure.  Th(>  sheathing  of  the  modern  war  ship  and  ocean  steamer  is  prac- 
tically impossible,  and  therefore  the  docking  of  vessels  is  necessary  about 
twice  a  year. 
6102 


61 

The  fouling  of  ships'  bottoms  depends  on  the  time  spent  in  cruising,  the 
waters  in  which  the  cruise  is  made,  and  the  service  performed. 

The  loss  of  speed  and  the  corresponding  increase  in  coal  consumjition  due 
from  the  fouling  of  the  hull  are  matters  that  vitally  concern  the  shipowner. 
As  for  men-of-war,  the  subject  is  of  greater  moment,  since  one  of  tne  most 
important  factors  in  determining  tne  usefulness  and  efficiency  of  the  war 
ship  is  the  ciuestion  of  radius  of  action,  or  the  distance  that  the  vessel  is  able 
to  steam  without  coaling. 

The  following  data  will  show  how  seriously  a  foul  hull  will  interfere  with 
the  efficiency  of  the  war  ship.  This  data  ia  taken  from  official  records  and 
has  been  compiled  with  exceeding  care,  since  it  is  necessary  that  the  Depart- 
ment secure  absolutely  correct  information  upon  the  subject. 

Oregon,  10,000  tons  displacement. 

Knots. 

1.  One-half  month  out  of  dock,  speed 11.42 

2.  Two  and  a  half  months  later,  having  been  under  way  at  a  speed  of 

11  or  12  knots  almost  continuously  (three  months  out  of  dock) 11. 17 

3.  Three  months  later,  having  been  on  blockade  and  in  tropical  waters 

three  months  (six  monthsout  of  dock) 9.6 

The  same  horsepower,  practically,  was  developed  and  the  same  conditions 
obtained  in  all  three  of  these  runs. 

The  loss  of  speed,  then,  in  two  and  a  half  months,  with  th6  vessel  under 
way  almost  continuously,  was  0.25  knots,  while  after  three  months  more, 
with  the  vessel  on  blockade  and  in  tropical  waters,  the  loss  of  speed  was  1.5 
knots. 

Philadelphia,  k,325  tons  displacevient. 

Knots. 

1 .  With  half  power,  clean  bottom  (If  months  out  of  dock) 13. 22 

2.  Same  power,  3  months  later,  after  having  been  under  way  about  half 

the  time  (4i  months  out  of  dock) 11.9 

Three-quarter  power,  6  months  later,  after  lying  in  the  harbor  of 

Honolulu  G  months  (10^  monthsout  of  dock) 10.19 

These  results  can  not  be  compared  as  well  as  the  ones  for  the  Oregon,  but 
the  speed  of  10.19  knots  made  with  three-quarter  power  compared  with  13.22 
knots  made  with  half  power  shows  a  loss  of  speed  equivalent  to  3.5  knots  had 
the  powers  been  the  same. 

Detroit,  2,000  tons  displacement. 

Knots. 

1.  On  half  power,  clean  bottom 10.28 

2.  After  lying  4}  months  in  a  tropical  harbor 7.95 

Same  power  for  both  runs. 

Nashville,  1,871  tons  displacement. 

Knots. 

1.  With  clean  bottom  made 10.28 

2.  With  seven  months'  cruising  in  the  Philippines,  same  power 8. 46 

Celtic,  collier,  6,1^8  tons  displacement. 

Knots. 

1.  One-half  month  out  of  dock;  trip,  Sydney  to  Manila 10.4 

2.  Six  months  out  of  dock,  Manila  to  Sydney 9.4 

Same  power  for  both  runs. 

Hannibal,  collier,  h,291  tons  displacement. 

Knots. 

1.  With  clean  bottom,  Hampton  Roads  to  Ponce,  P.  R 10.00 

2.  One  and  six-tenths  months  later,  Ponce  to  Hampton  Roads,  same 

power 8.82 

These  results  cover  a  wide  range  of  conditions.  The  second  run  of  the 
Oregon  shows  the  least  loss  of  speed  (0.25),  the  vessel  having  been  under  way 
at  a  comparatively  high  sustained  speed.  The  greatest  loss  of  speed  is  shown 
in  the  case  of  the  Philadelphia^  third  run,  when  the  loss  of  speed  was  Over  3 
knots,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  three-quarters  power  was  used  on  the 
third  run  and  only  half  power  on  the  first  run.  (Loss  would  have  been  3.5 
knots  with  the  same  power. )  Under  average  conditions  of  cruisings  vessels 
with  a  sustained  speed  of  9  to  11  knots  lose  1  to  3  knots  after  six  months  out 
of  dock.  The  loss  is  very  much  greater  than  this  with  vessels  lying  in  trop- 
ical ports  for  a  considerable  length  of  time,  and  less  if  cruising  continuously. 
If  a  vessel  is  immersed  in  fresh  water,  the  effect  is  to  clean  the  bottom  of 
barnacles  and  sea  grasses  to  some  extent.  The  following  data  shows  a  com- 
parison of  performances  of  sevei-al  vessels  before  and  after  having  been  in 


52 

tresh.  water,  and  their  performance  with  clean  bottoms.    The  conditions  and 
power  developed  were  pi'actically  the  same  for  each  set  of  results: 

Monterey. 

Knots. 

With  clean  bottom  made ..      10.00 

With  foul  bottom  (dust  before  entermg  the  Columbia  River) 9. 00 

Af tei'  leaving  the  Columbia  River,  having  been  in  fi-esh  water  for  44 

days - 9.73 

Monadnock. 

With  clean  bottom  made 9-5 

With  foul  bottom  (just  before  entering  the  Columbia  River).., 7.88 

After  leaving  the  Columbia  River,  having  been  in  fresh  water  for  14  days    9. 01 

Scorpion. 

This  vessel  was  in  the  Mississippi  River  for  ffty -seven  da-ys.  Data  for  ac- 
curate comparisons  could  not  be  obtained,  as  the  runs  before  entering  the 
river  and  after  leaving  it  were  under  such  different  conditions  that  compari- 
sons were  impossible.  However,  the  vessel  was  eight  and  one-half  months  out 
of  dock  on  entering  the  river,  and  after  leaving  made  11.49  knots  on  power 
that  would  have  given  11.6  to  11.7  knots  had  the  bottom  been  clean.  Un- 
doubtedly her  condition  was  greatly  improved. 

These  results  show  that  when  vessels  with  foul  bottoms  are  immersed  in 
fresh  water  for  a  considerable  length  of  time  the  condition  of  the  hull  is 
greatly  improved,  from  two-thirds  to  three-fourths  of  the  loss  of  speed  being 
recovered. 

Thfijeaet^time,  spent  in  fresh  water  by  any  of  these  ships  was  fourteen 
davs.  "  -  _ 

Unfortunately  there  is  no  data  available  for  shorter  peri6'ds,~and  I  regret 
that  I  am  unable  to  give  you  any  information  as  to  the  effect  of  time  on  the 
cleansing  of  ships  immersed  in  fresh  water. 

Yours,  truly,  GEO.  W.  MELVILLE, 

Engineer  in  Chief,  U.  8.  Navy. 

Hon.  John  T.  Morgan, 

United  States  Senate,  Washington,  D.  C. 

CLIMATE,  TEMPEBATUBB,  AND  HEALTH  OF  THE  MIDWAY  STATIONS  AROUND 
THE  WORLD. 

If  this  advantage  meets  the  anxious  expectations  of  our  naval 
officers  and  commercial  navigators  and  dry  docks  are  constructed 
in  Lake  Nicaragua  they  will  add  immensely 'to  the  sea  power  of 
the  United  States  and  will,  with  other  attractive  features  of  the 
climate  and  the  productions  and  the  sea  air  blowing  across  that 
country  make  the  Nicaragua  Canal  route  so  attractive  to  naviga- 
tors that  those  who  control  that  canal  route  need  not  fear  compe- 
tition with  the  Suez  Canal  and  the  Red  Sea,  which  is  the  hottest 
region  of  the  world  accessible  to  ships.  As  the  midway  station 
of  the  equatorial  zone  of  navigation  around  the  world,  one  of  the 
m.ost  useful  features  will  be  the  docks  for  cleaning  and  repairing 
vessels,  while  the  ships'  companies  will  find  rest  and  refreshment 
after  long  voyages.  It  is  the  only  way  station  where  such  facili- 
ties can  be  found  grouped  together.  They  are  far  too  important 
to  be  lightly  considered. 

PAGE  103  OE  THE  REPORT. 

I  will  now  close  this  outline  statement  of  this  great  subject  with 
an  inquiry  that  is  not  intended  as  a  criticism,  but  is  intended  to 
point  out  the  fact  that  the  statements  on  page  103  of  the  final  re- 
port of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  which  the  hunger  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Company  provoked  them  to  snap  up  as  if  it  had 
been  prepared  as  a  bait,  was  not  considered  or  prepared  by  that 
commission  with  any  such  purpose.  It  was  evidently  prepared 
only  to  satisfy  Congress  that  the  offer  of  the  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany to  sell  its  concessions  and  their  belongings  for  $109,000,000 
was  too  exorbitant,  and  to  dismiss  that  subject  from  further 
consideration. 

That  commission  had  no  authority  tmder  the  law  to  make  or  to 
accept  any  offer  of  purchase  or  sale  connected  with  the  canal,  and 
5162 


53 

they  repeatedly  so  informed  M.  Hntin,  who  was  the  general 
manager  of  the  Panama  Canal  Company. 

Even  the  President  of  the  United  States  had  not  the  authority 
to  make  or  accept  any  such  offer,  under  the  statute.  His  express 
duty  was  to  recommend  a  route  for  the  acceptance  of  Congress, 
after  he  had  employed  the  commission  in  ascertaining  the  facts 
relating  to  the  practical  question,  not  the  diplomatic  or  political 
question,  of  the  practicability  and  feasibility  of  the  respective 
routes  and  the  material  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  both 
routes. 

It  was  the  sole  and  exclusive  duty  of  the  President  to  determine 
which  route  he  would  recommend  to  the  acceptance  of  Congress. 
In  perf omiing  that  duty  he  would  necessarily  obtain  light  from 
sources  that  were  closed  against  the  examination  of  the  Commis- 
sion and  even  of  Congress,  unless  he  chose  to  invite  Congress  into 
his  confidence  as  the  diplomatic  head  of  the  Government  under 
the  Constitution. 

The  shrewd  traders  of  the  Panama  Canal  Company  having 
failed  for  five  years  to  involve  the  United  States  in  the  partial  joint 
ownership  of  a  property  that  was  already  wrecked  ^^  y|^ino  or./! 
(#f^iTiife^^'^^<^  ^^  rharartfir.  they  found,  on  page  lu^  or  tne  reportTDf 
our  Commission,  a  bed  on  which  its  fall  could  be  broken,  and  they 
suddenly  dropped  their  price  for  the  wreck  all  the  dizzy  distance 
from  $109,000,000  to  $40,000,000.  The  fall  was  so  startling  as  to 
shock  all  observers,  but  the  agile  performers  discovered  the  safety 
net  and  leaped  for  it.  It  was  a  desperate  leap,  but  they  had  faith 
in  the  reputed  American  fondness  for  glittering  temptations  in 
the  way  of  bargains.  It  rests  with  Congress  to  say  whether  they 
have  made  any  serious  miscalculation. 

If  we  would  be  magnanimous  to  those  who  are  performing  this 
apparent  act  of  felo  de  se,  let  us  lend  them  the  money,  with  Co- 
lombia as  security,  and  let  them  proceed  with  their  costly  experi- 
ment. If  we  are  ready  to  accept  the  inviting  bargain,  at  the 
expense  of  their  suffering  and  apparent  loss,  let  us  play  true  to 
the  character  and  price  the  property  at  the  sum  that  it  would  cost 
us  to  reproduce  it. 

When  we  have  paid  Colombia  for  the  privilege  of  buying  the 
canal  and  the  railroad  stock,  we  will  abandon  the  role  of  shrewd 
and  heartless  dealers,  to  which  character  we  will  be  forever 
doomed  in  the  estimation  of  the  French  people,  whatever  else  we 
may  do,  and  when  we  pay  a  percentage  of  $10  on  each  share 
for  the  railroad  stock,  the  par  value  of  which  is  $100,  we  will  be 
written  down  as  dolts.  And  so,  when  we  pay  $2,000,000  for  maps, 
the  useful  parts  of  which  have  been  thrust  upon  us  as  a  donation— 
if  we  pay  $2,000,000  premium  on  the  maps  under  the  head  of 
"  contingencies,"  we  will  lose  our  reputation  for  shrewd  dealing, 
and  will  be  classed  as  veiy  common  and  foolish  i>eople  who  ao 
not  know  what  to  do  with  their  money. 

REASONS  FOR  AN  EXCHANGE  OF  MAPS. 

If  the  inducements  for  cheap  bargains  are  to  be  a  feature  of  the 
trade,  it  would  be  well  to  offer  them  in  exchange  for  their  maps 
our  Nicaragua  maps,  that  represent  to  us  a  cost  of  at  least  $2,000,- 
000.  They  could  be  kept  for  a  time  of  need;  which  time  will 
surely  arrive  when  the  railroads,  or  the  men  who  are  to  get  the 
$40,000,000,  shall  take  up  Lull's  or  Menocal's  plan  and  build  a 
cheap  slack- water  canal  for  $65,000,000,  in  combination  with 
Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua. 

5162 


54 

Our  owners  of  sailing  ships  conld  afford  to  build  snch  a  canal 
for  the  accommodation  of  our  coastwise  trade.  Such  an  enter- 
prise is  no  more  than  Great  Britain  accomplished  with  the  Suez 
Canal,  after  using  all  its  powers  short  of  war  to  defeat  its  con- 
struction. 

That  this  subject  is  in  the  minds  of  the  persons  connected  with 
the  Panama  Canal,  is  manifest  from  the  statement  of  General 
Abbott  in  his  deposition,  on  pages  838-840. 

What  our  situation  would  be  with  a  canal  between  our  coast 
and  the  Panama  Canal  when  completed  by  the  United  States  is 
a  subject  worthy  the  attention  of  thoughtful  men.  How  we 
could  prevent  such  a  situation,  under  the  recognized  right  of 
Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua  to  build  a  canal  with  money  borrowed 
in  trans-oceanic  countries  or  in  South  America  or  in  Mexico  and 
Cuba  is  a  problem  that  will  demand  solution  whenever  we  build 
the  Panama  Canal,  600  miles  away  from  our  coasts. 

WHY  THE  ESTIMATES  ON  PAGES  101  AND  103  WERE  MADE. 

It  is  evident  from  the  report  of  the  Commissioners,  on  pages 
101-103,  that  the  inventory  of  the  assets  of  the  Panama  Canal 
and  the  railroad  stock  and  its  appraisement  was  intended  to  con- 
vince Congress  that  the  actual  value  of  it  to  the  United  States, 
even  when  swollen  by  30  per  cent  of  contingencies,  was  far  below 
the  estimate  of  $109,000,000  put  on  the  property  by  the  French 
appraisement.  That  appraisement  is  $19,000,000  greater  than  the 
estimate  of  M.  Hutin,  made  to  President  McKinley  in  the  letter 
of  January  18, 1899,  addressed  to  him  by  Mr.  Cromwell,  general 
attorney  for  the  Panama  Canal  Company. 

M.  Hutin  must  have  had  some  strong  encouragement  in  Amer- 
ica for  thus  raising  the  price  of  this  property  from  $90,000,000,  in 
January,  1899,  to  $109,000,000  in  November,  1900.  It  must  have 
been  this  that  stimulated  him  to  attack  the  Isthmian  Canal  Com- 
mission, and  especially  Admiral  Walker,  for  misleading  him, 
which  M.  Hutin  did  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of 
State,  dated  November  22,  1901.  In  this  letter  M.  Hutin  exhibits 
petulance  and  resentment  because  his  estimates  were  rejected 
without  discussion,  and  without  the  acceptance  of  an  arbitration 
proposed  by  him  to  ascertain  these  values,  for  the  want  of  au- 
thority to  agree  t(i  it. 

He  demanded  that  Admiral  Walker  should  print  their  cori'e- 
spondence  in  his  official  report  to  the  President,  which  was  done, 
without  any  good  reason,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  M.  Hutin 
has  suppressed  Admiral  Walker's  letters  of  October  22,  1901,  to 
him,  which  utterly  destroyed  the  ground  of  his  complaint  to  the 
President,  through  his  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  State.  (See  Re- 
port No.  1,  Fifty-seventh  Congress,  p.  127.)  This  company  has 
not  been  able  to  forget  the  large  sums  paid  to  its  American  com- 
mittee by  the  old  company  for  influence,  or  that  it  succeeded  in 
tempting  a  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  quit  the  Cabinet  and  become 
its  agent  and  promoter,  on  a  salary  of  $25,000  per  annum,  and 
the  audacity  of  the  company  is  correspondingly  aggressive. 

■WHY  THE    SUPPOSED  COMMITTAL,,  ON   PAGE   103,  WAS    SEIZED   UPON  AS  AN 
OFFER  OF  PUUCHASB. 

When  M.  Hutin  had  delivered  this  Parthian  arrow  at  Admiral 
Walker  and  returned  to  Paris,  the  Hepburn  bill  passed  the  Hou^e 
of  Representatives  by  a  vote  wanting  only  two  votes  of  unanim- 
ity, and  General  Abbott  says  a  panic  ensued  in  the  Panama  Com- 
pany. 


55 

M.  Hutin  was  deposed  and  M.  Bo  was  elected  general  manager 
of  the  Panama  Canal  Company.  The  price  of  the  property  was 
dropped  to  the  $40,000,000  mark,  assumed  to  have  been  prepared 
as  an  offer  of  purchase,  by  the  report  of  the  Commission  on  page 
103.  Sixty-nine  millions  of  property  values  was  thrown  away  in 
the  "panic,"  and  the  wheels  of  justice  in  the  French  courts  re- 
volved rapidly  to  anticipate  results  and  to  confirm  the  acceptance 
of  the  proposed  agreements  before  they  were  made  or  accepted 
by  anybody,  which  provisional  arrangements  the  ocean  cable  was 
taxed  to  send  to  Washington. 

Hot  haste  was  winged  with  lightning  to  stop  the  Senate  from 
passing  the  bill  which  had  just  passed  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives. The  innocent  and  loose  estimates  of  page  103  of  the  report 
of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  was  identified  by  M.  Bo  by 
reference  to  a  single  page  of  that  report,  when  the  estimate  in- 
cluded two  pages,  and  was  seized  upon  by  telegram  as  a  solemn 
offer  of  the  Government  to  pay  money  for  property  valued  at  a 
fixed  price,  which  cash  value  was  increased  |4,942,038  by  the  ad- 
dition of  contingencies. 

And  Congress  is  now  asked  to  appropriate  this  sum  to  meet  the 
contingency,  that  our  Commission  had  really  undervalued  the 
property  in  their  report  of  its  actual  value  made  to  the  President. 
If  we  accept  it,  we  do  so  as  a  glittering  success  in  making  a  bar- 
gain for  property  that  our  Commission  had  greatly  undervalued. 
If  we  accept  what  the  Commission  say,  and  what  the  proof  shows 
to  be  true,  we  can  not  do  this  on  account  of  any  just  regard  for 
the  men  who  are  trying  to  save  themselves  at  the  expense  of  many 
thousands  of  innocent  people,  who  have  been  grossly  defrauded 
by  them. 

WHAT  THE  PACTS  STATED  IN  THE  REPORT  ACTUALLY  SHOW. 

The  report  shows  the  actual  value  of  the  work  done  in  its  pres- 
ent condition.  It  is  all  excavation  and  embankment,  capable  of 
being  estimated  in  cubic  yards  at  current  prices  for  labor,  and 
there  is  no  other  sort  of  work,  so  that  the  calculation  is  simple 
and  no  room  is  left  for  contingencies.  This  sum  allowed  for  contin- 
gencies is  only  less  than  the  whole  difference  in  the  cost  of  the 
canals  by  the  sum  of  $291,361,  as  the  same  is  estimated  by  the 
Commissioners. 

On  page  103  of  their  report  the  Commissioners  say: 

The  concession  is  of  no  value  to  the  United  States  since  a  new  one  must  be 
obtained  from  the  Colombian  Government  in  any  event.  It  is  the  same  with 
the  lands,  title  to  which  is  dependent  upon  the  completion  of  the  canal,  and 
is  still  to  be  earned. 

Much  of  the  property  is  ill  adapted  to  American  methods,  and  all  of  it  is 
now  from  thirteen  to  twenty  years  old,  during  which  period  the  imjjrove- 
' '         ■  m 


ments  of  this  class  of  machinery  have  been  such  that  contractors  would  gen- 
ally  find  it  to  their  advantage  to  buy  entirelv  new  machinery  of  modern 
ittern,  rather  than  attempt  to  use  this  of  an  older  class,  even  if  it  was  given 


The  same  is  true  of  the  greater  part  of  the  buildines,  including  all  bar- 
racks, storehouses,  shops,  stable3,  and  miscellaneous  buildings,  and  excepting 
only  hospitals  and  prin9ipal  administration  buildings.  The  latter  would  be 
the  subject  of  special  negotiation.  They  have  appeared  in  the  estimate 
under  the  head  of  contingencies.    No  special  allowance  is  made  for  them. 

All  this  means  that  the  canal  machinery  and  the  buildings,  ex- 
cept the  hospitals  and  principal  administration  buildings,  are  of 
no  value  to  the  United  States,  and  that  those  that  are  of  value  are 
included  under  the  estimates  for  contingencies.  Therefore  these 
excepted  buildings  are  to  be  paid  for  at  the  sum  of  $4,579,005, 
with  10  per  cent  on  that,  §457,900,  making  a  total  for  houses, 


56 

$5,036,905.  This  10  per  cent  is  said  to  be  '*  omissions,"  but  there 
are  no  omissions  of  articles  to  be  purchased,  for  on  page  101  there 
are  11  classes  of  articles  of  wliich  a  full  description,  by  items,  is 
given  in  an  "  inventory  furnished  to  the  Commission." 

Under  the  statement  of  the  value  of  the  property  made  by 
the  Commission,  the  value  of  canal  excavation  is  $21,920,386. 
The  value  of  houses  is  $5,036,905.  The  value  of  maps  is  $2,000,000. 
The  value  of  railroad  stock  is  $6,850,000.  Total,  $35,807,291. 
Here  is  a  gap  of  $4,192,709  to  be  filled  by  Chagres  diversion, 
$178,187;  Gatun  diversion,  $1,396,456;  railroad  diversion,  $300,- 
000;  total,  $1,874,642,  leaving  $2,318,067,  for  which  there  is 
nothing  to  answer  but  a  bonus  or  placebo.  With  $2,000,000  for 
maps  and  $2,318,067  for  bonus,  we  have  $4,318,067  in  this  $40,000,- 
000  for  which  we  have  nothing  of  value  to  show. 

This  is  more  than  half  the  sum  that  Nicaragua  asks  for  per- 
petual and  exclusive  canal  rights  and  privileges  through  the 
heart  of  her  country.  In  any  light  in  which  these  estimates  can 
be  viewed  they  can  not  be  justly  regarded  as  fixing  the  actual 
cash  value  of  the  property.  They  were  never  intended  as  such, 
and  Congress,  if  it  appropriates  this  money,  should  find  a  more 
solid  basis  for  the  appropriation  than  this  loose  and  conjectural 
estimate,  made  to  show  the  exorbitant  price  set  upon  it  in  the  in- 
definite and  incomplete  offer  of  M.  Hutin. 

If  our  Commission  is  to  have  credit  for  high  diplomatic  ability 
in  driving  a  good  bargain  with  the  failing  Panama  Canal  Com- 
pany, their  estimates  of  the  value  of  the  property  they  purchase, 
as  stated  by  them  in  detail,  should  come  nearer  to  a  balance  with 
the  round  sum  of  $40,000,000  than  the  sum  of  $4,818,067,  which 
is  their  nearest  approximation  to  a  balance,  and  when  this  dif- 
ference is  taken  into  account  in  estimating  the  actual  cost  of 
completing  the  Panama  Canal  as  compared  with  the  cost  of  the 
Nicaragua  Canal,  it  reduces  the  difference  to  $1,312,637. 

And  it  is  for  this  sum  we  are  asked  to  yield  all  tolls  forever 
from  sailing  vessels,  half  the  competition  of  the  canal  with  the 
transcontinental  railways,  600  miles  of  shorter  lines  for  our  war- 
ships, more  than  100  miles  of  voyage  in  fresh  water  for  ships  that 
are  fouled  with  sea  travel,  and  the  speed  gained  by  them  by  im- 
mersion in  the  river  and  Lake  Nicaragua.  And  we  tax  sailing 
ships  with  10,000  miles  of  sea  voyage  through  cold  and  dangerous 
seas  around  Cape  Horn,  and  steamships  with  a  loss  of  four  days 
on  a  round  trip  between  our  Atlantic  ports,  at  a  cost  of  $150  per 
day  on  a  5,000-ton  ship.  For  this  we  compel  the  wheat  growers 
and  lumbermen  of  the  great  Pacific  slope  to  cross  the  Pacific  to 
find  the  markets  of  Europe,  instead  of  the  markets  of  our  Gulf 
and  Atlantic  States. 

When  we  have  concluded  this  brilliant  bargain  we  shall  find, 
like  poor  Richard,  that  we  have  paid  too  dear  for  our  whistle. 

THE  COST  OF  MAINTENANCE  AND  OPERATION  OF  THE  CANALS. 

I  will  allude  to  the  expenses  charged  to  the  respective  routes  for 
operating  expenses  and  the  maintenance  of  way,  to  add  only  a 
few  observations  that  need  to  be  made. 

Under  this  head  there  are  no  items  given  in  the  report  of  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  as  to  which  a  computation  can  be 
made  in  order  to  test  the  accuracy  of  their  estimates,  or  the  cost 
of  maintaining  and  operating  any  other  canal  as  an  approximate 
criterion. 

6162 


67 


The  cost  of  maintenance,  -per  mile,  of  the  Suez  Canal  is  $13,000; 
of  the  Kiel  Canal,  $8,600,  and  of  the  St.  Marys  Canal  from  $46,000 
to  $60,000  per  mile. 

The  St.  Marys  Canal  is  only  1^  miles  long  and  has  all  the  ad- 
vantages of  concentration.  At  the  rate  of  $1  per  ton,  its  income 
during  the  eight  months  it  is  open  during  the  year  would  be 
more  than  $30,000,000.  It  is  the  force  employed  in  handling  the 
traffic  in  the  open  months  that  costs  so  heavily. 

The  basis  of  these  estimates  was  discussed  by  the  Commission, 
but  it  was  not  given  in  their  final  report,  because  it  was  not 
agreed  upon.  It  was  produced  by  Colonel  Ernst,  on  his  exami- 
nation, and  is  found  in  his  deposition  on  pages  687  to  698  of  the 
hearings. 

The  scheme  of  government  is  elaborate,  even  grand,  and  is 
quite  ample  in  officials  and  salaries  for  the  government  of  a 
commonwealth.  It  consists  of  a  supreme  board  of  control,  at 
Washington,  and  an  engineering  department.  A,  with  a  governor 
at  a  salary  of  $15,000,  and  the  other  salaries  are  correspondingly 
high  for  five  other  departments. 

The  risk  of  life  in  the  climate  of  Panama  may  excuse  this  ex- 
travagance for  that  canal,  but  it  is  without  justification  for  Nica- 
ragua. The  following  summary  of  these  items  will  show  the 
great  magnitude  of  this  plan: 

THE  BAIiABIBS  OP  FIVE  MEMBERS  OP   THE  SUPREME  BOARD  OP  CONTROIj 
AND  THEIR  SUBORDINATES  IS  NOT  GIVEN. 

Annual  cost  of  maintenance  of  both  canals. 

ANNUAL  COST  OP  MAINTENANCE, 
NICARAGUA  CANAL. 

Salaries,  etc . ,  of  governor . .  $39, 300 
Engineering  dei)artnient,  A: 

268  employees 187,780 

Plant 397,400 

Supplies lOO.noO 

li  per  cent  depreciation  620, 532 


Total 1,305,713 


Transit  department,  B: 

390  employees 

Plant 


846,160 
320,500 


Total. 


Medical  department,  C: 

84  employees 

•  glaunclies 

Supplies 


Total 

Finance  department,  D: 

15  employees 

Supplies 

Total 

Law  department,  E: 

13  employees 

Suppues 

Total 


666,660 


70,980 
5,000 
50,000 

125,980 


27,200 
500 

27,700 


18,200 
500 

18,700 


ANNUAL  COST  OP  MAINTENANCE, 
PANAMA  CANAL. 

Salaries,  etc.,  governor $39, 000 

Engineering  department,  A: 

170  employees 128,640 

Plant 211,600 

Supplies 50,000 

7i  per  cent  depreciation  407, 373 


Total. 


797,613 


Transit  department,  B: 

158  employees 142,840 

Plant 150,000 

Supplies  for  locks 9, 000 

Lignte  on  locks 4,500 

Maintenance  of  railroad  45,000 


Total. 


851,840 


Medical  department,  C: 

74  employees 

2  launches 

Supplies 


64,880. 

5,000 

85,000 


Total. 

Finance  department,  D: 
14emT' 
Supplies" 


104,860 


26,800 
500 


Total 

Law  deiMirtment,  E: 

8  employees 

Supplies 


27,300 


14,800 
500 


Total. 


15,800 


6162 


58 


Annual  cost  of  maintenance  of  both  ca?ia?s— Continued. 


NICARAGUA  cANAL—continued. 

Police  department,  F: 

443  employees $600,800 

30  horses,  at  S250 7,500 

Supreme     control     in 
XJnited  States 100,000 


Total. 


608,300 


PANAMA  CANAL— continued. 

Police  department,  F: 

213  employees $241,100 

40  horses,  at  $250 10, 000 

General      expense      in 
United  States 100,000 


Total. 


351,100 


Grandtotal 3,350,000  Grandtotal 2,024,174 

The  law  department  at  Panama  is  put  at  $15,300,  for  providing 
the  legal  regimen  for  35,000  resident  people,  while  it  is  put  at 
18.700  at  Nicaragua,  where  not  more  than  2,000  people  now  reside. 

The  police  department  is  put  at  $251 ,100  at  Panama,  where  there 
are  35,000  unruly  people  to  control,  and  at  $508,300  at  Nicaragua, 
to  control  a  scattered  population  of  2,000,  quite  orderly  and  peace- 
able people. 

The  finance  department  is  put  at  $27,700  at  Nicaragua,  and 
$27,300  at  Panama.  The  amount  of  money  to  be  received  in  tolls 
is  supposed  to  be  the  cause  of  this  discrimination  against  Nicara- 
gua of  $400  in  the  expenses. 

The  medical  department  is  made  to  cost  $125,000  at  Nicaragua, 
in  a  healthy  country,  and  13  medical  officers,  6  stewards,  36 
nurses,  and  18  laborers  are  provided,  while  the  total  cost  of  the 
medical  department  at  Panama  is  $104,860,  with  7  medical  offi- 
cers, 3  stewards,  12  nurses,  and  6  laborers  at  emergency  hospitals, 
and  5  medical  officers,  2  stewards,  20  nurses,  and  10  laborers  at 
the  regular  hospital.  The  difference  of  $20,620  per  annum  is 
made  in  favor  of  Panama,  where  the  pestilential  character  of  that 
region  is  described  as  "  fever  hole  "  by  General  Alexander,  and  is 
known  of  all  men  to  be  a  region  where  the  yellow  fever  and  chagres 
fever  have  their  habitat,  from  which  they  are  never  absent.  It 
is  so  in  each  of  the  departments  of  this  proposed  government, 
which  seems  to  have  been  created  to  form  a  basis  for  the  calcu- 
lation of  maintaining  an  isthmian  canal  and  then  retired  from 
observation  for  future  use. 

THIS  STATELY  PROGRAM  FOR  WORKING  A  CANAL,  AS  IF  IT  WAS  A  KINGDOM, 
IS  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  THESE   TREMENDOUS  ESTIMATES  OF  EXPENSES. 

It  is  in  this  programme  that  the  idea  had  its  origin  that  $2,024,174 
was  required  for  maintenance  and  operation  of  the  canal  at  Pan- 
ama, and  that  $3,350,822  is  required  for  the  canal  at  Nicaragua. 
The  difference  of  $1,326,664  is  ample  to  operate  either  canal,  if  we 
accept  the  experience  at  the  Suez  Canal,  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie 
Canal,  or  any  other  canal  between  great  bodies  of  water. 

It  is  impossible  to  know  or  safely  to  conjecture  by  what  rule 
or  principle  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  fixed  the  charges  of 
maintenance  and  operation  of  the  canal  at  Nicaragua  or  com- 
pared them  with  those  of  the  Panama  Canal.  For  engineering, 
police,  sanitation,  and  general  contingencies  their  estimate  of  the 
cost  of  construction  of  the  canal  is  $31,644,010.  This  evidently 
includes  all  the  plant  that  is  needed  for  these  purposes,  and  for 
a  canal  completed  and  equipped.  Then  they  add  other  sums  for 
plant,  for  the  maintenance  of  all  the  canal  purposes,  for  keep- 
ing the  canal  in  good  order,  and  for  vessels  and  other  appliances 
aeeded  for  such  service. 

The  contingencies  charged  to  the  Nicaragua  Canal  are  $558,470 
in  this  plan  of  government,  and  those  charged  to  the  Panama 
Canal  are  $337,362,  a  difference  of  $221,118  annually,  while  the 


59 

steam  tugs,  insi)ection  steamers,  dredge^,  pile  drivers,  tugs,  scows, 
pilot  boats,  naphtha  launches,  canoes,  and  saddle  horses,  which  in 
their  nature  can  not  be  reasonably  expected  to  be  resupplied  each 
year,  are  charged  at  full  cost,  which  is  very  great,  for  each  year^ 
as  if  they  would  all  disappear  after  a  single  year  of  service. 

These  estimates,  which  are  far  too  extravagant  and  are  so 
loosely  made,  and  these  salaries  and  pay  rolls,  which  are  very  ex- 
pensive, account  in  great  part  for  the  charge  of  §3,350,832  to  the 
Nicaragua  Canal  for  maintenance  and  operation,  when  the  Chief 
of  the  Bureau  of  Statistics,  in  December,  1900,  said  in  an  official 
bulletin  of  that  date: 

There  are  no  locks  on  the  Suez  Canal,  but  the  channel  is  throngh  drifting 
sand  for  a  ^reat  part  of  its  length.  The  entrance  to  the  harbor  or  Port  Said, 
on  the  Mediteri*anean,  intercepts  the  drift  of  sand  discharged  from  the  Nile 
and  carried  along  the  coast  by  the  easterly  current.  The  navigation  in 
which  steamships  can  make  full  speed  if  they  chose  is  longer  than  the  entire 
length  of  the  Suez  Canal.  The  line  of  canalization  on  land  at  Nicaragua  is 
53.^  miles,  only  about  half  that  of  the  Suez  Canal,  and  only  6  miles  longer 
than  the  Panama  Canal,  all  of  which  is  artificial  canal. 

Suez  has  100  miles  of  navigation  through  an  ailificial  channel,  and  Panama 
has  47  miles,  while  Nicaragua  has  63  miles  of  artificial  channel  and  120  miles 
of  river  and  lake  navigation  in  which  there  are  no  locks.  On  this  state 
of  facts  it  is  impossible  that  any  reason  can  be  stated  why  it  should  require 
$18,310per  mile  to  maintain  183 miles  of  canal,  of  which  only  G3  miles  isof  actual 
canalization,  when  the  cost  per  mUe  of  the  Suez  Canal  is  $13,000,  and  that 
canal  is  dug  entirely  through  the  desert  sands,  which  blow  into  it  and  make 
constant  di'edging  necessary  to  keep  it  open. 

That  is  the  official  statement  of  your  Government,  which  Imocks 
the  estimate  of  the  canal  commissioners  into  dust.  Nobody  is 
responsible  for  that  but  your  Government. 

It  is  beyond  all  reason  and  experience  that  the  more  than  100 
miles  of  deep  water  on  the  route  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal,  where 
there  is  no  lock  and  where  a  dredge  will  never  be  used,  should  be 
charged  annually  with  $1,741,400  for  cost  of  maintenance  and 
operation.  It  is  on  this  absurd  conjecture  that  this  erroneous 
calculation  has  been  made.  When  this  sum  of  $1,741,400  is  sub- 
tracted from  the  estimate  of  $3,850,822,  made  by  the  commis- 
iioners,  it  still  leaves  $1,611,492  to  be  applied  to  maintenance  aiid 
operation,  which  is  still  more  than  is  expended  annually  on  the 
Suez  Canal  for  those  purposes  by  the  sum  of  $811,422,  which  is 
more  than  the  estimates  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  for 
operating  and  taking  care  of  the  locks,  with  20  per  cent  added 
for  contingencies. 

The  uncertainty  of  the  situation  as  to  the  cost  of  maintenance 
and  operation  of  the  canal,  created  by  this  effort  to  fabricate  a 
great  and  expensive  system  for  its  government  and  control,  has 
introduced  into  this  subject  an  element  of  doubt  and  confusion  of 
a  serious  character. 

It  would  not  have  existed  if  the  commissioners, -at  the  time  they 
made  this  report,  had  been  confronted  with  the  $40,000,000  propo- 
sition of  the  Panama  Canal  Company.  They  then  had  no  doubt 
that  this  company  was  acting  sincerely  in  the  statement  that 
$109,000,000  was  the  sum,  below  which,  they  would  not  sell  the 
ditch,  the  maps,  and  the  railroad  stock,  with  the  right,  without 
objection  from  them,  to  purchase  new  concessions  from  Colombia; 
and  they  had  no  special  reasons  for  closely  estimating  the  cost  of 
maintaining  and  operating  the  canal,  as  to  which  there  must 
always  be  a  margin  of  doubt. 

The  effort  was  made,  on  a  plan  of  great  amplitude,  to  institute 
a  very  costly  government  for  the  canal,  but  it  failed  in  committee 

5163 


60 

and  was  not  sent  to  the  President  with  their  report,  and  it  is  this 
abortive  scheme  that  is  now  presented  as  the  estimate  of  great 
engineers,  carefully  made,  as  to  the  difference  of  the  cost  of  main- 
tainance  and  operation  as  between  the  two  routes. 

The  number  and  salaries  of  the  official  corps,  the  cost  of  the 
plant,  to  be  renewed,  annually,  and  the  contingencies,  have  no 
actual  relation  to  the  experience  of  governments  in  respect  of 
other  canals.  They  are  arbitrary  suggestions,  and  are  not  calcu- 
lations based  on  facts  that  are  even  alluded  to  as  supporting  the 
plan. 

The  following  statements  in  the  deposition  of  Colonel  Ei-nst 
sufficiently  explain  this  situation: 

The  Chairman.  About  what  is  the  population  of  Panama? 

Colonel  Ernst.  About  20,000, 1  think. 

The  Chairman.  And  about  how  much  in  Colon? 

Colonel  Ernst.  About  five  or  six  thousand. 

The  Chairman.  Is  there  any  considerable  number  of  French  citizens  or 
people  located  in  Panama  or  Colon  permanently? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Well,  I  fancy  not.  Of  course,  most  of  the  people  that  we 
saw  were  French.  They  were  the  oflBcers  of  the  canal  company,  but  I  do  not 
think  there  are  many  outside  of  those  officials. 

The  Chairman.  Are  there  many  French  residents  in  that  part  of  the 
country,  in  those  cities? 

Colonel  Ernst.  I  did  not  see  any. 

The  Chairman.  In  the  sanitation  that  is  necessary  on  the  Panama  route, 
would  you  feel  that  it  was  safe  without  including  the  city  of  Panama  and  the 
city  of  Colon? 

Colonel  Ernst.  No;  I  can  not  say  that  I  think  it  would  be  safe. 

The  Chairman.  How  far  is  the  city  of  Panama  from  the  line  of  the  canal 
as  it  is  dredged  from  the  bay  there? 

Colonel  Ernst.  It  is  about  3  miles. 

The  Chairman.  That  would  be  included  in  the  canal  limits,  if  they  were 
3  miles  wide? 

Colonel  Ernst.  I  certainly  would  prefer  that  they  should  beincluded. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  not  think  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to 
include  it  in  order  to  preserve  the  sanitation,  or  whatever  results  might  come 
from  sanitation,  on  the  Panama  route? 

Colonel  Ernst.  I  think  the  result  would  undoubtedly  be  better  with  it.  It 
is  a  question  of  degree.  You  certainly  could  not  have  the  same  sanitary 
state  there  without  that  city  as  you  can  with  it. 

The  Chairman.  That  would  apply  equally  well  to  Colon? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Yes;  but  Colon  is  neai-ly  all  owned  by  the  Panama  Railroad 
Company,  and  if  you  buy  that  you  buy  the  city. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  I  think  that  is  a  legal  question.  Suppose,  however, 
that  we  bought  it  and  got  the  title  to  all  the  property  that  had  passed  through 
the  hands  of  the  railroad  company  and  under  concessions  from  Colombia,  it 
would  be  still  necessary  to  have  the  control  of  it  in  order  to  accomplish  this 
sanitary  purpose? 

Colonel  Ernst.  I  think  so. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  it  would  be  also  necessary  to  have  the  control  of  it 
for  police  purposes? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  What  sort  of  a  population  Is  there  at  Colon  and  at 
Panama? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Well,  I  could  not  say  that  it  was  a  very  high  order  of  pop- 
ulation. I  did  not  come  into  very  close  personal  contact  with  it.  I  would 
say,  however,  that-  they  were  a  rather  low  order  of  people,  a  great  many  of 
them.    Of  course  there  are  some  respectable  people  there. 

The  Chairman.  A  very  mixed  population? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  They  are  a  turbulent  people,  too,  are  they  not? 

Colonel  Ernst.  I  would  say  they  are;  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Hard  to  manage? 

Colonel  Ernst.  They  are  fighting  and  quarreling  all  the  time;  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  And  they  are  insui-rectionary? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  We  have  had  several  occasions  when  we  have  had  to  send 
ships  of  war  down  there  with  marines  aboard  in  order  to  preserve  the  peace 
and  save  the  property  that  the  French  people  have  got  on  that  Isthmus,  and 
also  to  protect  and  guarantee  the  sovereignty  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia 
over  the  State  of  Panama.    That  is  in  our  treaty. 

Colonel  Ernst.  Yes. 
5102 


61 

-  The  Chairman.  Now,  in  making  up  your  estimate  of  the  maintenance  of 
the  Panama  Canal,  the  current  expenses  of  maintenance  and  preservation  and 
protection,  etc.,  I  suppose  you  took  all  of  those  elements  into  consideration? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  include  the  sanitation  and  the  i)olice  control  of 
the  city  of  Panama,  with  20,000  inhabitants? 

Colonel  Ernbt.  We  did  not  in  terms.  The  way  we  did  that  was  to  drav 
up  an  organization  for  the  management  of  the  canal,  a  separate  board  of 
control  here  in  this  country  consisting  of  5  members,  a  governor  on  the 
Isthmxis  with  his  staff  and  ofRce,  and  then  provide  for  6  departments,  the 
engineering  department,  with  all  its  various  assistants  and  appliances  and 
the  material  required;  the  transit  department,  having  charge  or  the  regula- 
tion of  duos  and  the  transit  and  management  of  all  pilots  and  all  that  sort  of 
thing,  and  the  light-houses;  the  medical  department,  charged  with  the  quar- 
antine regulations,  the  general  hospitals,  and  the  hospital  supphes,  the  sub- 
ordinate hospitals,  and  sanitary  inspection;  the  police  dei)artment,  and  a 
law  department,  and  a  finance  department. 

We  had  all  those  worked  out  in  detail,  and  the  medical  department  was 
charged  mainly  with  the  hospitals  and  subhospitals  and  the  sanitary  inspec- 
tion and  the  quarantine  service.  Now,  we  allowed  a  force  necessary  for  tnat, 
without  taking  into  account  any  great  city. 

The  Chairman.  You  took  into  account  the  men  who  were  connected  with 
the  operation  of  the  canal? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  And  the  railroad? 

Colonel  Ernst.  And  the  railroad.  The  general  hospitals,  which  would  be 
some  Uttle  way  off,  probably,  from  the  canal. 

The  Chairman.  But  you  made  your  estimate  on  the  number  of  men  that 
would  probably  be  employed  in  the  nayigati(»x  and  management  of  tine  ciuial 
and  railroad? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  You  did  not  include  in  it  the  citizenship  of  these  cities? 

Colonel  Ernst.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Could  you  name  here  the  appendix  that  contains  those 
estimates?    We  have  been  very  much  at  a  loss  to  nnd  out  about  them. 

Colonel  Ernst.  We  did  not  publish  those,  because  it  is  purely  theoretical; 
we  felt  that  we  could  not  defend  every  estimate  of  it.  We  felt  that  there 
were  errors  both  ways.  You  can  conceive  of  the  difficulty  of  getting  up  of 
such  an  organization  at  a  desk  for  a  great  work  like  that,  which  must  actu- 
ally be  tested  and  corrected  in  practice.  I  mean  it  must  be  adjusted.  There 
are  many  of  those  items  that  we  felt  would  err,  some  on  one  side  and  some 
on  the  other,  and  we  thought  that  they  would  correct  each  other;  but  doing 
it  the  same  for  both  lines,  we  thought  it  was  a  fair  comjxarison. 

The  Chairman.  You  made  a  comparison  in  your  own  minds,  based  unon 
facts  that  you  yourselves  had  observed  on  the  line  or  had  learned  from  other 
sources,  but  you  did  not  make  up  an  itemized  statement  and  balance  sheet 
between  the  cost  of  maintenance  on  the  one  route  and  the  other? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Oh,  yes;  we  went  through  this  organization  for  both  canals. 
Of  course  the  Nicaragua  Canal  had  the  same  general  control.  The  govern- 
ing board  in  this  country  woxtW  be  the  same  as  for  the  Panama  and  also  the 
governor  and  his  staff  on  the  Isthmus  would  be  the  same  and  the  chiefs  of 
these  departments  would  all  be  the  same.  Now.  when  it  came  to  the  num- 
ber of  posts  you  would  have  to  have  for  police  force,  there  would  be  more 
on  the  Nicaragua  than  on  the  Panama,  We  would  have  to  have  more 
engineering  divisions. 

The  Chairman.  What  I  want  to  get  at  is  whether  the  items  were  put  down 
on  the  list. 

Colonel  Ernst.  Oh,  I  have  got  them  all,  and  I  would  be  very  glad  to  show 
them  to  you.  I  have  not  got  them  here  to-day,  but  I  can  bring  them  if  you 
wish  to  see  them. 

The  Chairman.  They  were  not  published? 

Colonel  Ernst.  No. 

The  Chairman.  I  would  be  very  glad  if  you  will  furnish  us  with  them, 
because  wo  have  had  a  great  difficulty  in  getting  at  the  items  of  the  estimate. 

Colonel  Ernst.  It  is  one  of  those  things  that  we  are  perfectly  aware  is 
open  to  attack,  because  they  are  approximations,  but  they  are  identical  for 
the  two  linos. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  furnish  them  to  us? 

Colonel  Ernst.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Then  I  will  not  go  any  further  into  that  question. 

Additional  statement  of  CJol.  Oswald  H.  Emst: 
The  Chairman.  Did  you  get  the  pai)er  I  refeired  to? 
Colonel  Ernst.  Yes;  here  it  is. 

The  Chairman.  I  would  like  very  much  to  have  this  go  mto  the  record. 
It  may  become  very  important  if  the  canal  should  be  built. 
5102 


62 

Colonel  Ernst.  It  is  very  carefully  gotten  up.  The  reason  we  did  not  pub- 
lish it  is  because  there  are  undoubtedly  errors  in  it.  Estimates  are  too  nigh 
in  some  respects  and  too  low  in  others.  We  thought  they  would  correct  each 
other.  The  comparison,  however,  is  a  fair  one.  It  is  the  same  for  both 
canals.  It  is  a  study  to  which  we  devoted  a  good  many  weeks.  It  is  as 
follows: 

Tkntativb  Organization  for  the  Maintenance  and  Operation  of 
THE  Canals. 

I.  NICARAGUA  CANAL. 

Supreme  control  to  rest  in  a  board  of  five  members,  located  in  Washing- 
ton.   The  duties  of  the  board  will  be: 

1.  To  make  regulations  for  the  government  of  the  canal,  including  the 
tariff  of  charges,  navigation  rules,  police  and  sanitary  rules,  and,  in  short, 
all  rules  required  for  the  operation  and  maintenance  of  the  canal. 

2.  To  make  or  approve  all  appointments,  the  salary  of  which  equals  or  ex- 
ceeds $100  per  month. 

3.  To  make  or  approve  all  contracts. 

4.  To  audit  all  money  accounts  before  transmitting  them  to  the  Treasury 
Department. 

The  annual  expenses  of  the  board  may  be  placed  at  $100,000. 

Organization  on  the  Isthmus.— The  general  control  to  be  vested  in  a  gov- 
ernor, having  his  headquarters  at  Greytown,  where  the  genei-al  offices  will 
be  located. 

The  administration  will  be  divided  among  six  departments,  viz: 

A.  Engineer  department,  charged  with  all  the  maintenance  and  improve- 
ment of  the  canal,  including  the  repair  shops  and  storehouses,  and  the 
repairs  of  public  buildings;  also  with  the  location  and  sale  or  rental  of  lands. 

B.  Transit  department,  charged  with  the  navigation  of  the  canal,  the  as- 
sessment of  dues,  the  service  of  the  ports,  including  light-houses,  and  the 
operation  of  telegraph  and  telephone  lines. 

C.  Medical  department,  charged  with  the  hospital  and  other  medical 
service,  including  port,  quarantine,  and  sanitary  inspection  service. 

D.  Finance  department,  charged  with  the  collestion  of  dues,  payment  of 
salaries,  and  management  of  the  funds. 

E.  Law  department,  charged  with  the  supervision  of  such  minor  courts 
as  may  be  esteblished  and  with  all  legal  matters. 

P.  Police  department,  charged  with  the  preservation  of  order  and  with 
the  management  of  the  armed  force  required  for  that  purpose. 

The  governor.— The  governor  will  issue  orders  to  the  heads  of  departments, 
will  make  reports  to  the  board  of  control,  and  conduct  all  correspondence 
with  that  board,  and  will  make  frequent  inspection  of  all  parts  of  the  canal. 
Attached  to  his  office  will  be  a  secretary,  two  clerks,  two  messengers,  and 
one  small  inspection  steamer,  the  latter  to  be  available  for  other  officials 
when  not  required  by  the  governor. 

Annual  expense  of  governor's  office. 
Salaries: 

Governor $15,000 

Secretary 5,000 

Clerks,  2  at  $1,500 3,000 

Messengers,  2  at  $400 8(X) 

Impection  steamer 15,G(X) 

Office  supplies 500 

Total 39,300 

A  board  of  five  members  in  Washington,  for  the  government 
of  the  Philippine  Islands,  with  salaries  corresponding  with  those 
of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  of  $60,000  a  month,  would  be 
quite  as  safe  and  useful,  as  this  proposed  board  would  be  for  the 
government  of  an  isthmian  canal  and,  probably,  more  expedi- 
tious in  getting  through  with  their  work. 

No  salaries  are  named  for  this  supreme  board  of  control,  and 
the  only  precedent  we  have  on  that  point  is  that  it  would  cost 
not  less  than  $60,000  each  year. 

The  estimated  contingencies  of  $558,470  for  the  Nicaragua  route 
and  $337,362  for  the  Panama  route,  in  all  $895,832.  included  in  the 
cost  of  this  plan  of  canal  government,  would  safely  cover  the  es- 
timate of  $60,000  and  provide  living  salaries  for  the  five  mem- 
bers of  the  board  of  supreme  control,  and  still  leave  enough  to 

fi.C2 


63 

pay  the  salary  of  the  governor,  at  $15,000  per  annnm,  and  his  offi- 
cial staff,  and  for  a  steamer  for  their  use,  which  is  summed  up  at 
$39,300  per  annum.  The  total  annual  expense  of  the  supreme 
board  of  control  and  of  the  governor's  executive  department  is 
not  to  be  less  than  $783,000  in  the  plan  proposed  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  canal.  This  plan,  although  it  was  not  adopted,  is  the 
actual  basis  of  computation  of  the  cost  of  the  maintenance  and 
operation  of  this  canal. 

Yet  it  is  no  hazardous  venture  to  assert  that,  with  a  good, 
honest,  industrious,  and  reliable  engineer  at  the  head  of  the  en- 
terprise, this  array  of  salaried  officials  could  be  dispensed  \vith 
far  more  safely  than  they  could  be  employed  in  the  conduct  of 
the  work. 

It  has  required  the  estimates  that  were  made  for  this  novel, 
extravagant,  and  dangerous  plan  of  canal  government  to  support 
the  estimates  of  the  commission  for  the  maintenance  and  opera- 
tion of  these  canals,  which  have  no  support  in  the  actual  experi- 
ence of  any  other  canal  in  the  world. 

An  argument  against  the  Nicaragua  Canal  based  on  such  esti- 
mates has  no  just  support  in  fact  and  no  sanction  in  the  history 
of  any  other  canal. 

Mr.  President,  I  have  not  attempted  to  discuss  a  single  question 
that  I  have  presented  upon  the  mere  weight  of  the  conflicting 
testimony.  As  to  many  of  the  matters  there  is  not  one  particle 
of  conflict.  The  very  leading  issues  upon  which  I  plant  myself 
in  this  case  and  upon  which  the  majority  of  the  committee  plant 
themselves  are  sustained  by  proofs  against  which  there  is  no  ob- 
jection and  about  which  there  is  no  controversy. 

At  the  expense  of  very  great  personal  risk  and  labor,  and  doubt- 
less at  the  expense  of  the  patience  of  the  Senate,  possibly  of  the 
country,  I  have  undertaken  to  present  those  leading  issues  and  the 
facts  that  sustain  them  absolutely  and  without  controversy,  for 
the  consideration  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  in  giving  to 
the  majority  of  the  committee  that  support  of  tmth  and  justice 
in  their  action  in  this  great  case  which  is  due  to  the  occasion  and 
to  their  own  character  and  to  the  country  we  serve  and  to  the 
prosperity  we  are  trying  to  advance.  I  am  grateful ,  indeed ,  to  the 
Senate  for  having  permitted  me  to  stand  this  long  time  on  my  feet, 
even  in  the  absence  of  many  Senators,  and  trust  that  those  who 
were  away  will  take  occasion,  when  it  suits  them  to  do  so,  to  read 
what  I  have  had  to  say. 

Appendix  1. 
List  of  sailing  vessels  over  S50  tons  built  in  1901  in  the  United  States. 


Name. 


A.P.Coates 

A.  "W.  Thompson. 

Acme 

Ada  F.Brown 

Adelaid  Barbour , 

Advent 

Apena 

Alumna 

Alvena 

Amaranth 

Annie , 

6162 


Ton- 
nage. 


716 
2,279 

3,388 

1,450 

!,»«> 

431 

970 

696 

772 

1,109 

613 


Builder  and  where  built. 


Geo.  H.  Hitchings,  Hoguiam,  Wash. 
American   Shipbuilding  Co.,   West  Bay 

City,  Mich. 
Arthur  So  wall  &  Co.,  Bath,  Me. 
Chaa.  V.  Minott,  Phippsburg,  Me. 
W.  S.  Currier  &  Co.,  Newbursrport,  Mass. 
North  Bend  MiU  Co., North  Bond,Oreg. 
Hall  Bro's.  Shipyard,  Port  Blakoley ,  Wash. 
North  Bend  Infill  Co.,  North  Bend,Orefr. 
Bendixen  Shipbuilding  Co.,Faii'haven,Cal. 
Mathew  Turner,  Benicia,  Cal. 
Carleton, Norwood  &  Co.,Rockport,Me. 


64 


List  of  sailing  vessels  over 

S50  tons  built  in  1001  in  the  United  States— QonV A. 

Name. 

Ton- 
nage, 

Builder  and  where  built. 

2,207 

1,211 

2,792 

777 

1,576 

522 

620 

723 

1,281 

821 

682 

1,263 

881 

352 

1,476 

613 

726 

998 

847 

730 

861 

1,778 

1,149 

1,664 

1,274 

1,2.53 

1,808 

929 

955, 

679 

1,067 

955 

371 

1,492 

955 

738 

1,247 

955 

548 

2,178 

1,833 

1,579 

679 

1,589 

312 

1,120 

905 

2,374 

677 

789 

703 

2,556 

389 

955 

481 

955 

2,279 

l,5a5 
588 
955 
584 
405 
675 
633 
1,763 
1.169 

H.  M.  Bean,  Camden,  Me. 

Aurora                 

Everett  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Everett,  Wash. 

Baker  Palmer 

Welt's  Shipyard,  Waldoboro,  Me. 

Balboa 

Hairs  Shipyard,  Port  Blakeley ,  Wash. 

Cardenas    -  

Kelley,  Spear  &  Co., Bath, Me. 

Clias  H.Clinke 

Palmer's  Shipyard,  Noank,  Conn. 

Clias.  S.Hirsch 

Kelley,  Spear  &  Co., Bath, Me. 
Bendixsen   Shipbuilding  Co.,  Fairhaven, 

Chehalis 

Cordelia  E.  Hayes 

Cal. 
Percy  &  Small,  Bath,  Me. 
Marshfield,  Oreg. 

E.B.Jackson      .  .     .. 

Liindstrom's  Yard,  Aberdeen,  Wash. 

Edith  G  Folwell 

New  England  Co. ,  Bath,  Me. 
Lindstrom's  Yard,  Aberdeen,  Wash. 

Emily  I.  White     

E.  J.  White,  Machias,  Me. 

Francis  C.  Tunnel 

Frederick  W.  Day 

Gamble    

Warren  Sawyer,  Millbridge,  Me. 
Kelley,  Spear  &  Co.,  Bath,  Me. 
Hall's  Shipyard,  Port  Blakeley,  Wash. 
Bendixsen  S.  B.  Co.,  Fairfaxen,  Cal. 

Georgina 

Henry  B.  Fiske 

George  A.  Gilchrist,  Belfast,  Me. 
New  England  Co  Bath,  Me. 

J.  C.  Strawbridge 

Jacob  M  Haslceil 

H.  N.  Bean,  Camden,  Me. 

Cobb,  Butler  &  Co.,  Rockland,  Me. 

Moran  Bros.  Co.,  Seattle,  Wash. 

James  Tuft 

Henry  K.  Hall,  Port  Blakeley,  Wash. 
Washburn  Bros.,  Thomaston,  Me. 

Joseph  G.Ray 

James  W.  Paul,  jr 

Kenwood.. 

Kimberton 

McKay  &  Dix,  Verona,  Me. 
Wm.  McKie,  East  Boston,  Mass. 
Palmer's  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Noank,  Conn, 
Hay  «fe  Wright,  Alameda,  Cal. 

Kona 

Lahaina          

Oakland,  Cal. 

Langhorn.. 

Palmer's  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Noank,  Conn. 
Sawyer  Bros.,  Milbridge,  Me. 
Thomaston,  Mo. 

L.  Herbert  Taft 

Logan 

Palmer's  Shipyard,  Noank,  Conn. 

Geo.  H.  Hitchings,  Hoquiam.  Wash. 

Gardner  G.  Deering,  Bath,  Me. 

Palmer's  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Noank,  Conn. 

Leesburg,  N.  J. 

Percy  &  Small,  Bath,  Me. 

Gardner  G.  Deering,  Bath,  Me. 

Malcolm  B.  Seavey 

Manheim 

Marie  F.  Cummings 

Martha  P.  Small 

Mary  F.  Barrett 

Matanzas 

Kelley,  Spear  &  Co.,  Bath,  Me, 
Hay  &  Wright,  Alameda,  Cal, 
Parcy  &  Small,  Bath,  Me. 

Miles  M.  Merry 

Newport 

Kelley,  Spear  &  Co.,  Bath,  Me. 

Harlan  «fe  Hollongsworth  Co.,  Wilmington. 

R.  M.  Spedden  Co.,  Baltimore,  Md. 

Parcy  &  Small,  Bath,  Me. 

New  England  Co.,  Bath,  Me. 

White's  Shipyard,  Everett,  Wash. 

Bethel,  Del. 

No.  6 

No.  21 

Oakley  C.  Curtis 

Orlando  V.  Wooten 

OteUa  Pedersen 

R.  J.  Camp 

Rebecca  Palmer 

Cobb,  Butler  &  Co.,  Rockland,  Me. 

Robert  Donaldson 

Robesonia 

E.James  TuU,  Pocomoke  City,  Md. 
Palmer  Shipbuilding' Co.,  Noank,  Conn. 
Kelley  Spear  &  Co.,  Bath,  Me. 
R.  Palmer  &  Sons,  Noank,  Conn. 

Rockland 

Rutherford 

S.  D.  Warriner 

American   Shipbuilding  Co.,    West   Bay 

City,  Mich. 
Kelley,  Spear  &  Co.,  Bath,  Me. 
Copi)er  &  Saurhof,Sharpstown,Md, 
Palmer  Shipbuilding  Co., Noank, Conn. 

Sagua 

Saliie  C.  Marvil 

Saucon 

Savannah 

David  Clark,  Kennebunkport,  Me. 
C.  V.  Minott,  Phippsburg,  Me. 
Hall  Brothers,  Port  Blakely,  Wash. 
New  England  Co.,  Bath,  Me. 
Palmer's  Shipyard,  Noank,  Conn. 
P.  W,  Stone,  San  Francisco,  Cal. 

Seguin 

Sophia  Christensen 

Springfield  . 

Trevorton 

W.H.Marston 

65 


List  of  sailing  vessels  over  250  tons  built  in  1001  in  the  United  States — Cont'd. 


Name. 


Builders  and  where  built. 


W.  J.  Patterson 

Watson  A.  West.... 

Weir 

Wempe  Brothers... 

Whitman 

Wm.  F.  Garms 

Wm.  H.  Yerkes  .... 
William  P.  Frye.... 

Total  tonnage 


Lindstrom's  yard,  Aberdeen,  Wash. 

Do. 
Kelley  Spear  &  Co.,  Bath,  Me. 
Lindstrom's  yard,  Aberdeen,  Wash. 
Kelley  Spear  &  C;o.,  Bath,  Me. 
White  Shipyard,  Everett,  Wash. 
Washburn  Brothers,  Thomaston,  Me. 
Arthur  Sewall  &  Co.,  Bath,  Me. 


Appendix  2. 
List  of  new  American  steamers  of  over  250  tons  capacity  built  in  1901. 


.  Name. 


Acme 

Alvina 

Apache 

Arapohe , 

Ai'ctic 

Argo 

Bound  Brook 

Buckman 

Cape  May 

Cai-tegena 

Carlisle 

Charles  S.Nefr 

Chas.  R.  Spencer. . . 

Chicago 

Chicago 

Christopher 

City  of  Rockland.. 
City  of  St.  Joseph  . 
City  of  Trenton  ... 

Colonel 

Cuba 

David  M.  Whitney 

Denver 

ElDia 

ElSiglo 

ElValle 

Esperanza  

F.B.Jones 

F.T.Heffleflnger  .. 
Frederick  B.  Wells 
G.A.Flagg 

George  Gar  butt ... 
George  W.  Peavey 

George  W.  Thomas 
Gilchrist 

5162- 6 


416 
526 

8,378 

3,878 

392 

1,089 

1,016 

1,820 
714 

1,532 
644 


474 
3,195 
1,334 
4,260 
1,696 

691 


3,879 

594 
4,626 

4,549 


4,616 
4,605 
4,702 

324 

4,807 
4,897 
8,062 

'442 
4,997 


8,871 


Builder  and  where  built. 


Not  known. 

Harlan  &  HoUings worth  Co.,  Wilmington, 

Del. 
Wm.  Cramp  &   Sons   Ship   and   Engine 

Building  Co.,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Do. 
H.  R.  Reed,  Bay  City,  Oreg. 
Craig  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Toledo,  Ohio. 
Harlan  &  Hollingsworth  Co.,  Wilmington, 

Del. 
Craig  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Toledo.  Ohio., 
Harlan  &  Boilings  worth  Co.,  Wilmington, 

Del. 
James  Davidson,  West  Bay  City,  Mich. 
Neafie  &  Levy  Ship  and  Engine  Building 

Co. ,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Jenks  Shipbuilding  Co.  .Port  Huron,  Mich. 
E.  W.  Spencer,  Portland,  Oreg. 
Buffalo  Dry  Dock  Co. ,  Buffalo,  N.  Y. 
Buries  Dry  Dock  Co., Port  Richmond. 
Superior  Shipbuilding  Co.,  West  Superior. 
Wm.  McKie,  Boston.  Mass. 
Alexander  Stewai't,  St.  Joseph,  Mo. 
Neafle  &  Levy  Ship  and  Engine  Building 

Co.,  Philadelphia. 
Detroit    Shipbuilding    Co.,    Wyandotte, 

Mich. 
Bath  Iron  Works,  Bath,  Me. 
Detroit    Shipbuildiag    Co.,    Wyandotte, 

Mich. 
Harlan  Ss  Hollingsworth Co.,  Wilmington, 

Del. 
Newport  News  Ship  and  Engine  Building 

Co.,  Newport  News,  Va. 
Do. 
Do. 
Wm.  Cramp  &   Sons   Ship   and   Engine 

Building  Co.,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Taiuas  Ellington,  Portland,  Oreg. 
Chicago  Shipbuilding  Co.  Chicago,  111. 

Do. 
Superior  Shipbuilding  Co.,  West  Superior, 

Wis. 
Thomas  W.  Gar  butt,  Wright,  Ga. 
American   Shipbuilding  Co.,   Cleveland, 

Ohio. 
E.  J.  Howard,  Jeffersonville,  Ind. 
American   Shipbixilding  Co.,  West  Bay 

City,  Mich. 


List  of  new  American  steamers  of  over  250  tons  capacity  built  in  1901— ConVd. 


Name. 


Ton- 
nage. 


Builder  and  where  built. 


GoldDust 

Hampton 

Harry  B.  Hollins 

Hawaiian 

Hawalei 

Henry  Steinbrenner . 


Hugoma  ..., 

Illinois 

International . . . 

Irociuois 

J.S. 

John  B.Collins.. 
John  English ... 
John  F,  Carroll. 


John  J.  Albright . . 

John  S.  Tompkins. 

Jupiter 

Kennebeck  

Lake  Shore 


Lakeside.. 
Lakewood 


Louise 

Lyra. 

M.F.Henderson. 

Majestic 

Marion 

Mars 


Marshfleld 

Mary  C.  Elphicke . 

Mauch  Chunk 

Meggido 

Meteor 

Mills 

Mineola 

Minne  tonka 


Monterey 


Morning  Star 

Neptune 

New  Shoreham 

New  York  Central,  No.  6. 
Notth  Beach 


Northwestern . 

Northman 

North  Star  .... 

Northtown 

Northwestern. 

Oregonian 

Orion 

Ossian  Bedell . . 
Pathfinder 


Patience 

Pennsylvania. 


Pere  Marquette 

Puritan 

Randolph  S.  Warner  '.. 


Batum... 
5102 


430 

580 

1,019 

5,597 

660 

4,719 


403 
590 

1,169 
292 
325 

1,022 
510 

4,805 

593 
3,719 
2,183 
3,781 

450 
1,016 

335 

4,417 
534 
657 
262 

3,748 


4,998 
4,499 

250 
2,301 
2,525 

295 
5,270 

4,702 


3,717 
503 
453 
833 

2,157 
2,157 
3,195 
2,157 
2,157 
6,597 
1,736 
296 
2,792 


394 

2,775 
1,547 
3,062 

8,717 


E.  J.  Howard,  Jeffersonville,  Ind. 

Lewis  Nixon,  Elizabethport,  N.  J. 

T.  S.  Marvel  &  Co.,  Newburg,  N.  Y. 

Roach  Shipyard,  Chester,  Pa. 

John  W.  Dickey,  Alameda,  Cal. 

Jenkins  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Port    Huron, 

Mich. 
DetroitShipbuildingCo.,Wyandotte,Mich. 
Quincv,  111. 

John  Slarr,  "West  Haven,  Conn. 
Craig  Shipbuilding  Co..  Toledo,  Ohio. 
E.J.  Howard,  Jeffersonville,  Ind. 
A.  C.  Brown  &  Sons,  Tottenville,  N.  Y. 
T.  S.  Marvel  &  Co.,  Newburgh,  N.  Y. 
Rodermond's  Shipyard,  Tompkins  Cove, 

N.  Y. 
American   Shipbuilding   Co.,   Cleveland, 

Ohio. 
Mound  City,  111. 

American  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Lorain,  Ohio 
Jenks  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Port  Huron,  Mich! 
American   Shipbuilding   Co.,    West   Bay 

City,  Mich. 
Craig  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Toledo,  Ohio. 
Harlan  Sz  HolUngs worth  Co.,  Wilmington, 

Del. 
A.  D.  Stevens,  Jacksonville,  Fla. 
Maryland  Steel  Co.,  Sparrow  Point,  Md. 
J.  H.  Johnson,  Portland,  Oreg. 
E.  J.  Heath,  Everett,  Wash. 
Wilmington,  Del. 
Detroit    Shipbuilding    Co.,    Wyandotte, 

Mich. 
Mai*shfield,  Ore^. 

Chicago  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 
Union  Dry  Dock  Co.,  Buffalo,  N.  Y. 
M.  J.  Godfrey,  Lyons,  Ohio. 
Craig  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Toledo,  Ohio. 
Maryland:  Steel  Co.,  Sparrow  Point,  Md. 
Port  Clyde  Marine  Ways,  Port  Clyde,  Me. 
American    Shipbuilding  Co.,   Cleveland, 

Ohio. 
Wm.  Cramp  &   Sons,   Ship  and  Engine 

Building  Co.,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
E.  J.  Howard,  Jeffersonville,  Ind. 
American  Shipbuilding  Co..  Lorain,  Ohio. 
Wm.  McKie,  East  Boston,  Mass. 
Burlee  Dry  Dock  Co.,  Port  Richmond,  N.Y. 
Townsend  &  Downey,  Shooters  Island, 

N.Y. 
Chicago  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

Do. 
Roach's  Shipyard,  Chester,  Pa. 
Chicago  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Chicago,  HI. 

Do. 
Roach's  Shipyard,  Chester,  Pa. 
George  Johnson,  Green  Bay,  Wis. 
Buffalo  Dry  Dock  Co.,  Buffalo,  N.  Y. 
Harlan  &  HoUingsworth  Co.,  Wilmington, 

Del. 
John  H.  Dialogue,  Camden,  N.  J. 
American   Shipbuilding   Co.,   Cleveland, 

Ohio. 
Do. 
Craig  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Toledo,  Ohio. 
Superior  Shipbuilding  Co.,  West  Sui>erior, 

American  Shipbuilding  Co.,  Lorain,  Ohio. 


67 


List  of  new  American  steamers  over  S50  tons  capacity  built  in  1901— ConVd. 


Name. 


Builder  and  where  built. 


Springfield 

Standard 

Tamalpais. 

Thomas  Patton 

Two  States 

Uranus 

Valetta 

Venus 

W.  H.  Paringle , 

Walter  Scranton . . . 

Watson 

West  Point 

WillH.Isom 

William  L.  Brown.. 
Williams.  Mack.... 

Yozemite 

Zulia 

Total  tonnage 


The  Pusoy  &  Jones  Co.,  Wilmington,  Del. 
Burlee  Dry  Dock  Co.,  Port  Richmond,  N.Y, 
Union  Iron  Works,  San  Francisco,  Cal. 
T.  S.  Marvel  &  Co.,  Newburg,  N.  Y. 
John  M.  Graham,  Savannah,  Ga. 
Detroit    Shipbuilding    Co.,   Wyandotte, 

Mich. 
W.  D.  Delaney,  Benecia,  Cal. 
American  Shipbuilding  Co.,  LoraiiL,  Ohio. 
Louis  Pacquet, Pasco,  Wash. 
American    Shipbuilding    Co.,  Cleveland, 

Ohio. 
Craig  Shipbuilding  Co., Toledo, Ohio. 
T.  S.  Marvel  &  Co., Newbiirg,  N.  Y. 
Thomas  Dunbar,  Ballard,  Wash. 
Chicago  Shipbuilding  Co., Chicago, 111. 
American  Shipbuilding  Co., Lorain, Ohio. 
Detroit  Shipbuildin  g  Co . ,  Wyandotte,  Mich . 
Neafle  «fe  Levy  Ship  and  Engine  Building 

Co.,  Philadelphia. 


O 


^"^ 


